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An Anatomy of Conflict Resolution in Africa’s Civil Conflicts 
 
George Klay Kieh, Jr. 
 
Abstract 
The crises of the post-colonial state in Africa have led to civil wars in various African states. In 
several of these war affected countries, the state has disintegrated and occasioned myriad 
adverse consequences, including deaths, injuries, the mass displacement of people, and the 
collapse of the systems of governance. Against this background, this article examines the 
methods that have been used to terminate civil wars in Africa, and to set into motion the 
processes of peacebuilding.  The article argues that in order to build durable peace in Africa’s 
post-conflict societies, the post-colonial state needs to be democratically reconstituted.   
 
Introduction 
The euphoria that greeted the dawn of independence in Africa was quickly turned into 
nightmare in various states, as the contradictions and crises generated by the neo-colonial state 
plunged these states into civil wars. As the post-independence era unfolded, more African states 
became engulfed in civil wars. By the end of the 20th century, the continent had experienced 27 
civil wars and their associated negative effects, including the death of thousands of innocent 
civilians, mass displacements both in terms of the refugee crisis and the internal displacement 
conundrum, the breakdown of political governance, and serious social and economic costs 
(Nyanduga 2004; Bariagaber 2006; Arnold 2007). 
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Although most of the civil wars that engulfed various states across the continent have 
ended, the one in Somalia, which began in 1988, continues to rage. Also, the high hopes for 
peace that greeted the Nairobi Peace Accord that ended the Sudanese civil war, the longest in 
Africa, in 2005, were dampened by the eruption of a genocidal civil war in the country’s Darfur 
region (de Waal 2006; Natsios 2008). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite the end 
of the country’s third civil war since independence in 1960, post-conflict peacebuilding efforts 
are experiencing serious stress as, for example, the eastern portion of the country remains under 
the control of various warlordist militias (Thom 1999; Paddon 2010). 
What methods have been, and are being used to help resolve Africa’s civil wars, and 
what have been the attendant outcomes? What steps have been, and are being pursued to resolve 
the underlying conflicts and to build durable peace in post-conflict states? And how can durable 
peace be established in Africa? This article seeks to address these three interrelated questions. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
The study employs two major terms—conflict resolution and its attendant derivative 
peace—as the centerpieces of its conceptual framework. By conflict resolution, I am referring to 
the use of a broad array of “problem solving” approaches that seeks to identify the causal factors 
behind a conflict, and then search for ways of dealing with them. It entails addressing such issues 
as the institutional structure of society; the making of significant socioeconomic, political and 
other changes that would restructure society in a more just and inclusive way (Spangler 2005, 1). 
Drawing from the works of Cortright (2008, 6-7) and Howard (1971, 225), peace is 
conceptualized as “the desirable end product of the conflict resolution process that attempts to 
establish and maintain an orderly and just society protective against violence, and the 
An Anatomy of Conflict Resolution 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 2 
279  
exploitation of less powerful groups by more powerful ones, and seeks to transcend the 
conditions that limit human potential.” In essence, “peace is more than the absence of war” 
(Cortright, 6).  
 
Resolving Africa’s Civil Wars 
Background 
Conflict resolution involves two major stages: war termination (Licklider 1993; Hegre 
2004) and peacebuilding (Call and Cook 2003; Francis 2010). The former is designed to end 
violent conflict, while the latter is intended to address the causes of the underlying conflict that 
gave rise to the armed violence (Boutros-Ghali 1995). As twin processes, each is dependent upon 
the other. For example, peace cannot be established without the cessation of war; and the 
establishment of durable peace is the sine qua non for preventing the recurrence of war or armed 
violence. 
Against this background, this section of the article will examine the general modalities 
that have been used to terminate civil wars on the continent, assess their efficacy, and decipher 
the efforts that have been, and are being made to build durable peace in the continent’s post-
conflict states. Clearly, the quality of the war termination efforts is a critical determinant of the 
texture of the post-conflict environment in which the construction of peace takes place. That is, if 
the post-conflict environment that is created by the termination of the war is not conducive, then 
it would in turn adversely affect the peacebuilding project. 
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War Termination  
Generally, the template for the termination of civil wars in Africa has consisted of three 
interlocking elements: peace-making, peacekeeping (in the majority of the cases), and peace 
settlement.  
Peace-making 
Peace-making consists of a broad array of methods that are designed to end the war 
(Assefa 1996; Darby and MacGinty 2008). The two most widely used in Africa’s civil wars have 
been mediation and negotiation. In mediation, a third party “guides the [conflicting parties] 
through a non-adversarial discussion process that has as its goal the settling of the [war]” 
(Isenhart and Spangle 2000, 72). Operationally, the mediation process in the various civil wars in 
Africa has entailed the intervention of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (AU), a 
sub-regional organization such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
and the United Nations. In some cases, these international organizations have acted either 
singularly or in concert. For example, during the first Chadian civil war (1979-1982), the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) was the primary mediator (Kieh 1993; May and Massey 
1998). During the initial stages of the first Liberian civil war (1989-1997), ECOWAS was the 
sole mediator (Sessay 1996; Adebajo 2002). However, since the emergent post-Cold War global 
order, the practice has pointed toward a collaborative mediatory role involving a regional 
organization, the AU and the United Nations (Boulden 2003). For instance, ECOWAS, the AU 
and the United Nations served as joint mediators in the Ivorian civil war (2002-2008). In other 
cases, the ambit of mediation has been extended to include some of the major global powers such 
as the United States, Britain and France. During the second Liberian civil war (1999-2003), 
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ECOWAS, the AU, the UN and the United States served as joint mediators, although ECOWAS 
played the leading role. 
As a practical matter, mediation has always been coupled with negotiation. This is 
because no peace-making effort can succeed without the willingness of the belligerents to end 
the conflict. Thus, negotiation provides the conflicting parties the opportunity to interact directly, 
especially to articulate their respective positions. Depending on the circumstances, as the various 
civil wars in Africa have demonstrated, negotiation may “create and fuel collaboration” (Isenhart 
and Spangle 2000, 45). However, such an outcome has been, and is dependent upon what 
Keltner (1987, 68) calls the “good faith and flexibility” of the conflicting parties.    
Peacekeeping 
Peacekeeping has been used as an instrument for helping to create a conducive 
environment for peace-making in the majority of the civil wars in Africa. Two major genres of 
peacekeeping operations have been used: peace observation (Kieh 2009) and the military 
interposition force (Malan 1998; Bellamy et al. 2004). Peace observation has involved either a 
regional organization, the Organization of African Unity/African Union or the United Nations 
intervening in a civil war with a team of military and civilian personnel. The intervention has 
been premised on the existence of a ceasefire agreement between or among the warring factions. 
The peace observers’ major task has been to monitor compliance by all of the conflicting parties 
with the terms of the ceasefire. The observers were prohibited from using military force. This 
model was used by the United Nations during the first Liberian civil war, and during the initial 
stage of the Sierra Leonean civil war. 
Two major models of the military interposition force have been employed in some of the 
civil wars in Africa: the traditional model (Mays 2002; Weiss et al. 2007; Bellamy et al. 2010; 
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Guldimann 2010) and the “new or robust” model (Ramsbotham et al. 2005; Curran and 
Woodhouse 2007; Lipson 2007; Nsia-Pepra 2009). The traditional model has been anchored on 
several elements: 1) either a regional organization or the Organization of African Unity 
intervened in various civil wars with a military force. The intervention required the consent of 
one or more of the parties involved in the conflict; 2) the existence of a ceasefire between or 
among the warring parties was a major precondition for the intervention; 3) the interventionist 
force served as a buffer between the belligerents; 4) the interventionist force created a security 
corridor for the transport and distribution of humanitarian assistance; 5) the force was required to 
be neutral by not aligning with any of the conflicting parties; and 6) the force was prohibited 
from using military force offensively. Instead, it could only use force in self-defense.  
Since the emergence of the post-Cold War era, a “new or robust model” has been 
developed. This was occasioned by the changing dynamics of civil wars on the continent, 
including the limitations of the traditional model. The “new or robust model” is based on several 
tenets. First, the intervention is undertaken by either a regional organization, the African Union 
or the United Nations or jointly—a regional organization and the African Union; a regional 
organization and the UN; and the AU and the UN (African Recovery, 1998). Second, the consent 
of either one or all of the belligerents is not required for the intervention to take place. Third, a 
ceasefire does not need to exist prior to the intervention. If one exists, it is then enforced by the 
military force. Alternatively, if there is no ceasefire, then the force imposes and enforces one. 
For example, during the first Liberian civil war, ECOMOG, the ECOWAS peacekeeping force, 
established and enforced a ceasefire. Given the nature of the civil war, the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL), the major warlordist militia led by Charles Taylor, rejected the 
ceasefire and proceeded to attack the peacekeeping force. Fourth, the peacekeeping force serves 
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as a buffer between the warring factions, and creates a security zone for the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance to civilians. Fifth, the peacekeeping force can use military force 
offensively in peace enforcement operations. ECOMOG’s peace enforcement operations during 
the first Liberian civil war and the Sierra Leonean civil war are good examples. However, the 
danger is that peace enforcement can undermine the peacekeeping force’s neutrality by drawing 
it into the conflict. Sixth, the peacekeeping force may participate in what is generically referred 
to as “nation-building activities.” These include a range of activities from helping to restructure 
and retrain the police to the primary assumption of security functions for the affected country 
during the transitional period. 
Peace Settlement 
When the belligerents agree to terminate the war, a peace settlement is then crafted 
(Walter 2001; Stedman et al. 2002). Its terms are embodied in a peace accord or agreement, 
which the belligerents sign. Drawing from the lessons of the various civil wars in Africa, peace 
agreements usually have three major components: the procedural, substantive and the 
organizational. The procedural component generally consists of the processes for the 
establishment and maintenance of peace such as the establishment and monitoring of the 
ceasefire. On the other hand, the substantive component embodies what Yawanajah and Quellet 
(2003, 1) characterize as the “political, economic, and social structural changes that are needed 
to remedy past grievances and provide for a more fair and equitable future.” The organizational 
dimension encompasses the institutions and mechanisms that are required to implement the terms 
of the settlement. The Comprehensive Agreement that ended the Sudanese civil war in 2005 is a 
good example of a peace settlement. 
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It is important to note that a peace settlement may not end a civil war. This is because 
since it is a process that spans an appreciable period of time, a peace settlement is vulnerable to 
being violated either at the onset or at some point in the process. Characteristically, either 
scenario usually causes the reversion to war. Two common trajectories from some of Africa’s 
civil wars are instructive. Even after the terms of the settlement are formulated and enveloped in 
a peace agreement or accord, and signed by the warring factions, one or more parties may decide 
to violate a term or terms of the settlement at the onset without the “ink even having dried on the 
agreement.” In turn, this then reignites the war. For example, during the first Chadian civil war, 
the various peace settlements collapsed moments after they were signed. Similarly, during the 
first Liberian civil war, the Taylor-led National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) recurrently 
violated a stipulation or stipulations of the various peace accords immediately after the signing 
ceremonies. The NPFL did this recurrently with sixteen peace accords.  
Another trajectory is that one or more of the belligerents uncommitted to ending the war 
may initially agree to the peace settlement as a strategic move designed to “buy time”—the 
acquisition of weapons and materiel, the repositioning of forces, etc. Once the strategic objective 
is achieved, the “spoiler” (Newman and Richmond 2006; Stedman 2000) may then decide to 
violate a term or terms of the peace settlement at a juncture in the settlement process.     
What have been the outcomes of the various efforts that have been designed to terminate 
civil wars in Africa both in the past and present? Generally, there have been three outcomes: 
successful war termination (Walter 2001; Lyons 2002; Hegre 2004), failed war termination 
(Walter 1999; Stedman et al. 2002; Binningsbo and Dupuy 2009), and mixed (Hartzell and 
Hoddie 2003; Kreutz 2010). Successful war termination has been characterized by the full 
compliance of the warring factions with the terms of the peace settlement. The most important 
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aspect is that there is no re-eruption of war. This then has created the environment for setting into 
motion the “Herculean” task of post-conflict peacebuilding (the building of durable peace). 
Several cases are instructive: The Mozambican peace settlement of 1992; the Angolan peace 
settlement of 2002; the Sierra Leonean peace settlement of 2002; and the Liberian peace 
settlement of 2003.  
In contradistinction, failed war termination has been evidenced by the collapse of the 
peace settlement either at the onset or at some point in the settlement process. The resultant 
effects have been the reversion to war; and the impossibility of transitioning from war 
termination to peacebuilding. Several cases provide instructive lessons. As has been mentioned, 
the first Chadian civil war was the prototype of failed war termination on the continent. Another 
case was the Rwandan civil war. After the successful conclusion of a peace settlement embodied 
in the Arusha Peace Accord of 1993, the Rwandan military played the role of the “spoiler” by 
violating the terms of the accord. The consequence was renewed violence, and significantly, the 
commission of genocide by the military and its paramilitary collaborators. 
Mixed success in war termination is captured by the “tugs and pulls” associated with the 
implementation of a peace settlement. That is, the war termination efforts tend to oscillate 
between failure and success—the eruption of a cycle of successful war termination–failed war 
termination. In short, a peace settlement may either collapse at the onset or at some point in the 
process; then a new peace settlement is formulated; again, it either collapses at the onset or 
succeeds for some time, and then collapses again. The first Liberian civil war is the archetype of 
this genre of war termination efforts in Africa. Beginning with the Banjul Peace Accord, the 
Taylor-led NPFL violated every subsequent peace agreement at the onset over a six-year period. 
Interestingly, each violation was followed by the formulation of a new peace settlement 
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ostensibly designed to placate Taylor and his militia. Like failed war termination, the mixed 
variety can lead to the prolongation of a civil war, and therefore make the prospects for 
peacebuilding quite remote. This is because, as I have suggested, successful war termination is 
the essential pre-condition for setting into motion the process of building durable peace.  
 
Building Peace in Africa’s Post-Conflict Societies: A General Assessment 
The Peacebuilding Efforts 
With the end of civil wars in several African states, these countries have undertaken the 
long and arduous task of building durable peace. The vortex of the effort revolves around the 
trilogy of capacity building, reconciliation and societal transformation (Boutros-Ghali 1995). The 
liberal peacebuilding model has become the hegemonic framework for reconstituting Africa’s 
post-conflict societies. The model was imposed on these post-conflict states by the United 
Nations and the dominant metropolitan powers led by the United States.  
The model is hoisted on three pivotal pillars of the establishment of political 
democratization, the re-establishment of peripheral capitalism under neo-liberal orthodoxy, and 
reconciliation (Barnett 2006; Kurtenbach 2007; Sriram 2007). The political democratization 
dimension consists of the promotion of individual civil liberties and political rights, such as the 
freedoms of assembly, association and speech, and the right to vote; the establishment of the 
tradition of holding regular elections within a multiparty framework; the establishment of a 
systems of “checks and balances” within the government; the establishment of the sanctity of the 
rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; the promotion of accountability and 
transparency in the conduct of public affairs; and the establishment of a vibrant civil society that 
can serve as an autonomous sphere for checking on the powers of the government. The advocates 
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of the model posit that the success of its principles is contingent upon the undertaking of 
comprehensive institutional reforms within the public sector of these post-conflict African states. 
The generic reforms include: judicial reforms, political reforms, and security sector reforms. In 
other words, the contours of the liberal model are powered by an institutional tapestry.        
On the economic front, post-conflict African states are instructed by the dominant 
metropolitan powers to either abandon their socialist economic system (Angola and 
Mozambique) or adopt the peripheral capitalist mode of production or reform their existing 
peripheral capitalist political economies under the ideological guidance of neo-liberalism. The 
basic neo-liberal prescriptions include: the removal of all trade barriers; the removal of all 
obstacles to foreign investment; the dismantling of existing “social safety nets;” the devaluation 
of currencies; the reduction of the labor force in the public sector; the freezing of employment 
and salaries in the public sector; and the increase of interest rates. The neo-liberal rationale is 
that the implementation of these policies would spur private investment, increase exports and 
save money for the state. 
Reconciliation in post-conflict societies in Africa has been based on two major pathways: 
the restorative and the retributive. The former is based on the efforts to establish 
interrelationships between and among the offenders, the victims and the extant communities by 
restoring the harm that has been caused; the rights of the victims and the communities; and the 
responsibilities of the offenders. Bishop Desmond Tutu, who chaired the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, provides an excellent summation of the restorative justice 
model thus: 
The central concern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of Ubuntu, 
the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken 
An Anatomy of Conflict Resolution 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 2 
288  
relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both the victim and the 
perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the 
community he or she injured by his or her offense (Bell 2002, 90).      
 In short, the centerpiece of the restorative pathway is the search for “truth and reconciliation.” 
One way in which this is done is through the establishment of a truth and reconciliation 
commission. Generally, the major functions of the truth and reconciliation commission are to 
recreate memory about the war; and to encourage those with knowledge about the war, including 
warlords and their militia men and women, to provide narratives about the war, especially their 
roles. In keeping with the overarching framework, the commission’s terms of reference do not 
include the issuance of indictments, the holding of trials and the bringing to justice of those who 
have committed war crimes and crimes against societies. Instead, the focus is on restorative 
justice. Since the establishment of the truth and reconciliation commission after the end of the 
South African civil war in 1994, the example has been followed in other African states, including 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Liberia.  
On the other hand, the retributive model’s central premise is that “justice requires 
punishment” (Fisher 2007, 16). That is, more often than not, for victims and bystanders alike to 
feel that justice has been achieved, some form of punishment has to befall the offender.  
Significantly, punishment is necessary because it serves as retribution, deterrence, some form of 
moral education, incapacitation, society’s expression of condemnation (Fisher).  
In some of Africa’s post-conflict societies, three major retributive mechanisms have been 
used: war crime tribunal, special court, and the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the case of 
the war crime tribunal, one was established for Rwanda in 1994 (United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 955 1994, 1). Under the resolution, the International Criminal Court for 
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Rwanda (ICTR) is to “contribute to the process of national reconciliation in Rwanda and to the 
maintenance of peace in the region” (United Nations Security Council Resolution 955, 1).  Since 
it commenced the trials, the tribunal has handed down 50 judgments (International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda 2008, 1).  In Sierra Leone, a special court was established through an 
agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations in 2002. The court is 
mandated to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law (The Special Court for 
Sierra Leone 2008, 1). Since the establishment of the court, 13 people have been indicted, 
including Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia. Eight of the indicted persons have 
been convicted and sentenced (Special Court for Sierra Leone).     
Also, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is playing a pivotal role in bringing to 
justice those accused of violating various aspects of international humanitarian law in some of 
Africa’s civil wars. For example, the ICC has indicted four Congolese for the commission of 
various violations of international humanitarian law during the “second civil war” in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 1998-2003(Human Rights Watch 2008, 1). 
Three of these defendants are already in ICC custody (Human Rights Watch). In the case of the 
Central African Republic’s civil war (2003-2006), the ICC has indicted Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, the former Vice President of the transitional government of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (2003-2006), and runner-up in the DRC’s presidential election in 2006, for atrocities 
committed by his militia during that country’s civil war in 2002 (Human Rights Watch). As for 
the Ugandan civil war, the ICC indicted and subsequently issued arrest warrants against Joseph 
Kony, the leader of  the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and four of his commanders for 
the commission of sundry crimes in contravention of international humanitarian law (McGreal, 
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2008, p.1). Interestingly, however, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, who requested the 
ICC’s intervention, has refused to effect the court’s arrest warrants. This is because President 
Museveni used the court as leverage in dragooning the LRA leader into signing a peace 
agreement to end the country’s 22-year-old civil war (McGreal). 
A “Balance Sheet” on the Peacebuilding Efforts 
Are Africa’s post-conflict states on the path to building durable peace? On the positive 
side, the termination of most of the continent’s civil wars is a major step forward in creating a 
conducive environment for ultimately addressing and resolving the underlying conflict that is at 
the root of these various wars. Based on this, some progress has been made in liberalizing the 
political space in these various states, including improvements in the areas of political rights and 
civil liberties and the establishment of political institutions, rules and processes. 
Despite the progress that has been made in the political sector, the various peacebuilding 
projects on the continent are generally plagued by several major problems. First, the liberal 
model, which provides the compass for navigating the terrain of peacebuilding, is not the best 
framework for addressing the taproots of civil conflicts in Africa for several reasons. The 
framework’s democratization plank is quite limited to the political domain. That is, it is 
exclusively concerned with the promotion of individual political rights and civil liberties and 
overall political procedures. While these are important, they only address one aspect of the 
puzzle; hence, they are not sufficient to address the undercurrents of civil conflicts on the 
continent. In other words, they lack the expansiveness that is exigent to address the 
multidimensional crises, the bedrocks of civil conflicts, which have been generated by the neo-
colonial African state. This is the case because liberal democratization is not comprehensive. As 
well, liberal democratization does not seek to fundamentally alter the portrait of the neo-colonial 
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African state—nature, character, mission, values and policies—and its resultant political 
economy. Hence, for example, pivotal issues such as socio-economic inequities and disparities in 
power relations between and among classes and social justice are not addressed. In short, the 
democratization dimension of the liberal peacebuilding model is primarily concerned with the 
establishment of political procedures, and accords virtually no attention to the material well-
being of the continent’s subaltern classes.  
Similarly, capitalism whether developed or peripheral is intrinsically an undemocratic 
economic system. This is because it is anchored on inequality and exploitation. Thus, it 
privileges the ruling class at the expense of the subaltern ones. Such an economic system cannot 
address the serious human needs deficit that is confronting the continent’s post-conflict societies. 
Instead, capitalism in its peripheral form in Africa’s post-conflict states is exacerbating the socio-
economic problems that contributed to the various civil conflicts in the first place. For example, 
the privatization project is simply transferring wealth from the state to private capitalists 
principally from various metropolitan states such as the United States, without improving the 
material conditions of the subalterns.  
  As for the reconciliation efforts, they are driven by Western approaches that fail to accord 
the requisite attention to the specific cultural context of the various post-conflict societies on the 
continent. As Kotzo (2002, 73) appropriately warns, “Conflict resolution efforts must take 
cognizance of the cultural context.”   
Second and related, although traditional African methods are now being used in some 
cases, much still needs to be done. One helpful step could be to take cognizance of the historical 
and contemporary realities in a conflict-affected African state, prior to making the determination 
about the appropriate method or methods that could be helpful in resolving the conflict. 
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Accordingly, in those cases in which the use of traditional African methods is still deeply rooted 
in the society, it would then be useful to use those methods. However, this should not preclude 
the use of Western or other methods as supplements, if they have utility under the circumstances. 
Third, the peacebuilding projects on the continent are driven and dominated by external 
actors, some of whom contributed to planting the seeds of civil conflict in the continent’s various 
post-conflict societies. For example, the United States played a pivotal role in the germination of 
the civil conflict in Liberia that occasioned two civil wars. Specifically, the United States was a 
major participant in the creation of the peripheral capitalist Liberian state, and provided the 
economic, political and military support that Liberia’s ruling class used to suppress, repress and 
exploit the subaltern classes. Similarly, Britain was the chief architect of the neo-colonial Sierra 
Leonean state, and thus contributed to the multidimensional crises that were germinated over 
time. Clearly, based on the history of the involvement of these external actors in these post-
conflict societies in Africa and their broader imperialist agendas, there is no doubt that these 
metropolitan powers are not interested in peacebuilding projects that would fundamentally alter 
these societies, including the transformation of power relationships. Accordingly, as Gounden 
(2002, 3) observes, “[The imperialist powers’] cardinal goal is to attempt to influence the process 
of resolution to their interests sidelining and or worse ignoring local ideals.” This is done through 
withholding support for initiatives that may result in undesired outcomes but that are supported 
by a majority of the polity in question. 
Fourth, the various peacebuilding projects in progress on the continent have generally 
ignored the role of the Bretton Woods institutions—International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank—and the totality of the global capitalist system in planting and nurturing the seeds of civil 
conflict on the continent. For example, the Bretton Woods institutions’ “structural adjustment 
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programs” have played pivotal roles in the facilitation of the continual plundering and pillaging 
of the resources of these post-conflict states by metropolitan-based multinational corporations, 
and the decimation of the “social safety nets” that have provided a modicum of the basic human 
needs of the members of the various subaltern classes. Broadly, the required attention has not 
been paid to the inequities inherent in the nature and dynamics of the global capitalist system. 
For example, the “international division of labor” still requires that these post-conflict states 
remain producers of raw materials and the consumers of comparatively expensive manufactured 
goods from the metropolitan states. The “system of unequal exchange” remains intact. Under this 
arrangement, the post-conflict states will continue to be paid less for their raw materials, while 
being required to pay more for the manufactured goods from the United States, Europe and 
Japan. The point is that the global capitalist system will continue to remain hostile to 
development of these post-conflict states; hence, these societies will not be able to generate the 
resources that are required for them to address the problems of inequities in wealth and income, 
mass and abject poverty, social malaise and the strangulating effects of the overall precariously 
low standards of living.      
 
Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa: Some Suggestions 
There is the need to rethink conflict resolution in Africa. This is because, as has been 
argued, the various conflict resolution projects on the continent are fraught with major problems 
that would undermine the abilities of Africa’s post-conflict states to build durable peace. One of 
the major lacunas with the war termination efforts is the pervasive practice of rewarding 
warlordism. This is especially done by allotting various positions in the transitional 
administration to the various warlordist factions. A major resultant effect is that such a practice 
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has encouraged rather than deterred warlordism. This is because warlords are cognizant of the 
fact that if their respective militias do not win outright military victories, they will be rewarded 
with various positions in an interim administration. In turn, these positions are used to foster the 
practice of the accumulation of capital by the warlords and their coteries of top advisors. 
Alternatively, while it is important for the various warlordist militias to be involved in the peace 
process, they should not be rewarded with positions in the interim regime. Instead, the office 
holders in the interim regime should be people with the requisite skills, who are not affiliated 
with the warlordist militias. This approach will help to deter warlordism, because potential war-
makers would be aware that they would not be rewarded with positions in the state bureaucracy 
simply because they establish militias and participate in raining violence and mayhem on 
innocent civilians. 
Another problem is that the larger society is often marginalized in the war termination 
efforts. Instead, the focus is on the various warlordist militias and the government. Thus, the 
larger society, which represents the majority of the citizens, does not participate in the fashioning 
of the peace settlement, but is required to live and abide by the terms. Moreover, since it is 
usually a spectator in the peace process, the larger society has no basis for holding the interim 
regime, including the various office holders from the warlordist militias, accountable. 
Consequently, as has been demonstrated in post-conflict societies like Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the larger society is forced to suffer the consequences of 
the incompetence and poor policies of the interim administration without recourse. Clearly, this 
approach needs to be changed and replaced with one that emphasizes the inclusion of various 
citizen-based organizations representing various segments of the affected countries in the war 
termination efforts. Moreover, it should be clearly stipulated in the peace accord that the 
An Anatomy of Conflict Resolution 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 2 
295  
transitional regime would be accountable to the people. In order to practicalize such a provision, 
the major citizen groups should have representation in the transitional legislature. The 
transitional legislature should have oversight responsibilities over the transitional regime, 
including the power to remove the officers in the transitional executive branch. 
In the area of peacebuilding, Lederach’s (1995, 65) “elicitive approach” would be a 
useful pathway for several reasons. It places a premium on the cultural context and the associated 
knowledge and views of the citizens of the society in conflict as the foundation of peacebuilding. 
Also, it values the indigenous participants in the peacebuilding process as resources rather than 
recipients of conflict resolution knowledge, especially from “external experts.” In this regards, 
the methods for the establishment of a peaceful society based on constructive change—“the flow 
of human interaction in social conflict from cycles of destructive relational patterns toward 
cycles of relational dignity and respectful engagement” (Lederach 2005, 181)—are collectively 
established through the critical reflection.  
Building on the aforementioned approach, the liberal peacebuilding model that has been 
imposed by the powerful forces in the international system as the template for post-conflict 
African societies needs to be transcended. The alternative model should be framed around 
changing the portrait of the neo-colonial African state, and addressing the deeper issues of class 
inequities and the associated asymmetries in power in various relationships, human well-being 
and social justice. In terms of the transformation of the African state, this is the paramount task, 
because the neo-colonial African state is the generator of the contradictions and crises that lead 
to civil conflict and war. Specifically, the nature of the African state needs to reflect the 
historical-cultural realities of each African state rather than external ones (the nature of the neo-
An Anatomy of Conflict Resolution 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 2 
296  
colonial African state is a continuation from the colonial era). This would enable the citizens to 
take ownership of the state. 
The character of the state needs to be changed from being criminalized, exploitative, 
negligent, prebendal, and repressive to productive, protective, meritorious, supportive and 
responsive to the needs and aspirations of its citizens. This would have profound positive 
ramifications for improving state-society relations. Ultimately, the citizens would accept the state 
as their own, rather than as a construct that visits hardship on them. 
Another important element of the state that requires transformation is the mission. In its 
current formulation, the central mission of the neo-colonial African state is to create propitious 
conditions for the owners of metropolitan-based multinational corporations and other businesses, 
and the members of the local ruling classes and their relations to accumulate wealth, to the 
detriment of the majority of the citizens. Alternatively, the new primary mission of the state 
should be attending to the welfare of the citizens—employment, education, health care, housing, 
food security, etc. 
Moreover, the perennial problem of class inequities needs to be addressed. Two steps are 
instructive. Measures need to be taken to prevent the members of the local ruling class and their 
relations from illegally acquiring wealth through various corrupt means. This could be done 
through the establishment of an effective anti-corruption regime. As well, the transformed state 
would then formulate and implement various policies that are designed to address the issue of 
inequities in income and wealth. 
Addressing the vexing problem of asymmetries in power in various relationships is 
another major dimension of deep peacebuilding. This would cover the cultural, economic, 
gender, political and social spheres. For example, steps would need to be taken to curtail the 
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expansion of presidential powers and its resultant “hegemonic presidency.” Such a step would be 
important for ensuring a “balance of power” between and among the various branches of 
government. 
Central to the establishment of a new “culture of social justice” is the imperative of 
empowering people at the grassroots level, especially economically and politically. The rationale 
is that empowered citizens can serve as effective bulwarks against injustice. This is because the 
citizens would be able to hold public officials and others accountable for their actions. 
Ultimately, this would serve as an effective deterrent against actions such as the abuse of power, 
a major source of injustice on the African continent. 
Importantly, the success of this alternative peacebuilding trajectory would be dependent 
upon the participation of a conscious and engaged citizenry and a visionary national leadership in 
a post-conflict African state. An important initial step would be to hold national conferences as 
an integral part of the peacebuilding process. That is, the peacebuilding in a post-conflict African 
society should be preceded by the holding of a national conference involving the representatives 
of all of the major stakeholders in the society. The major purpose would be to re-design the state 
and society through the peacebuilding process.  
Within the framework of a democratically reconstituted state, traditional African 
approaches to conflict resolution should be valued. This is because as Zartman (1999, 3) 
suggests, “Traditional societies in Africa…are reputed to hold secrets of peacemaking locked in 
their ways, formed from centuries of custom before the disruption of colonization.”  For 
example, lessons can be drawn from the various traditional African approaches to conflict 
resolution such as the Mato Oput Justice clan-based model (Bangura 2008, 2). In turn, these 
lessons can be appropriately applied to various conflicts across the continent. On the other hand, 
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lessons from the conflict resolution approaches of other societies and cultures, including Western 
ones, can be applied to conflicts in various African states when the determination is made that 
they are relevant. This would represent a fundamental change from the current practice under 
which Western approaches are superimposed on African civil conflicts, without taking into 
consideration their cultural relevance and suitability to helping to resolve these conflicts. 
Yet, another major consideration in rethinking conflict resolution in Africa’s post-conflict 
states needs to be the formulation of strategies for addressing the conflict-inducing dynamics of 
the global capitalist system. That is, post-conflict states, other African states and Third World 
states would need to organize a united front and work collaboratively in struggling to make 
changes in the international capitalist system. For example, the “international division of labor” 
that requires African and other Third World states to be the producers of cheap raw materials 
needs to be changed so that these developing countries can develop industrial and technological 
bases. As well, the “system of unequal exchange” under which the dominant powers have 
determined that the raw materials from Africa and the rest of the Third World are sold at prices 
cheaper than the manufactured goods mainly from the industrialized capitalist states needs to be 
changed. This is because by accruing less for their primary products and paying more for 
manufactured goods, African states do not generate enough foreign exchange earnings to be able 
to address the multitude of domestic economic and social challenges such as education, health 
care, housing, and transportation. The resultant adverse impact on the well-being of the members 
of the subaltern classes has been a major contributor to planting the seeds of civil conflict in 
Africa.   
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Conclusion 
The article has attempted to address three major interrelated issues relating to the 
resolution of civil conflicts in Africa. First, the article tackled the war termination conundrum by 
examining the various methods—peace-making, peacekeeping and peace settlement—that have 
been used to terminate civil wars in Africa. The results indicate that these efforts have produced 
three general outcomes: success, failure and mixed. Successful war termination is characterized 
by the complete cessation of armed violence. On the other hand, failed war termination is 
distinguishable by the reversion to war either at the onset of the peace settlement process or at a 
subsequent juncture. The mixed war termination genre is hoisted on a series of cycles of 
successes and failures. 
Second, the issue of war termination was then linked to peacebuilding. Against this 
background, the article deciphered the nature and dynamics of the liberal peacebuilding model, 
the hegemonic pathway for reconstituting Africa’s post-conflict states, and ultimately “building 
durable peace” in them. Specifically, the central tenets—political democratization, capitalist 
economy and national reconciliation—and their dynamics were examined within the context of 
the continent’s post-civil conflict states. The central finding is that liberal peacebuilding, with its 
focus on political rights and freedoms, is inadequate for addressing the general undercurrents of 
civil conflict in the continent’s various post-conflict societies. 
Finally, the sine qua non for the building and maintenance of permanent peace in 
Africa’s post-conflict states and its other polities is the establishment of substantive or deep 
democracy on the continent beyond the limits of political liberalization and its pathological 
fixation with procedures. In other words, Africa—both its post-conflict states and others—needs 
a new kind of state that is anchored on holistic democracy and its tenets of, among others, mass 
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empowerment, equality and social justice—what Ake (1996, 124) correctly refers to as “real 
democracy.” Correspondingly, the new democratic African states would need to establish a 
united front among themselves, as well as with other democratic polities in the Third World to 
struggle for the fundamental restructuring of the structure and dynamics of the global capitalist 
system. One of the major outcomes of the restructuring must be what Muiu (2007, 55) calls 
“Africa’s control over its own economic resources.” That is, African and Third World states both 
post-conflict and otherwise must control their resources, if they are to build and maintain 
peaceful societies.      
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Abstract 
This study addresses the question of majority-minority relations in situations of intractable 
conflict (Bar-Tal 2000). The study focuses on processes involved in the majority Jewish group’s 
construction of images of the Palestinian minority group, all citizens of Israel, while 
participating in a structured dialogue encounter conducted at Tel Aviv University in Israel. In 
this dialogue, it was observed that negative inhumane images that the Jews have of the 
Palestinians were notably expressed by the Jewish group in three situations: to cope with 
distress when their morality was challenged by the Palestinian group; to preserve the Jewish 
group's superiority and hegemony in Israel; and to preserve or restore the Jewish group's 
power. The study also examines the gradual processes of change that the Jewish group 
experienced while becoming aware that dehumanization strategies are practices that preserve 
dominance.  This study contributes to a better understanding of the importance of addressing the 
iconic representations and images that majority groups hold of minority groups, and suggests 
the need to challenge the practice of power through the use of these representations and images 
when facilitating group encounters.  
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Introduction 
This study addresses the question of majority-minority relations in situations of 
intractable conflict (Bar-Tal 2000). The study focuses on processes involved in the majority 
Jewish group’s construction of images of the Palestinian minority group, all citizens of Israel, 
while participating in a structured dialogue encounter conducted at Tel Aviv University. In this 
dialogue, it was observed that negative inhumane images that the Jews have of the Palestinians 
were notably expressed by the Jewish group in three situations: to cope with distress when their 
morality was challenged by the Palestinian group; to preserve the Jewish group's ideology 
regarding the superiority and hegemonic power of Jews in Israel; and to preserve or restore the 
Jewish group's power. It shows how group interactions involving stereotypical representations of 
the other can be addressed and even transformed through processes encompassing discussion and 
mediation. 
Under conditions of severe and sustained conflict as in the Jewish-Palestinian case, there 
is extremely negative, overt categorization, known as delegitimization (Bar-Tal 1990; Bar-Tal 
and Teichman 2005).  This type of categorization based on extreme negative characterization 
serves to exclude the outgroup from the human family, hence justifying violence directed toward 
that group.     
    In the last decade, dialogical encounters have become a common and preferred means of 
addressing conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, serving as a way to modify hostile 
stereotypes between national and ethnic groups in conflict (Bar-On and Kassem 2004; Bar-Tal 
2002; Salomon 2002). Studies done since the 1990s on encounters between Jews and 
Palestinians in Israel strove to examine the process itself rather than merely its outcomes. This 
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research also took into account the social-political context in which it was conducted (e.g., Maoz 
2000; Bar, Bargal and Asaqla 1995; Katz and Kahanov 1990). These studies helped develop a 
new approach to the study of dialogue, attempting to describe and analyze what happens in 
intergroup dialogue and encompassing an awareness of power relations in Jewish-Palestinian 
encounters (Abu-Nimer 1999; Maoz 2000; Rouhana and Kroper 1997). 
Halabi, Sonnenschein and Friedman (2004) examined a Palestinian-Jewish group process 
and pointed to the five developmental phases that emerged in the group process including: the 
initial exploration and declaration of intent; the strengthening of the Palestinian group; 
resumption of power by the Jewish group; impasse when the dialogue mired down and the 
reigning atmosphere in the group is one of exhaustion on both sides; and a different more 
egalitarian dialogue with mutual respect.  
Maoz, Bar-On, Bekerman and Jaber-Massarwa (2004) revealed the strategies used by 
Jewish partners in a dialogue to preserve their dominance and prevent attempts to unfetter the 
dialogue. Among those strategies, they cite claims of moral superiority via delegitimization of 
what the other side is saying. Maoz, Steinberg, Bar-On and Fakhereldeen (2002), while 
analyzing a structured encounter between Jewish and Palestinian university students, pointed to 
the paradoxical notion of achieving empathy through confrontation. Although they focused their 
analysis on two participants, they recommended developing and applying similar procedures in 
additional studies that would enable a more comprehensive understanding of the complex 
processes involved in the dialogue on the level of the entire group.      
Bekerman (2002) analyzed the discourse that emerged between the majority and minority 
in a students’ dialogue group, discourses that shaped the national rhetoric of majority and 
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minority in the context of a nation state. He showed how this rhetoric directs and shapes the 
dialogue, through a reshaping of the ethnic, cultural and national identities of the participants. 
Helman (2002) also analyzed the discourse of a Jewish-Arab dialogue group. She found that 
when the Jews feel that the values they regard as crucial to their culture and identity—like 
liberalism, democracy, and humaneness—are under attack, they turn to their reified perspectives 
to justify structural inequalities between the two groups.  
The present study attempts to investigate when the majority group utilizes inhumane 
images of the minority group, and examines how these images are tied to the power relations 
between the groups, while describing in detail the processes which encourage the adoption of 
these images and the potential openings for change in their implementation.  First we will 
describe the participants, the course and the social political context in which it was conducted. 
Later on the method used is described, followed by the findings and discussion.  
 
Method 
 Participants  
The study focuses on a group participating in an elective course entitled “The Jewish-
Arab Conflict as Reflected in Theory and Practice,” offered jointly by the School for Peace and 
Tel Aviv University, in 2000-2001. Nine Jewish graduate students in social psychology and 
social work participated; among them, two men and seven women ranging in age from 23 to 36. 
The Palestinian group was composed of students from various fields in the social sciences and 
law, either in MA programs or in their final year of BA programs, including five men and four 
women ranging in age from 22 to 30. We do not think the difference in education levels had an 
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impact on the group process.  The data were collected in accordance with the guidelines of the 
American Anthropological Association (1998). Participants were guaranteed anonymity in any 
published results of the study, and permission to record the meeting, transcribe it and publish the 
results was obtained from every participant in the days preceding the first encounter meeting. 
Confidentiality has been further guaranteed by substituting the real names of the people with 
pseudonyms or random initials. 
In view of the fact that, for over thirty years, feminist language researchers and more 
traditional analysts have demonstrated the pervasiveness of gender in discourse and interaction 
as well as the ubiquity of gender in daily life (Stokoe 2004), a warning regarding expected 
gender differences is warranted. Though always important, the influence of gender on discourse 
has been shown to be relevant only when participants in the interactional event are demonstrably 
oriented towards it (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1997). While the excerpts considered in this 
paper would allow for an analysis in line with those which take into account gender differences, 
we do not think it can be demonstrated that participants in the intergroup encounter were 
demonstrably oriented towards gender categories. Thus, gender analysis of the data is not 
included in this study. 
The Course and the Method of the Group Facilitation 
The standard paradigm developed by the School for Peace for courses like the one 
discussed here is as follows: The goal of the course is to learn about groups in conflict through 
the Jewish-Arab conflict. There is experiential learning and every fourth session is devoted to a 
theoretical lecture concerning identity and conflict. Two facilitators (a Jew and a Palestinian) 
moderate the activity. Participants are asked to discuss any subject of interest to them relating to 
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the Jewish-Arab conflict. Most of the discussion takes place in a binational forum, with uni-
national meetings every third session. The encounter is treated as an intergroup—rather than 
interpersonal—encounter; the intervention method addresses the asymmetry in existing power 
relations and links processes occurring in the group to phenomena on the macro level in Israeli 
society (for details, see Halabi and Sonnenschein 2004).  In the course herein, there were 17 
meetings of three hours each. Additionally, the students participated in a two-day workshop 
halfway through the process, where they met with students from a similar course given at another 
university, and engaged in dialogue together.   
The Social and Political Context in which the Course was Conducted 
The course was opened right after the outbreak of the October 2000 Intifada. A general 
strike by Palestinian citizens of Israel (in identification with the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories) was declared and was followed by demonstrations. The Israeli police responded with 
unprecedented force and authorized the use of live ammunition against demonstrators–resulting 
in the deaths of 12 Palestinian citizens of Israel, with about 700 wounded and hundreds arrested. 
This was perhaps the most severe crisis in recent years in the relations between Jews and 
Palestinian citizens of the state (Report of the Or Commission 2003; Reinhart 2005; Yeshouvi 
2001).  
Procedure 
     A qualitative interpretive research approach was adopted to study the dynamics of 
intergroup processes dealing with identity, images and conflict (Charmaz 1995); this method 
emphasizes the detailed description of interactional processes while attempting to capture the 
participants’ own perspectives on the events described (Atkinson and Hammersley 1994; Maykut 
 
Who is More Humane? 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 2 
313  
and Morehouse 1999). Our analytical process drew heavily on the procedures and techniques of 
Grounded Theory Analysis (Corbin and Strauss 2008). We began coding (assigning conceptual 
categories to) emerging phenomena, noting the properties of each new instance of coded data 
and comparing them to previous instances. We then determined inclusion rules for each code and 
established the properties that each new piece of data should possess to be included in each 
existing category thus establishing the borders of emerging phenomena. We later tested 
relationships between phenomena to create emerging conclusions while refining our categories 
with the help of concepts from relevant literature. Lastly, when disproving instances were found, 
our conclusions were either refined to include them or scrapped. The process was repeated 
several times, producing a set of phenomena whose presence in the dataset can be supported by 
an extensive and varied body of evidence. Those phenomena are presented below. Drawing from  
a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967) we used a constant comparative method 
for we wished to stresses the importance of discovering theories, concepts, hypotheses, and 
propositions directly from the data rather than from a priori assumptions of an existing 
theoretical framework.  
The data gathered consists of 65 hours of videotaped activity, all student papers and 
journals, and semi-structured interviews conducted before the course and three months after its 
completion. All materials were coded via an open inductive coding scheme (Bogdan and Biklen 
1992).  This approach was similar to the approach developed by Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach and 
Zilber (1998) for analyzing life stories and addressing psychological and social dimensions. The 
present study did not use life stories of individuals but rather the story of a Jewish-Palestinian 
encounter group.  The main tool we used in our thematic content and dynamic qualitative 
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analysis was abduction. Unlike deductive or inductive methods, abduction starts by identifying 
themes that reappear in the narrative (Maoz, Steinberg, Bar-On and Fakhereldeen 2002).  These 
themes led us to hypothesis construction and testing. Since this study is dealing with a group 
process as a whole, group theory concepts are integrated in the analyses of the texts in this study. 
The most relevant concept adopted from group process theory is the notion of the social 
unconscious first propounded by Fromm (1962).  The term refers to the areas of repression 
shared by most members of a society. Generally, these repressed elements involve certain 
contents, of which a given society—if it wishes to function successfully—cannot allow its 
members to be aware.  Likewise Foulkes (1973) attributed great importance to the recognition of 
social forces and their analysis in group processes and argued that one cannot distinguish 
between inner reality and external reality. His main innovation was in arguing that the group is 
not an amalgamation of the unconscious processes of its individual members, but rather has a 
shared system of unconscious meanings constructed through communications, to which each 
individual makes a unique contribution. According to Hopper (2001), the term “social 
unconscious” relates to the existence of constraints, of social and communicational-related 
agreements of which people are unaware. In the following section we will present the findings 
regarding the three situations in which the extremist image of the Palestinians was expressed and 
the processes of change during the evolution of the group process.  
Findings 
Since some of the findings we will report in the following may also apply to the 
Palestinian participants we want to remind the reader that for the purposes of this study, we are 
exploring the attitudes of the Jewish participants in the group.   
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The Jewish group came to the process with an image of the Palestinian as an extremist. 
Eight of the nine Jewish participants, in pre-course interviews, said that the Palestinians wanted 
to kill the Jews, and some noted that “wanting to kill” is an integral part of Palestinian culture, 
whereas Jews perceived themselves as seeking peace. This self-definition was constructed in 
opposition to the other:  
Ofra (a Jewish participant-J): We were educated from the perspective of trying to 
reach peace and understanding…but most of the Palestinians are educated in a 
context of hate, to hate Jews, the biggest enemy, and (are educated) to murder. 
The extremist image of Arabs and Palestinians was attributed to the Palestinian group very early 
in the process: 
Ido (J): From the start, really from the first meeting, they said “we are 
Palestinians” and to me it felt subversive…I said how could  [you] be Palestinian. 
Palestinians are at war with us…When they said “Palestinian,” I heard 
“terrorist.” 
When the Arabs defined themselves as Palestinians, the Jewish students’ image 
associated with “Palestinian” was, for the most part, that of a terrorist, an enemy. 
The Jewish group used the extremist image when it felt distressed in the battle over who is 
more humane. 
 At the 6th meeting the Jewish group is talking about the feeling of distress and threat 
during the last discussion.  
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Ido: Last time I came out feeling distressed and threatened in the group itself 
especially when you said how do you feel about terrorist attacks on Jewish 
citizens and I had the feeling you are not objecting that.  
Maram: That we are part of it (cynically) 
Ibtisam: Each side uses its own means, you have been also in the army and 
fought, I do not know if you killed people but you were part of it.    
Ahmad: I do not support terrorist attacks on civilians but I do support the 
struggle against the occupation. 
Ido: I ask myself if I do sit here with extremists that would have been willing to 
participate in terrorist attacks.   
 Dealing with the moral implications of participating in the occupying army is very difficult for 
the Jewish group and a way out of this moral distress is to blame the Palestinians for supporting 
terrorism and ignoring the complex point of view that they have just presented. 
At the six first meetings of the process, as the Palestinian group repeatedly raised the 
subject of the injustices that the State is perpetrating on Palestinians, the Jewish group reported 
feeling embattled on the moral plane:  
Dalia (J): First of all, it’s very disturbing in the sense that you know there’s 
discrimination, but when you know someone personally and he tells you that he 
can’t rent an apartment because he’s an Arab…I mean, you don’t really want to 
think that this is your country that you’re living in, but that’s the situation…that 
makes [me] feel bad, feel in despair, feel, uh…helpless against the system. Okay, 
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they are discriminated against; what can I do? Nothing… And guilty of course, 
that things like that happen.  
The distress was evident in expressing despair, guilt and helplessness.   
In discussions during the first part of the course, the Jewish group paid attention only to 
the assertive or more militant voice of Adnan, a Palestinian participant who was confrontational, 
while neglecting other, more moderate Palestinian voices:  
Ido (J): We are constantly hearing the dominant and aggressive voice and we 
aren’t hearing the other voices and we have reinforced this. We got hung up on 
this dominant aggressive voice and we responded and created this, and that’s 
what is happening now, we the Israelis listen only to the aggressive voice out 
there, to the terrorists.  
The Jewish group wanted to empower this militant voice and thereby to construct it, 
perhaps to avoid dealing with its own immorality as reflected in descriptions of the injustices of 
the occupation. This voice seemed like the authentic voice of the Palestinian group. The process 
of focusing on the more militant voice is mutual; the Palestinians, too, focused on the nationalist 
or militant voices in the Jewish group. 
One way for the Palestinian group to regain a humane image was via a vision or fantasy 
offered by them with the following scenario: if the roles were reversed and the Palestinians were 
to become the dominant majority and rule Palestine, they would behave more humanely toward 
the Jews than the Jews have behaved toward them.  
Adnan ( a Palestinian participant-P): The bottom line is that we don’t reject 
Jewish existence, I mean if, after this war we have described now, a Palestinian 
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state were to arise, there would be no talk of transfer of the Jews; maybe, or so I 
believe, they would also give the Jews the option of either leaving this country or 
actually remaining and being citizens of the Palestinian state. 
Ronen (J): Adnan, but you are prettifying things, you in other words want to say 
no, they can’t exist. 
Ayelet (J): What is all this about our having power? This is really about how they 
hate us.  
We see here a breakdown in communications into two parallel discourses with no point 
of intersection between them. Entertaining the fantasy of the situations' being reversed, with the 
Palestinians as the ruling majority, evoked for the Jews the specter of nullifying their national 
existence. The possibility that the Palestinians, having become strong (the way the Jews 
experienced them as strong in the group process), would behave humanely toward the Jews, was 
not perceived as a possible scenario at this stage, perhaps because it contradicted the Jews' 
inhumane image of the Palestinians.   
Palestinian attempts to rehabilitate the Jews' image of them, restoring their (Palestinian) 
humanity, even via fantasy, was mirrored back to the Palestinians as inhumanity by the Jewish 
group. The imagery was more powerful than stated intentions or circumstances, hence the 
Palestinians' hypothetical statements were perceived by the Jewish group as a real Palestinian 
wish, a declaration of war. 
Ido (J): If the vision is that the State of Israel turns into Palestine – that’s war. We 
can stop this whole discussion right here.  
We found an example of a similar response in the 8th meeting:  
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Noor: Maybe the power of the Arab group here, the Palestinian group, [is] to 
bring things, like, to the same level, and you feel that there’s a group here that 
has rights... Maybe you have that sense of a threat. 
Ayelet: But on the outside, I want very much to give rights to the Arab group. But 
I feel that you (the Palestinians) don't give me rights; let's say I feel that, if it were 
the other way around and you were the ones ruling, you would kill us, like.  
Walid: Why do you think you're more human? Do you feel you are more human? 
Ayelet: I don't feel you are acting humanely toward me. 
Noor: I think that if you were on the outside, in the same circumstances, the same 
situation…[where] we have power and we are expressing our wishes and battling 
for our rights, you would behave the same way there too. 
This dialogue illuminates the connection between the threat, the dehumanization, and the 
power relationships. The association that came to mind for Ayelet was that, were the Palestinians 
in reality strong like the Palestinians in this group, they would kill the Jews or kick them out of 
the country. A strong, assertive Palestinian group evoked images of massacre. The Palestinians' 
strength, manifested in assertive speech, the expression of anger, and equality in the process 
from the standpoint of the power relationship in the room, connected with the existential threat 
and made the Jews feel weak. Via the inhuman images of Arabs harbored by the Jews, the threat 
was associated with killing and annihilation.  
When the struggle over “who is more humane” was at its height, processes of mutual 
delegitimization occurred. Each group proffered examples of the inhumanity of the other group, 
and the dialogue escalated in intensity. Usually the process of dehumanization was not mutual 
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and was expressed mainly by the Jewish group toward the Palestinian group, but in this specific 
phase of the process it was mutual therefore we mention it. The Palestinian group confronted the 
Jewish group mainly with their military service and accused them of being murderers.  
Adnan (P): How many Arabs did you murder during your army service, Ido? And 
you, Sigal, how many Arabs did you murder? 
The Palestinians did not let up, and they compared the Jews to Nazis with regard to the 
injustices of the occupation – a comparison that the Jews took very hard. In this tough battle over 
who is more humane, the Jewish group proffered images of the Palestinians as murderers and 
terrorists.  
Ido (J): I think that you wouldn’t mind being a part of this, that you don’t just take 
sides but would also plan terrorist missions…Am I really sitting here with people 
who could plan suicide bombings? 
At the height of this struggle over who is more humane, the processes of delegitimization were 
reciprocal. 
The differentiation between understanding terror and justifying terror was important for 
the Palestinian group:  
Hatem (P): I don’t justify it but I understand the feelings of someone whose house 
was razed; he spent quite a few years of his life in prison and was tortured by 
those criminals in the Border Police. 
Sigal (J): In spite of all that, it isn’t justified. 
Smadar (J): He is and he isn't 
 
Who is More Humane? 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 2 
321  
Hatem: I'm not justifying it, but I understand it. I understand what brought him to 
do something like that, and besides, he has no past, and he has no future, so he 
has nothing to fear. 
Sigal: So why aren't you justifying this? I don't understand why you-all aren't 
justifying it? If he has no past and he has no future, why don't you justify it? 
Hatem was giving Sigal a hard time. He refused to concede the distinction between 
justification and understanding, perhaps because relinquishing this nuance would have taken him 
to an inhumane place where he didn’t want to go.  Sigal was in distress; evidently it would have 
been easier for her if they had admitted justifying terror. This admission would have reinforced 
the inhumane image she had of them, but she was thwarted. The mission of the Palestinian group 
to preserve its humane image throughout the dialogue proved to be a difficult one. 
The extremist image is voiced when the Palestinians demand a civil state. 
The second situation that evokes the inhumane image of the Palestinians happened when 
the Palestinian group at the 9th meeting tried to promote the solution calling for “a state of all its 
citizens.”  
Ido (J): If the Palestinian residents of Israel identify with the Palestinians in the 
occupied territories who are fighting us and there are suicide bombings that blow 
us up and hurt us, and opinions become more extreme…the ideas raised here are 
very, very radical, positions that barely accept our existence here, our right to 
exist here, so we have to take some kind of stand that defends us, and there isn’t a 
lot of room there for integration, unfortunately. I wouldn’t want this, it’s not my 
ideal, but I’m responding to you. 
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Ahmad (P): When people talk about a solution they are talking about a certain 
partnership between citizens, you were talking from hostility, like how can I let 
my enemy... 
Sigal (J): What partnership are you talking about here? You are hurting us every 
day.  
  Again we see parallel discourses that do not meet. Ahmad tried to promote the solution of 
a civil state, from a desire to be a part of that state. When this happened, Ido mentioned the 
image of the enemy threatening its existence and said that therefore it could not accept the civil 
state as a solution. Ido was aware that justification of continued control over Palestinians did not 
sound liberal but claimed that he is just responding to the extremist positions that the Palestinians 
expressed in the group. Later in the group process we have another excerpt on this issue: 
Ido: Extrimism we heard here a lot. We have heard that actually we (the Jews) do 
not have the right to exist in this place, maybe in another place but not here. 
Adnan: You didn't hear that from us.  
Nur: We didn't say that. 
Sigal: You said so (to Ahmad) all the time you speak about bi-national state.  
The extremist image served as a tool to restore the power of the Jewish group.  
            One incident in the life of the group illustrates particularly well how 
images of Palestinians as extremist, vitriolic, and uncivilized were imposed on the 
Palestinian group in the encounter – and how this worked to restore the power of the 
Jewish group and weakened the Palestinian group. The incident occurred during the inter-
university weekend workshop, which brought together students from the course 
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examined here (University A) and students in a similar course at another university 
(University B). The workshop took place toward the end of the first semester. At the 
workshop’s opening session, Jews from University A were complaining to the group 
from University B that the Palestinians in their group were very extremist and were 
deficient in their ability to empathize, and that the discussion was uncivilized. They 
reported this in the getting-acquainted session at the start of the workshop and continued 
in the same vein in the various forums that followed. 
Ido: I have a question to you. When someone was hurt did the other group the 
Arab group expressed empathy? Identification with that  person since in our 
group it didn't happened the dialogue was uncivilized and the opinions were very 
extremist. 
Ahmad: I disagree to this discourse of extremism because it isn't clear what is 
extremism.  I clarified my opinions through the interaction with the other.  
The Jewish and Arab participants from University B argued that in their course, 
the discussions were not as stormy as at University A, but rather were quiet and cultured. 
The Palestinian participants from University A spoke out in their own defense and 
explained that the tumultuous dialogue reflected a hard reality rather than the absence of 
a culture of civilized dialogue. The Palestinian participants from University B responded 
that their more cultured tactics are more effective in conveying their message to the 
Jewish group, whereas the militant style was less effective in doing so.  
For the Palestinians, influencing the Jews was very important. Ido was arguing that the 
assertive Arabs from his group had radicalized him. By contrast, the Arabs from University B 
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had been able, in two hours, to influence him more than the Arabs in his own group had 
succeeded in doing over an entire semester. He was using this comparison to try to divide the 
two Palestinian groups and to win over the Palestinians from University B. 
 Ido (J): I listened to people from University B, to Arabs mainly. I personally was 
very impressed, and I was more moved than by any other discussion I had or 
people had with me during the semester we have been together…In our group, 
we’ve only had this verbal sparring. My views became more radically right-wing 
since coming to the group. 
The Palestinian participants as well as Jews from University B explain that they indeed 
were more effective in changing the Jewish group through their gentle way.  
Palestinian participant from University B: We also talk about difficult things and 
sometimes shout but, in my opinion, there is much more of a desire to listen and 
much more sensitivity to the feelings of the other group. 
(J)  from University B: There is less anger that makes this possible. With you, it’s 
still terrible, people really attack each other… 
Ahmad (P) from University A: I feel strongly that the Arab group from University 
A is being pushed into a corner and blamed for not listening.  
The struggle here was about the question of who is better able to influence the Jewish group. 
This issue developed during the joint workshop and assumed the dimensions of a serious conflict 
between the two groups of Palestinians over the most effective tactic for the struggle – courteous 
vs. confrontational – and this came up in the plenary forum. The Palestinians from University A 
blamed the Palestinians from University B for lack of national feeling and for conducting 
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“hummus and falafel” (polite and superficial) encounters – a telling insult in an Intifada year. 
The Jews from University B defended the Palestinians from their group and testified to major 
changes they themselves had undergone, but when the Palestinians (University A) appealed to 
the Jews in their own group to testify that the message had gotten across, the Jews were mostly 
silent, suggesting a failure to convey the political message. Ayelet (a Jewish student) confessed 
that the Jews at her university (A) were not all that cultured themselves, and voiced extremist 
positions too: 
The truth is that I really feel that the Arab group from my university has been put 
on trial here...And I feel that there's some kind of injustice, I mean, that we are 
remaining silent is because it is very convenient for us to keep quiet, because 
there is someone who is really doing the work for us, and yells at the Arabs from 
our group and  tell you  it’s very hard with you, you’re very aggressive and it’s 
terrible…By the way, there's something twisted about this, because it's not that 
we're sitting here miserably while they shout at us; they are getting some very 
aggressive and extremist responses from us.  
Ayelet mentioned that the Jewish group, as the more powerful group, must bear 
responsibility for its actions. No longer could they hide behind weakness or victimhood, as we 
saw in the earlier phases of this workshop; instead, responsibility was taken for the majority 
group’s belligerent attitude and behavior. Her words in fact sparked changes among other Jewish 
participants, who subsequently admitted to a process of accumulating power during the weekend 
and took ownership of their power.  
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In the joint workshop, the facilitators and the lecturers of the two groups mentioned that 
the process in the two groups was quite similar, with only small variations in content and in the 
dynamics between the Jews and the Palestinians. Statements to this respect were made by the 
staff of the courses during a session following the plenary session mentioned above; this later 
session was conducted as a staff meeting that was open to the participants.  
The Lecturer of University B (P): It isn’t true that the Arabs in University B were 
moderates,they raised very difficult issues, for example the right of return. I was 
surprised to see the compromise they got from the Jewish group. 
The lecturer of University A (J): I do not think both groups have very different 
dynamics and I ask myself what was in the process today that caused both groups 
to polarize and both groups accepted this. I do not think that the Arab group as it 
was presented here characterized the group throughout the course. There were 
different stages in the group and I saw also here that with just a bit of difficult 
dynamics, the group from University B came apart. I think that the processes are 
very similar…For the Jews from University A this competition happened in a 
certain moment in their group in which there is a very strong conflict of two very 
strong forces in the room and it was convenient that somebody else is doing this 
fight (against the Palestinians from their group). I see here two very strong 
groups.  
The Palestinian facilitator of University B: The processes are very similar in both 
groups. I remember the first two or three meetings in University B. They were 
 
Who is More Humane? 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 2 
327  
unbearable. Later something else developed. The processes in both groups are 
similar.  
A week later Nur (P) also related to the processes taking place during the weekend that 
led to a dramatic change in the power relationship between the two groups; she noted that the 
Jews were empowered and the Arabs weakened. 
Nur (P): I feel that we have reached the point where the balance of power in the 
two groups has been reversed, as if throughout the semester it seemed outwardly 
that the Arab group was very powerful and that it was in control of the discussion 
and dialogue,  but now suddenly as a result of some kind of shock, some type of 
encounter, this balance is reversed and the Jewish group regains its power and 
the Arab group gets to a situation where I have no power…and it started right 
after the weekend, I think.  
By means of dehumanization, the Jewish group from University A had been able to 
divide the two Palestinian groups, creating tremendous conflict between them and ending in 
mutual recriminations about allusions to extremist images in the presence of the Jewish 
participants. The internal conflict cost the Palestinian groups from both universities considerable 
power and they emerged from the process exhausted. Meanwhile, the Jewish participants from 
University A, after numerous sessions at which they felt that the Palestinians in their group were 
the stronger party, had now regained their power (when we use the term power here, we mean 
the group who set the agenda and speaks more than the other group in the dialogue).  
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Processes of Change 
The transition from a competitive struggle over who is more humane to a different kind 
of dialogue is a fascinating dialectical process. The seeds of such a change in the Jewish group 
first appear in the uni-national session which is mainly a reflective forum. Noa’s suggestion was 
to stop generalizing.  Here, the homogeneity of the out-group begins to break down.  
Noa (J): You say ‘them.’ I think this is a very dangerous word. Like, because this 
‘them’ often includes ‘he,’…In my opinion, there is some kind of normal division 
here, they have to be given the space to express this. We don’t look enough for 
this difference.  
Thus far, the Palestinian group had struggled valiantly to change the inhumane image 
forced on them, without success. In the seventh session, they took on a different tactic. The 
Palestinians offered examples from reality in which Jews were portrayed as humane, perhaps 
with the intention of making things easier for the Jews. Adnan (P) talked about the Bereaved 
Parents Circle, whose Israeli and Palestinian members demonstrate together against the 
occupation – something Adnan saw as a humane act. 
Ronen(J)): Adnan, do you see this as something good, or bad? 
Adnan (P): No, of course as something good. 
Sigal (J): But it’s hard for you to imagine this. So what does it make you feel? 
Adnan (P): It was hard for me actually to imagine that someone might get this 
idea and especially in this period that they initiated this. Those 300 images that 
they put in Rabin Square, I just see people Palestinians and Jews, who are trying 
despite everything to live together and to do something, and they’re simply 
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creating a grounded place with ideas like these, which are very original in my 
opinion, and very moving, and I don’t know what this is doing to me, Sigi [sic]. 
What stands out here is the astonishment of the Jews at a new type of conciliatory 
dialogue, introduced by Adnan, whom the Jews had stubbornly nicknamed “the extremist.”  The 
Jews were trying to take hold of this new dialogue to make sure it was really genuine. They 
embraced this moment of benevolence, because there is nothing stronger, in establishing their 
identity as humane, than to have the Palestinians acknowledge this humanity—and this, after 
sessions during which they experienced quite the opposite. The group was exhausted by these 
struggles and was looking for a way into a different kind of dialogue. 
The Palestinians distinguished between their attitude toward the Zionist movement and 
their attitude toward the Jews as an additional way of changing the image forced on them.  
Nur distinguished between the two because she wanted very much to refute the extremist image 
and clarify that there was an ideological disagreement there and not hatred based on ethnic/ 
national origin. 
Nur (P): I appreciate the contributions of the Jews, my problem isn’t that 
someone is Jewish. My problem is with the Zionist movement, first of all. And I 
always hear, Nur, you are an extremist, and you always take the negative side and 
you always radicalize things, I’ve heard this. And I think that the Jewish side 
thinks that Nur hates the Jews because they are Jews. It’s not true. I don’t hate 
the Jews, because the bottom line is, we are human beings. But I have a problem 
with the Zionist movement which you represent and which you support.  
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The distinction between Jews and Zionists along with the Palestinian acknowledgment of 
the humane steps taken by the Jews came as a relief to the Jewish participants, who 
acknowledged the suffering of the Palestinians in the occupied territories in the group.  
Sigal (J): Yesterday on television they showed the father of Muhammad Dura 
[Palestinian boy whose father was unable to prevent his being shot] and showed 
Gaza, I felt, I really felt a kind of sadness. I had a hard time with it. On the other 
hand, if I hear about a soldier killed or I know a bereaved family, then it’s awfully 
hard for me. That isn’t detachment, it’s just a kind of acceptance of, like, there 
are contradictions, and I accept them.  
Sigal wanted to emphasize that identification with Palestinian suffering did not mean 
non-identification with the Israeli side, and did not mean joining the Palestinian struggle. On the 
one hand, behind this statement may be a zero-sum view, the assumption that more identification 
with the Palestinians has to mean less identification with her own people. On the other hand, 
what was new in what Sigal was experiencing was the idea that it is possible to embrace both 
feelings simultaneously. The different kind of dialogue offered by the Palestinians also created a 
different dialogue from the Jewish side. Just as there was reciprocity in the escalation of the 
struggle over who is more humane, there was also reciprocity in the more placatory dialogue.  
After the joint weekend workshop the Jewish participants acknowledged that they were 
the group with the power. Letting go of the role of perpetual victim and accepting ownership of 
the identity of the stronger side was one of the main components of the change undergone by the 
Jewish group: 
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Smadar (J): Suddenly they understood that they lost power. They were very, very 
weak… and they weren't crying out the way they had been, they were left with this 
minority-ness of theirs. I had the feeling that maybe it was a happy feeling and 
somehow comfortable for us, to go back to being the strong ones, but there was 
something sad about it. 
Ido (J): The trouble is, we won’t have a partner; we don’t want them to fall apart.  
In facing off with them, we came together, and now they are falling apart on us… 
I have a kind of lonely feeling, not so comfortable, it’s a lot more comfortable to 
shout. 
Sigal (J): I really don’t know how this happened. Maybe in the last meeting, 
suddenly I’m really looking at myself, I really see what shits we are…Really, in 
every area suddenly it did something to me, like, look at yourself  for a second 
and see how you behave, how you and your people behave, and it was 
unbelievable.   
The Jewish group was having trouble because, again, they found it impossible to forge a 
clear identity (a positive sense of belonging to their national group) in contrast to the other 
group's identity while the Palestinians were falling apart. The Jewish group was challenged to 
define a national identity not shaped in opposition to the other and not via struggle, and it turned 
out that this was not such an easy thing. Admitting the ugliness of your own group power in 
oppressing the other is a painful process.    
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In interviews after the end of the course, one of the most common changes reported by all 
the Jewish participants was that they did not see the Palestinians as extremists or as valuing 
human life less than do the Jews.  
Ofra (J): We are a lot like them. We are all hot-tempered to some extent and we 
shout a little. We’re all Middle Eastern types…If we think we’re better, that their 
values don’t hold life as sacred as we do, I don’t think so. We also had our 
suicide bombers once upon a time. From a more Israeli perspective, it would be 
easier for me to say that they don’t care about their life because look, the mothers 
send their children to make war and people commit suicide and on our side no 
one would do that. We’ve done it, we’ve done everything, so we could joke and 
say that we had first claim there...like, been there, done that. We don’t hold life to 
be any holier than they do.  
Ofra, who prior to the process spoke about how the Arabs educate their children to hate 
while Israelis educate for peace, evidently modified her position. The value of life was now held 
to be equal among both peoples, and she felt that the differences at that point came from the 
different reality in the lives of occupier and the occupied and not as moral and cultural inferiority 
in the Palestinian culture. These insights developed among the participants during the last third 
of the course and they were part of the process of taking responsibility for their power, as 
discussed here earlier.  
Ayelet described the changes in the Jewish group’s stance of cultural superiority. 
Ayelet (J): Now their culture does not seem as different from ours. I mean they 
are basically students like we are, and we all take exams. Before, I thought it was 
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this culture like the Bedouin. What stands out more for me is the situation they are 
in as opposed to the situation we are in, and not the cultural markers, but that 
they are in a situation of the minority, of occupation, of a very hard daily 
reality…As if it were natural to say that we accord more value to human life, and 
these are things I grew up with, that they have this exalted goal, and martyrs, and 
we are willing to send back masses [of prisoners] for just one captive [of ours], 
as if the value of human life for us is very, very strong. But on the other hand, we 
also have this “to die for our country.” Before, I was less aware of their pain, the 
mothers’ pain for their children. Today, I don’t know, it’s hard for me to see it 
that way. 
Before the course began, there was a hierarchy of values in the way the Jewish students 
perceived the two cultures, and they felt more humane than the Palestinians. Gradually, all the 
interviewees developed an understanding of the context in which things were taking place; their 
inhumane images changed, and they accepted the idea that the Jewish-Israeli side has some 
responsibility for the situation.   
Discussion and Conclusions  
A group process by self-selected students over a series of workshops allowed us to 
capture the process by which people position themselves in opposition to one another and also let 
us see how, over the longer term, change might happen.  The Jews’ extremist image of 
Palestinians existed prior to the process; these images are acquired via powerful socialization 
processes in Jewish Israeli society (Bar-Tal and Teichman 2005). The question that concerned us 
in this study was not whether the extremist image existed, but rather at what points did the 
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Jewish group choose to use it and for what purpose, and what processes occurred in the group  
through which this image was strengthened or weakened.  
      The rationale for Jews labeling the Palestinians in the group as ‘the enemy’ offered itself 
in the first meeting of this joint workshop, when Palestinians described themselves as 
Palestinians and not as Israeli Arabs. The image of the enemy ascribed to the Palestinians by the 
Jews protects their self-concept of being more moral than the Palestinians. Constructing identity 
through dialogue is an anticipated and natural development in encounter focusing on the inter-
group dimension (Suleiman 1997). This process was perceived by the Palestinians in the group 
as a positive process of shaping their national identity, of empowerment, and as part of the 
struggle to change the situation. They emphasized their Palestinian identity also as a way of 
protesting Jewish hegemony in the State. The Jews designated this self-definition as subversion, 
thereby delegitimizing it. Evidently the life space permitted by the Jews to the Palestinians, 
within which they are allowed to express, develop, and strengthen their national identity and still 
remain human, is limited.  
Oakes (2001) noted three crucial conditions for transforming a categorization into a bias: 
(a) Activating the category: In our case, the fact of the encounter with the assertive, strong 
Palestinian group that defined itself as Palestinian provided the catalyst to activate the category; 
(b) The entire concept is relative to the context: Here, the negative images arose in three 
situations in the majority group: to cope with distress, to preserve its superiority and hegemony, 
and to preserve or restore its power; (c) The process is circular and happens via social 
discrimination: In our case, the will to preserve the discrimination constituted a reason for raising 
the negative and inhumane images of Palestinians, and the inhumane images provide justification 
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for continuing the discrimination. Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005) also noted the circularity in 
processes of delegitimization of Palestinians in the Israeli reality.  
The statements by Palestinian participants about the actions of the Israeli army in the 
occupied territories and about discrimination within Israel caused distress in the Jewish group. 
These statements represented a threat to their perceived moral values. Raising the image of 
extremist Palestinians lessened the difficulty while providing a justification for the situation 
(Sonnenschein, Bekerman and Horenczyk 2010).  
The Jews found themselves torn inwardly between their values of equality and justice, 
and the tale told by the mirror held up by the Palestinian group, where the image of the society 
reflected is inconsistent with the Jews’ own liberal values. Delegitimizing the Palestinians freed 
the Jewish group briefly from having to cope with this inner conflict.  
Findings in the present study suggest that the resolution for this inner conflict in the 
Jewish group was a two-stage developmental process. First, exaggeration of the cultural 
differences emerged, ascribing inhumane images to the Palestinian group, along with a defense 
of the group’s internal values – preserving the state as Jewish; we saw this in the first half of the 
course. When the Jews’ liberalism was challenged, they turned to essentialist concepts linking 
nationality and culture (Helman 2002). Later in the process, when the Jewish participants 
acknowledged that they, the Jews, are the powerful group and when they were aware of racist 
elements within themselves, this pattern disappeared and was replaced by feelings of guilt and 
self-criticism, along the lines of the phenomena observed by Devine (1989).  
The Jewish group also raised the extremist image when asked to agree to equal treatment 
for Palestinian citizens of Israel. A similar observation was made by Bekerman, Maoz and 
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Sheftel (2006) among Jewish facilitators who conduct inter-group encounter. They claimed that 
even in the most ideological, emancipatory setting, the hegemonic forces hold sway.  When the 
Palestinian group asserted its right to full civic participation, and the Jews were asked to 
relinquish their hegemony, they talked about the alleged “support for terror” by the Palestinians 
in the group. The discourse of national security breeds the perception of the stereotypical Arab as 
one whose first priority is to harm the Jews at all times, regardless of costs and benefits 
(Rabinowitz 1992).  
In fact, the Jews at that specific moment in the group process were unable to deal with the 
argument that nullifies full civic participation for Palestinians in a manner congruent with their 
own internal faith, liberal values and equality. This internal conflict was resolved by reference to 
the Palestinians’ demand to rescind the Zionist definition of the state and turn it into a state of all 
its citizens, which was portrayed as a demand to do away with the national existence of the Jews 
in Israel. The Palestinians in the group had not expressed this intention in the group. Palestinians 
reject the Zionist definition of the state as a Jewish national state because that definition excludes 
its Palestinian citizens (Rabinowitz, Yiftahel and Ghanem 2000). The Jews interpreted this non-
acceptance as a negation of their existence. According to this perception, only a national Zionist 
Jewish state can enable their existence. Loss of Jewish hegemony in the state was perceived, 
apparently, as loss of Jewish existence within it. The overlap that the Jewish participants saw 
between the Zionist identity of the state and their national Jewish-Israeli identity, buttressed by 
the inhumane images of Palestinians, seemed to  block constructive, positive dialogue (that could 
open up new options) about the character of the state. Essentializing discourses (those which 
assume that for any specific kind of entity there is a set of characteristics or properties all of 
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which any entity of that kind must possess) of culture and identity are geared towards the 
naturalization of inequality and domination and thereby disguise the context of their production 
and reproduction (Scott 1995).   
The Jewish participants could not enjoy playing with the fantasy of  reversed roles in the 
situation. The expression by the Arab group of a vision of a reversal in the situation prompted the 
Jews into a process of constructing the self which, in fact, is actually done by the other. There 
may be no recognition that can compare in power with the acknowledgment of our humanity by 
someone we are harming. This is why the Jews had such intense need for recognition of their 
humanity by the Palestinians, throughout the encounter process. The Palestinians also exerted 
themselves to receive acknowledgment of their humanity by the Jews, but as a minority group, 
they were unable to get this acknowledgment from the other. As a minority group, they suffered 
from the reverse situation, wherein they got caught in the fixed images of inhumanity attributed 
to them by the majority group.  
Bhabha (1994) has recommended that we no longer look at images, positive or negative, 
but instead begin looking at the process of surrender that becomes possible in a stereotypical 
dialogue. To understand the productivity of colonial power, one must understand how its truth is 
constructed by loci of power, opposition, control and dependency that shape the relations 
between rulers and ruled. The process that began over the joint weekend workshop was an 
example of this surrender process. We saw how the Jewish group’s perseverance in clinging to 
negative images of Palestinians gradually subdued the assertive Palestinian group, but not 
entirely. The Palestinian group was hurt by the images that portrayed it as uncultured, uncivilized 
and extremist. The Jewish group, perhaps unconsciously, exploited this injured place and 
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encouraged a split between the two Palestinian groups; this contributed further to the Jewish 
group’s power and to the Palestinian group's weakness. 
The question of reciprocity in images is a fascinating one. Oren and Bar-Tal (2004) argue 
that generally, the delegitimization processes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are mutual. We 
believe, however, that one may not generalize from those situations regarding the overall 
situation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly between the Jewish majority and the 
Palestinian minority in Israel. In the present study a different pattern emerged: In a situation of 
escalation of the conflict in the group, there was reciprocity in negative images but when the 
discussion was more relaxed, and the power relations less equal, the negative cultural images 
were one-way. The Jews labeled the Palestinians as uncultured, uncivilized and extremist, while 
the Palestinians did not attribute such qualities to the Jews. This pattern is probably connected 
with the asymmetrical power relationships obtaining in the country. 
Unlike similar encounter groups observed by Bekerman (2002),  Helman (2002), and 
Bekerman, Maoz and Sheftel (2006), wherein the researchers observed a vicious circle—with no 
way out, with the stereotypes unbroken, and with participants engaged in discourses that help 
maintain existing ideological patterns of power—the groups analyzed in the present study found 
their way out of the cycle. Each in its own way, the two groups managed to escape the cycle and 
develop a critical and dialectic discourse with the other group. This is fully documented on 65 
hours of video showing a process that was not restricted to a given time frame and enabled a 
dynamic of change to develop. 
The Palestinian group in the present study finally changed the inhumane image imposed 
on it, mainly by persevering in the struggle to show the Jewish group the inhumanity of the 
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occupation and its apparatus of control. Generally, the Palestinians’ efforts to demonstrate their 
humanity nearly always end in failure. The Palestinian group in this case was more successful 
when it persevered in confronting the Jewish group on the plane of its own morality and was 
able, as we have seen, to crack the Jews’ notion of their own moral superiority. The Palestinians 
also tried to pull apart what Jews posit as an inherent link between Judaism and Zionism. In the 
wake of these steps, the Jews’ negative image of the Palestinians began to break down. 
The change that the Jewish group experienced was a gradual process. At first it was 
covert, and we saw attempts to break down the homogeneity of the Palestinian group. Gradually 
the group looked inward and talked about the difficulty of internalizing the accusations made by 
the Palestinian group. Only when the Jewish group acknowledged its own power, did it permit 
itself to be moved to change. The Jewish group finally stopped mentioning the extremist image 
of the Palestinians and admitted to itself, and to the Palestinians, the truth about its own power 
and about immoral acts and injustices perpetrated by the Jewish majority against the Palestinian 
minority.  The Jewish group also acknowledged phenomena of aggression and condescension 
that occurred during the course itself.  
The Jewish group moved to confront the challenge of defining its national identity, not in 
opposition to the other, not through a struggle, and not from a posture of superiority—and this 
turned out to be a substantial challenge indeed. The intergroup conflict serves to reinforce the 
Jewish Israelis’ national identity. When the conflict was less present, there was a vacuum to be 
filled with new content not based on superiority over, or control of, the other.  
The paradoxical notion of achieving empathy or change in deep images through 
confrontation (Maoz, Steinberg, Bar-On and Fakhereldeen 2002) is becoming clearer in this type 
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of research. Here, we observed a dialectic process. The Palestinians' insistence on challenging 
the Jewish group about its morality was influential. Meanwhile, the Palestinian group proffered a 
few examples in which Jews were portrayed as humane, and the Palestinians drew distinctions 
between their attitude toward the Zionist movement and their attitude toward the Jews. The 
Palestinian group may have done that with the intention of making things easier for the Jews. 
Further research may examine the connection between the strategies chosen by the Palestinians 
in the Jewish –Palestinian dialogue and the change in the inhumane images the Jews have of the 
Palestinians.   
We believe this study contributes to a theoretical understanding of intergroup conflicts 
and to an understanding of this type of struggle over who is more humane as it takes place 
between groups with unequal power both on the global and the local level. The research points to 
the importance of addressing the cultural dimension and the deeply-held images that the majority 
group has of the minority group, and of challenging the practice of power by using these images 
in facilitating groups in conflict. Our hope is that this study will also contribute knowledge useful 
to those working in facilitating groups in conflict both elsewhere and in Israel, regarding their 
understanding and interpretation of the processes that take place in encounters of this type, 
thereby enhancing the professional quality of intergroup encounter facilitation. 
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The "Public" in "Public Peace Process" and in "Mini-Publics:"  
A Dialogue between Democratic Theory and Peace Studies 
 
Amit Ron 
 
Abstract 
The recent attention of peace studies scholars to the role of the "public" parallels an increased 
interest of democratic theorists in the legitimacy of "mini-publics:" initiatives that bring small 
groups of citizens together to discuss policy issues.  In fact, democratic activists and peace 
activists who seek to engage the public face similar theoretical and practical challenges.  The 
purpose of this article is to contribute to an emerging dialogue between the disciplines of 
democratic theory and peace studies.  Such a dialogue can be beneficial in at least two ways: it 
allows an exploration of the role of legitimacy in public peace processes and the burdens that 
legitimacy put on the institutional design of such processes, and it allows an exploration of more 
ambitious models of public participation in the peace process. 
 
Introduction 
Traditionally, peace studies understood peacemaking as the realm of diplomats. This is 
no longer the case.  Many scholars of peace studies believe that peace must be made by publics, 
not politicians. Sustainable peace requires a "public peace process:” “sustained action by citizens 
outside governments to change the fundamental relationship between groups in conflict” 
(Chufrin and Saunders 1993, 155-6).  Indeed, Gawerc (2006, 440) notes that in recent years 
peace studies scholarship “have given voice to the critical role that private citizens, local 
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initiatives, and people-to-people activities have in building peace, as well as in maintaining 
conflict.” 
Practically, peace scholars and activists who embrace the notion of a “public peace 
process” focus on grassroots initiatives that try to create ongoing productive dialogue among 
groups of citizens within and across the belligerent sides.  These initiatives operate at two levels.  
At one level, they seek to modify the views of the participants themselves.  At the same time, the 
hope and expectation is that this change of minds will trickle wide and up, so to speak, and lead 
to a similar change of minds in the public at large and among policy makers. 
The recent theoretical and practical interest of peace studies scholars in the role of the 
public parallels similar trends in democratic theory.  Scholars and practitioners of participatory 
and deliberative democracy are exploring the idea of "mini-publics:" initiatives that bring small 
groups of citizens together to discuss policy issues (Fung 2003; Goodin and Dryzek 2006).  
There are obvious similarities between initiatives of "public peace process" and "mini-publics."  
Both try to generate a small-scale model, a microcosm, of a process that has to take place in 
society at large.  The underlying belief of both is that citizens can change their minds when they 
encounter different perspectives, and that they need to have the opportunity to do so for the 
desired social change to be possible.  Furthermore, both kinds of initiatives also face similar 
difficulties.  They are mostly local initiatives and typically with limited budgets (Ross and 
Rothman, 1999, 9, describe them as “bootstrap operations;” see also Dajani and Baskin, 2006, 
75, 107-8).  They often take place in hostile environments which question the very legitimacy of 
the initiative, and the attention that these initiatives receive from politicians and the media is 
mostly scarce and fickle. 
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Given these theoretical and practical similarities, it is surprising that there is very little 
dialogue between democratic theory and peace studies.1  One reason for the lack of dialogue is 
probably the different orientations of the two fields: the theoretical orientation of democratic 
theory vs. the practical orientation of peace studies.  Yet, these orientations too are changing.  
Democratic theorists are increasingly interested in on-the-ground experiments in democracy, and 
peace studies scholars are engaging in theoretically sophisticated reflections about their 
practices.  Within this fertile ground, a dialogue between peace studies and democratic theory 
begins to emerge, and the purpose of this paper is to contribute to this dialogue by examining the 
relevance of works done in democratic theory to the theory underlying public peace process 
initiatives.2
I argue that a conversation between the two research-action areas can be beneficial in at 
least two ways.  First, generally speaking, peace studies understand the role of public 
participation in conflict resolution through the framework of social-psychology (for example 
Azar and Burton 1986; Kelman 1997).  Public participation is a way to shift the discussion from 
the political dimension to the level of inter-personal relationships (Kelman 1999).  In contrast, 
within democratic theory public participation is understood as a pre-condition for achieving 
legitimacy.  Even if officials can reach a stable agreement, the only way to know whether this 
agreement is legitimate is through a process of reflective scrutiny by those who will be affected 
by the terms of the agreement.  A dialogue between democratic theory and peace studies allows 
an exploration of the role of legitimacy in public peace process.  This is not merely a theoretical 
or philosophical question.  The claim for legitimacy depends on aspects of institutional design of 
the public peace process.  To be sure, practitioners in both camps generally engage in an uphill 
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battle in which institutional design is dictated more by the limited perseverance of funding 
agencies and participants than by what is required for gaining legitimacy.  Nevertheless, 
democratic theorists take more liberty to imagine ideal conditions of more control over design 
and therefore engage in a comparative analysis of the legitimacy of different models of 
institutional design.  Their conclusions speak directly to similar issues in public peace processes. 
The second benefit of such a conversation is that it allows an exploration of more 
ambitious models of public participation in the peace process.  In particular, I refer to the model 
of Citizens’ Assemblies on Electoral Reform that took place in British Columbia (2004) and 
Ontario (2008).  In these cases, the provincial government assembled a group of citizens who 
were selected randomly and asked them to study electoral systems and recommend electoral 
reforms to the province if they find that reforms are needed.  What was unique in these cases was 
not just that the government invested comparatively vast resources in the process, and the length 
and depth of the deliberative process itself, but also the fact that the government committed itself 
to submit the recommendations of the assembly to a referendum (Lang 2007; Warren and Pearse 
2008).  Thus, the government took itself outside of the process of decision-making and allowed a 
deliberative body of a small group of citizens to make recommendations to the public at large.  I 
believe that this model serves as a precedent for citizens’ involvement in policy making that 
should excite the imagination of scholars of peace studies (the limited success of the assemblies 
in the referenda and then many differences between electoral reforms and peace agreements 
notwithstanding).   Peace scholars can and should build upon this precedent and study the 
viability of more ambitious models of public involvement in the peace process.3 
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The scope of the discussion is therefore limited to the questions that emerge from a 
dialogue between these two kinds of practical initiatives and the academic scholarship about 
them.  It does not purport to offer a comprehensive survey of the relationship between 
democracy and peace-making.  Furthermore, my focus here is on the question of legitimacy.  
While I believe that both mini-publics and public peace processes are promising and important 
kinds of social activism, I am in no position to assess within the scope of this article the likely 
effectiveness of such initiatives in any particular setting.  
 
Background 
The last two decades witnessed a dramatic change in the terrain of democratic theory.  
While previous generations of democratic theorists understood democracy to be a mechanism for 
fair aggregation of preferences via the mechanism of voting, the "deliberative turn" in 
democratic theory shifted the scholarly attention to the important role of reasonable debate in 
democracy.  In this latter view, the mere fact that a majority of the citizens favors a policy or a 
candidate provides only weak grounds for claiming legitimacy for this decision.  Democracy can 
and should make a stronger claim for legitimacy, which is that democratic institutions provide a 
site for exchange of reasons.  Democratic decisions are legitimate not only because they won a 
plurality or majority of votes but because they are an outcome of public debate.  Strong 
democracy, then, requires a viable public sphere where citizens can freely exchange opinions and 
debate policies.  Furthermore, the strength of democracy depends on the quality of the discussion 
in the public sphere.  Even a viable public sphere would not be legitimate if arguments of certain 
participants are systematically silenced or marginalized.  The public, in this view, is not simply 
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an aggregate of individual opinions but a social sphere where different players demand and give 
justifications for public policies. 
However, when viewed through the lenses of deliberative democracy, many established 
democracies face a deficit, if not a crisis, of democratic legitimacy.  Most citizens choose to 
remain generally passive in their political participation, limiting themselves at best to voting 
every four years.  Furthermore, it seems that there are very limited sites of genuine public 
discussion while the public sphere is dominated by corporate media and the political 
establishment. 
Although some argue that these features are endemic to modern mass-democracies, many 
of those who are interested in promoting democracy look for alternative ways to revive a public 
sphere of discussion and debate.  In particular, the last decade witnessed the rise of initiatives 
that try to create what Robert Dahl (1989) called "mini-publics." These are small groups of 
representative sample of citizens who come together to discuss – by exchanging reasons, not 
simply by bargaining – policy-issues.  These initiatives include Citizen Assemblies, Deliberative 
Polls, Consensus Conferences, Citizens’ Juries, Planning Cells, and a host of other initiatives 
(Goodin and Dryzek 2006, 220). 
For obvious reasons, democratic theorists became interested in these real-life 
experiments.  The question that they ask is how, and under what conditions, these local 
initiatives can be understood as an integral part of democratic decision-making.  Put differently, 
the question that they ask is under what conditions the deliberations and decision-makings which 
take place in mini-publics can claim to be considered legitimate by the public at large. 
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In this context, it is important not to overlook significant changes in the recent mini-
publics are understood by democratic theorists. Earlier generations of deliberative democrats 
understood mini-publics as an approximation of some ideal speech situation in which the power 
of the better argument can prevail.  In this earlier understanding, the burden of legitimacy of 
these initiatives fell on their ability to approximate the ideal condition of free and open 
communication.  More recent theories understand the legitimacy of mini-publics as dependent on 
the interaction between the quality of the inner deliberations and the corresponding deliberations 
in the public sphere at large (Habermas 1996; Bohman 1998; Chambers 2009).  In this view, the 
mini-publics generate a needed space for exchange of ideas, but it is not only impossible but also 
unnecessary to expect the decisions made in mini-public to be legitimate tout court.  Democratic 
theorists who advocate mini-publics see them as one – albeit central and indispensible – tool for 
policy-making within a complex “ecology” of institutions that are needed for establishing 
democratic legitimacy (Warren 2008, 67-8).  In a similar way, the discussion in the following 
sections will not treat public peace processes as the only or the right way to bring about 
sustainable and just peace but will examine the place of such initiatives within a complex 
“ecology” of peace making. 
 
Peace Processes and the Democratic Legitimacy 
But why should decision-makers seek to get the public involved in the peace process?  
What is the advantage of “citizens’ diplomacy” (Davies and Kaufman 2002) over a process that 
takes place solely by professional diplomats?  A dialogue between democratic theory and peace 
studies can bring forth a distinction between two possible purposes of the public peace process: 
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the instrumental role and the legitimacy role.  While the two purposes are often combined in 
practice, it is important to separate them analytically since they pose different burdens on the 
design of the public peace process. 
The first answer to the above questions is that having the public involved in the peace 
process helps “building a peace constituency” and thus increasing the likelihood of achieving a 
sustained agreement that is stable and just (Lederach 1995, 211).  This is a vast 
oversimplification of a complex argument, but for our purpose we can focus on two 
characteristics of this answer.  First, the demand for public participation is instrumental: the 
public is expected to help bring about a “desired result” – namely, peace – that has already been 
set.  The question is will these efforts “add to our overall practical capacity in making and 
building peace?” (Saunders 2000, 265).  Second, within this framework, the question of whether 
public participation is conducive to peace is essentially an empirical question (albeit, again, a 
very complex one).  In some situations, it might be the case that public participation would 
distract the cause of peace. 
According to the second answer to this question, the role of the public is normative and 
epistemic: it is only the public that can make decisions about which terms of negotiation and 
agreement are legitimate.  Diplomats can generate an agreement, but without some form of 
public involvement, it is not possible to know whether the agreement is legitimate.  To explain 
this contention, we need to look more closely at the idea of a procedural conception of 
legitimacy. 
Moral philosophers distinguish between two routes to understand the very concept of 
legitimacy.  One route we can follow in answering this question is identifying some general 
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criteria by which to engage in normative judgment.  For example, if we want to evaluate the 
fairness of a peace agreement, we can follow various criteria.  We can ask whether the agreement 
is stable, whether both sides are treated as equal, whether the cost and benefits of the peace are 
distributed fairly across different groups in society, whether the agreement balances “peace 
versus justice” (Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005; see also Albin 1993), and so on.    What all these 
criteria share is the implicit assumption that the legitimacy of an agreement can be established – 
at least principally – independently of the view of those who are subject to the agreement. 
The procedural, or deliberative, turn in moral and political philosophy suggests a 
different route, according to which the validity of any social norm or institutional arrangement is 
based on the question of whether it can be agreed upon under some ideal conditions by those 
who are subject to it.  The basic idea behind this view, as Seyla Benhabib explains, is that “only 
those norms (i.e., general rules of action and institutional arrangements) can be said to be valid 
(i.e., morally binding), which would be agreed to by all those affected by their consequences, if 
such agreement were reached as a consequence …” of open deliberation among equals 
(Benhabib 1996, 70; I omit the specific conditions).  Put differently, the only way in which the 
normative validity of mutual agreements can be justified is by articulating how it can become the 
object of “reasoned agreement” (Cohen 1997, 73; other notable discussions of democratic 
legitimacy include Habermas 1996; Dryzek 2002; Bohman and Rehg 1997; Bohman 2000; 
Chambers 2003).  The second answer for why to get the public involved in the peace process, 
then, is that it is a necessary condition for reaching a legitimate agreement. 
Now, it is important to notice that this is a philosophical definition of legitimacy and not 
yet an account of an actual procedure for how to reach legitimate decisions. It should not be 
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understood as a procedure that one can follow in order to put a stamp of normative approval on 
any decision or a decision-making process.  Furthermore, most of the political decisions are not 
the product of real or ideal deliberations that involve all those who are affected.  While a good 
argument can be made for why actual wide public deliberation is necessary for establishing 
legitimacy, there are still ways to evaluate the legitimacy of decisions that were reached with a 
procedure that fails to meet a deliberative ideal.   We cannot know for sure what would be the 
outcome of an ideal deliberation, but we can still try to evaluate and argue about whether a 
decision can make a plausible claim to be the subject of a reasoned agreement. 
The understanding of the procedural conception of legitimacy as a general framework 
would allow us to address the questions of what counts as the relevant public. To begin with, at 
its core, beyond the general reference to all those who are affected the conception of the public 
refers to the ability to present arguments regarding the desired terms of social cooperation and to 
assess the validity of arguments made by others.  Technically, the public sphere does not have to 
include all the people but must include all the relevant arguments or viewpoints.  Individuals or 
groups can be represented by others who argue in their behalf.  However, the process of 
deliberation allows participants to better understand their own interests.  Democratic 
representation without deliberation creates a conflict of accountability.  If people elect 
representatives based on their pre-deliberative views, and if the representatives (and only them) 
modify their views in the process of deliberation, then the people who elected them are no longer 
in a position to hold them accountable.  If we allow an elected group of people to deliberate and 
arrive at a reflective decision, we have to find mechanisms for this reflection to trickle down to 
those who elected them. 
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Furthermore, from the perspective of the procedural understanding of legitimacy, the 
question is not only of who should participate but also of the quality of the exchange of reasons.  
In some settings, the mere presence of people who hold certain arguments does not guarantee 
that these arguments will be heard and considered.  Some debates take place in a political 
environment where members of certain groups are afraid or do not feel comfortable to express 
their views.  In addition, arguments can be heard but ignored or be marginalized by those who 
set the tone for the debate.  As we shall see, all of these questions are important for the 
evaluation of the claims for legitimacy of different institutional settings for peace making.  I 
therefore want to leave aside further discussion of philosophical questions about the procedural 
understanding of legitimacy and to look at the legitimacy of the institutional settings in which 
peace processes take place. 
 
Public Peace Process and the Challenge of Legitimacy 
To what extent can the process of traditional peacemaking at the level of diplomats claim 
to reach what would be the reasoned agreement for all those who are affected?  The first and 
most immediate reason why such a process can have a hard time to claim deliberative legitimacy 
is that diplomatic negotiations typically involve exchange of threats and not only exchange of 
reasons.  It is not the case that traditional diplomacy is entirely devoid of exchange of reasons.  
Diplomats and politicians are often required to give an account of the agreement they reached to 
several constituents: their public, third party mediators, the international community, and so on.  
Nevertheless, at least for some of these constituencies (and often the weak ones), there is no 
procedure by which they can ask for reasons and challenge the validity of these reasons. 
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It is possible to argue, however, that in democratic societies diplomats and politicians are 
accountable to the citizens and must provide reasons that they can accept.  Thus, while 
traditional peace agreements are based on exchange of threats between the two communities, 
politicians in democratic societies are accountable to their constituencies and are required to 
justify the terms of the agreement to their public.   However, as I discussed above, such a claim 
has significant shortcomings.   To begin with, even though in democratic societies there are lines 
of authorization and accountability that connect citizens and diplomats, these lines are often-
times broken and it becomes hard to claim that diplomats actually stand-in for the interests of the 
citizens (Francis 2004, chapter 2).  More importantly, even if diplomats are representing the 
interests of the citizens, they are representing their raw, pre-reflective, interests.  Had the citizens 
had the opportunity to deliberate about their own interests, they might have realized that they 
misjudged their perception of their interests.  Thus, even if citizens agree to the peace deal that 
was reached by diplomats, their agreement does not necessarily count as a reasoned agreement.  
Indeed, diplomats often present a hard-line claiming, not incorrectly, to represent the view of 
their constituencies.  However, the often unstated belief underlying much of the peace 
scholarship is that collective reflection can lead citizens to realize that they have a long-term 
interest in reaching peace (this belief is articulated most clearly by critics, see Carr 1946, chapter 
3; Waltz 1959, chapter 3).  Active warfare or the threat of it makes conversation about long-term 
interests more difficult and gives structural discursive advantage to hardliners (Dallmayr 2004). 
I now turn to examine the way in which public peace processes can claim to address the 
“deficits” that are inherent in traditional peace-making.  The challenges for peace activists is that 
a protracted conflict creates both political institutions and a public sphere that are not hospitable 
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for reasoned debate, especially when such a debate requires re-thinking the relationship with the 
other side.  Public peace processes try to generate an institutional space where members of the 
public can exchange arguments about the terms of the desired peace agreement.  Now, these 
processes do not understand themselves as being stand alone processes, but as processes that 
interact with the public at large and with the political system.  Unlike peace education initiatives 
(Harris and Morrison 2003, 81, 84; Wallach 2000, chapter 8), they typically do not intend to 
change only the hearts and minds of the participants, but to make broader change.  Therefore, to 
evaluate their claim for legitimacy, we need to discuss both the quality of the space that is 
created and the channels by which the local deliberations are communicated to the public at 
large. 
Scholars of public peace process make a distinction between "internal and external 
effectiveness" of the process (Gawerc 2006, 451; Ross and Rothman 1999).  Internal 
effectiveness refers to the impact of the process on the participants' perceptions and external 
effectiveness refers to its impact on the conflict itself.  We can now add a parallel distinction 
between the internal legitimacy and the external legitimacy of the process.  A process is 
internally legitimate to the extent that participants had the ability to openly express their 
positions, to reflect on them, and to modify them.  It is externally legitimate when the public at 
large come to see process and its outcome as legitimate.  Again, internal and external claims for 
legitimacy are philosophical constructs.  They refer to acceptance of the legitimacy of the 
deliberation for the right reasons, not simply to the view of the majority of the people.  It is 
possible that a group of people will view a process of deliberation in which they participated as 
fair and legitimate but would not be aware that the moderator provided them with biased 
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information.  Similarly, it is possible that the public at large would not accept the legitimacy of a 
decision reached by an internally legitimate process because the media misrepresented the nature 
of the process. 
To illustrate, let us examine a hypothetical case of a public peace process that consisted 
of peace activists from both sides.  They conducted several meetings in which they got to know 
each other and learn the issues in depth.  Throughout the process, they confronted their own 
biases in a honest and productive way and were able to reach agreement on wide variety of 
issues.  Furthermore, favorable media coverage led to some positive public reactions.  However, 
critics of this initiative pointed out that the participants hardly represent the views of the public at 
large since the participants were pro-peace from the get-go.  This process turned out to be 
effective both in terms of its internal effectiveness and in terms of its external effectiveness.  
However, there is a challenge to the forum’s claim of legitimacy since it cannot claim to 
represent the likely outcome of deliberations had all views been involved. 
In what follows, I am drawing on works in democratic theory to examine the way three 
aspects of the design of public peace processes can affect their claim for legitimacy: the 
purposed influence of the forum, the choice of its topic, and the choice of the participants. 
 
The "Macro Political Uptake" 
To assess which institutional designs work, we first need to discuss what work they are 
expected to do.  Goodin and Dryzek identify different “possible pathways” through which mini-
publics can have a “macro political uptake:” actually making policies, recommending policies, 
informing public debates, “market testing” of policies, legitimating policies, confidence or 
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constituency building, as a way to exert popular oversight over public officials, and as a way to 
resist co-option (2006, 225; for a comparable list of public peace processes, see Rouhana 2000, 
312-318 and Dajani and Baskin 2006, 91).  For our purposes, we can focus on a more basic 
distinction that underlies these different “pathways.” 
There are two kinds of relationship between the forum and the public at large.  The forum 
could be understood as inward oriented.  In this understanding, the purpose of this forum is the 
change that occurs among the participants themselves, either in reaching outcome or the changes 
in dispositions.  The main burden of legitimacy is expected to fall on the internal working of the 
forum.  The public at large is expected to endorse the outcome of the forum in virtue of the 
process itself.  Alternatively, the forum can be understood as providing a public display of 
reasons.  In this understanding, the role of the forum is to play out different possible reasons for 
the public at large to see.  The ultimate burden of decision is on the public at large and the main 
challenge is to ensure that the public gaze focuses on what takes place in the forum.  While in the 
former understanding, the members of the forum are accountable for the decision that they make, 
in the latter understanding they are accountable in the sense of providing an account of the 
possible reasons (Brown 2006, 211-212). 
These understandings are not mutually exclusive.  The Citizens’ Assemblies on Electoral 
Reforms that took place in BC and Ontario were expected to provide both a decision and a public 
display of reasons.  Citizens were invited to engage actively with the deliberations of the 
assembly by observing the meetings of the assembly, interacting with its members in public 
meetings, reading its educational material and its reports.  However, it was argued that citizens 
who were not willing or unable to inform themselves have a reason to vote for the proposal of 
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the assembly to the extent that they trust the deliberative process (Ferejohn 2008).  In fact, the 
failure of the assemblies to get sufficient voters’ support for their proposals is not a significant 
concern if they are understood as a public display of reasons: their value is that they allowed 
voters who want to make an informed choice to familiarize themselves with the relevant 
considerations in favor of or against each option. 
The intended “macro-political uptake” of the forum is important for the first aspect of the 
design: whether the deliberations of the forum are to be public or private.  The advantage of a 
forum that takes place in secret, or at least away from the media, is that it potentially allows for 
higher quality discussion.  The danger of open and public discussion is of what Simone 
Chambers  (2005, 260) calls “plebiscitory reason: [s]peakers …appeal to what they think are 
common or public values but with a twist. Under the ‘glare’ of publicity these arguments may 
become shallow, poorly reasoned, pandering, or appeal to the worst that we have in common.” 
However, as Chambers observes, the lack of publicity creates two opposing challenges.  First, it 
opens the door to the possibility of manipulation and to the promotion of private interests.  
Secrecy increases the capacity of organizers, moderators, and participants from powerful groups 
to manipulate the agenda and the decision-making process.  Second, the seclusion of the forum 
can be self-defeating because it creates a deep gap between the deliberative forum and the non-
deliberative public at large.  Since the public did not have a chance to go through the process of 
deliberation in the forum, the conclusions of the forum would be unpalatable and would be 
endorsed or rejected not for the right reasons.  The problem is that the more the participants 
change their views in the process of deliberation, the less likely it is that ordinary citizens will 
see them as their representatives.  In peace studies, this same problem is called the problem of 
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“re-entry:” “what happens to those who participate when they re-enter their society” (Gawerc 
2006, 449).  Chambers argues that the answer to the threat of plebiscitory speech is “to look at 
ways of minimizing the plebiscitory effect in public,” and “not a carte blanche to go behind 
closed doors” (2005, 263). 
Public peace initiatives focus almost exclusively on the inward oriented approach to the 
forum.  They do not see the forum as a public display of reasoning but as a consensus-forming 
mechanism.  They general recommendation in the scholarship is that the meetings will take place 
away from public gaze, preferably in secrecy (Chigas 2005, 132).  For example, Harold Saunders 
underscores the need to generate a “safe space,” one that would allow the participants to have the 
freedom to change their views (Saunders 1999, 14, 61, 105).  Obviously, in cases where meeting 
with the enemy can put participants in danger, secrecy is unavoidable.  But peace studies 
scholars appear to argue that seclusion is a virtue in itself since it provides the setting for much-
needed changes of mind. 
The focus of peace studies scholarship on inward oriented initiatives led the field to some 
extensive exploration of the problem of how to “transfer” the outcome of the initiatives (Gawerc 
2006, 449).  However, the main focus of peace studies is in transferring the outcome along the 
channel that goes from the forum to the decision-makers.  The expectation and hope is that the 
innovation and transformation that takes place within the “safety” of the forum will expand 
decision-makers’ horizons of what is possible (Saunders 1999, 136; for a similar argument, see 
O'Flynn 2007, 743-746). 
Some initiatives tackle the challenge of transfer by recruiting lower-key players in the 
hope that they will implement the change of minds in the policy circles where they work (Davies 
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and Kaufman 2002, 6).  Herbert Kelman (1995, 21) argues that the problem-solving workshops 
between Israelis and Palestinians that he organized over the years developed “cadres prepared to 
carry out productive negotiations.”  He describes how these cadres, who were “pre-influential” at 
the time of the workshops, “moved into positions of leadership and influence.”  Nevertheless, 
this sleeper-cells solution to the problem of transfer is a dangerous move from the point of view 
of legitimacy.4
What is neglected in Kelman’s answer to the “transfer” problem is a discussion about the 
transfer in the channel that goes from the forum to the public at large – even if the cadre reached 
internally legitimate agreement, and even if it is successful in implementing it, how can the 
public go through the change of minds that took place in the forum?  Here, I believe there is a 
need to think of public peace processes that follow a “non-sequential model” in which there are 
built in sites for quality deliberations but at the same time allow for interactive exchange of 
reasons with the public at large (Chambers 2005, 263). 
  To the extent that Kelman’s description is accurate, it strengthens the view of 
those in the Israeli right who see the Oslo Accord as a hostile take-over by this cadre. 
 
The Topic 
Democratic theorists distinguish “cold” topics from “hot” ones, where participants feel 
passionate about the topics and are emotionally invested in the decision (Fung 2003, 345; Dryzek 
2005, 229).  As Dryzek (2005, 229) rightly observes, “[d]eliberation tied to sovereign authority 
in divided societies is about as ‘hot’ a setting as one can imagine.”  Since, as he goes on, “most 
conceptions of deliberative democracy require reflection and the possibility that minds can be 
changed in the forum itself,” this is unlikely to happen in any deliberative forum.  Dryzek argues 
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that in divided societies the locus of dialogue should be in the public sphere at large, where 
changes of opinions are gradual and slow, and not in the intense exchange of reasons that takes 
place in a mini-public. 
Dryzek’s conclusions should be qualified.  To begin with, as we know from our 
experience in the classroom, hot topics make for more dynamic, engaged, and possibly 
meaningful discussion (Fung 2003, 345).  More importantly, failure to reach agreement is not 
necessarily a failure of legitimacy.  Deliberative forums are not intended as a panacea, a sure 
way to reach legitimate conclusions.  A failed well-designed “hot” forum can be instructive for 
the public sphere at large precisely because of the quality deliberations that took place in it.  
Indeed, public peace processes often see themselves as one catalyst in the slow process of 
changing public view.   
A second question regarding the topic is to what extent organizers should leave the topic 
itself open.  Should participants be provided with a narrow question that they can hope to tackle 
or should they be left free to frame their own discussion?  Each alternative has its own bearing 
on legitimacy.  The dilemma, as James Bohman (1998, 404) observed, is that “[d]eliberative 
democracy could become a very robust method for deciding very little. Or, it could also easily 
become a very weak procedure for deciding too much.”  If the setting remains vague and open, 
the discussion can wander around without getting to any concrete outcome.  Furthermore, 
concrete questions allow organizers and participants to try and agree on some basic historical and 
empirical “facts of the matter” and to sort out the relevant from the irrelevant. Information 
provided by experts can have more bearing on the discussion when the question is narrow.  If the 
topic itself is ever changing, important factual claims can get lost in the discussion. 
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On the other hand, the setting of the question and the setting of boundaries on the content 
of the discussion are in fact an imposition by powers from outside the discussion.  The 
legitimacy of pre-deliberative decisions is not subject to the procedural standards of legitimacy.  
The more one limits the boundaries of the discussion, the more the deliberations themselves 
become empty.  Furthermore, one of the central arguments for the need for citizens and not 
experts to deliberate is that experts can provide answers to a given question but they cannot use 
their expertise to tell us which questions are the right ones.  The public, and the public sphere, 
are the sites where citizens can transcend instrumental reasons and engage the substantive topics 
that they face. 
 
The Participants 
From the perspective of procedural legitimacy, no other obstacle is more difficult than the 
choice of participants.  The procedural conception of legitimacy requires an agreement to be the 
product of deliberations among all those who are affected.  The forums that this paper discusses 
– mini-publics and public peace processes – try to engage a microcosm of all those who are 
affected.  We have seen that there are different ways to conceptualize the notion of “microcosm,” 
namely to understand the way the forum stand in for the public at large.  Nevertheless, regardless 
of the understanding of representation, the ability of the microcosm to stand in for the public at 
large depends on the ability to recruit the right participants.  There are numerous challenges here.  
Not least in the case of peace processes is the possibility of physical or social harm to the 
participants.  Another challenge that is more significant in public peace process initiatives is the 
relative ease of recruiting those who are already committed to the cause of peace and thus ending 
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up “preaching to the choir” (Abu-Nimer 2001, 250).  Almost exclusively, public peace processes 
rely on recruiting partisans, people who already have some professional or personal investment 
in the conflict (Kaufman 2002, 188-190).  Forums that bring in laypersons commonly understand 
themselves as peace education and are targeted to students. 
From the perspective of the internal legitimacy of the forum, choosing participants who 
present partisan views is an obstacle for legitimacy.  As Hendriks et al. (2007, 362) claim, 
"[t]heir zeal sits uncomfortably with the deliberative ideal that collective political judgment 
should be a matter of public reasoning."  Thus, a forum that includes partisans is more likely to 
replicate the vicious dynamics that take place in the political sphere at large rather than generate 
the virtuous dynamics of sincere deliberation.  If partisans are locked in their own familiar 
positions, both the internal effectiveness and the internal legitimacy can be damaged.  On the 
other hand, there are reasons for why partisans could bolster the dynamics of the deliberations of 
the forum and thus bolster their claim for legitimacy.  Partisans are more invested in the issue 
and they are more willing to engage (Fung 2003, 345).  They discuss issues that they care about 
and therefore any change of minds, if it occurs, will be more authentic and more significant.  In a 
sense, their passion can be more representative of the depth of the issues at stake than non-
partisans.  One challenge to forums that rely on partisans is that some groups might choose not to 
cooperate with the project thus making any outcome of the microcosm less legitimate vis-à-vis 
the public at large.  On the other hand, the forum itself is more likely to have a macro-political 
impact if participants are more publicly visible to begin with and when they have the skills that 
are needed to make the forum itself more visible. 
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The design and the dynamics of forums that rely on non-partisans are different from those 
that involve partisans.  More of the burden of legitimacy falls on the moderators, the education 
program, and the experts who provide the background information for the participants.  When 
participants do not have solid independent knowledge, there is a higher risk that any forum will 
be a disguise for an indoctrination camp.  Designs that are closed to outside information, short in 
time, and allow interaction with only in-house experts are most susceptible to manipulation by 
the organizers.  Designs that allow outsiders to monitor the process and allow participants to 
interact with their communities and with alternative sources of information are far less 
vulnerable to takeovers.  On the other hand, the more the process is open and under the public’s 
purview, the more the participants themselves become vulnerable to outside unwanted influences 
(those that pursue means other than persuasion) by their communities or groups within their 
communities. 
Random selection of participants has two functions in establishing legitimacy.  First, 
random selection is the best way to ensure statistical representation – that the range of positions 
that exist in the public would be reflected in the forum (Fishkin 1995).  In this understanding, the 
claim that a forum is a microcosm of the public at large is based on the statistical representation 
of participants. 
The second – and I believe stronger – argument for random selection is political: it is a 
way to break powerful monopolies over the representation of the interests of each of the 
communities.  In some conflict situations, extremist groups have advantageous position in their 
ability to shape public opinion.  Extremist views typically receive disproportional media 
coverage.  Furthermore, in some cases extremist positions appeal to pre-reflective positions of 
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the public.  War, or even the threat of it, forces the public to focus on the short-term and to 
emphasize security over other concerns.  When the process of deliberation unfolds, participants 
can put the put the view of extremists in perspective. 
 
Conclusions 
As I emphasized throughout the discussion, mini-publics and public peace processes 
should not be seen as a way to replace other channels of making decisions but as a way to 
supplement them.  Nevertheless, wide public participation is an essential component of 
legitimacy, and the lack of it is the main source of the democratic deficit that exists in advanced 
democracies. 
The argument that I present here builds upon and shares the intuitions of public peace 
process scholars who believe that a similar case can be made for many of the peace processes of 
the recent decades.  Elites and diplomats can reach agreements, but these agreements are not 
necessarily in the interest of their citizens.  In some cases, elites might be more inclined to reach 
peace and are more effective in doing it.  But, by the same token, in other circumstances elites 
might be more inclined to pursue war and equally effective in pursuing it.   I believe that public 
peace processes are a viable tool of peace making precisely because it allows participants to 
explore grounds for peace that are mutually acceptable to the citizens.  
So far, however, we have assumed that the main interest of those who organize and 
design the public peace process is to achieve genuine democratic legitimacy.  When politicians 
and organized interests engage in deliberative processes, what they often seek is the appearance 
of legitimacy and a de-facto control of the outcome (Hendriks 2006; Dryzek et al. 2009; Kadlec 
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2008).  In most likelihood, any large-scale visible public peace process would be initiated under 
the auspices of a state or with heavy involvement of major political organizations in the process.  
A state can choose to organize a public peace process as a way to buy more time or to use the 
decisions made by a participatory forum as a way to constrain itself from making concessions.  If 
states would be pressured to organize public forums by a third party, they are most likely to insist 
on strict conditions on the selection of participants, the information that would be presented, the 
character of the deliberative process, the control over the media coverage of the process, and so 
forth.  In all of these cases, the dialogue between democratic theory and peace studies may be 
useful as a tool for social criticism: to understand how powerful players can abuse claims for 
democratic legitimacy to derail rather than promote the cause of peace. 
Generally speaking, current models of public peace process are semi-secretive, inward 
oriented, and (at least some) seek to influence decision-makers directly.  Such models work best 
when the stakes of the process are low; when key figures from both sides are brought together by 
peace activists to try to examine possibilities for mutual understandings.  However, the more 
public peace processes become central and visible players in peace making, the more current 
models become dangerous.  Closed, secret meetings where broad representation is not 
guaranteed are easier to manipulate so that they reach some pre-determined outcomes under the 
guise of democratic legitimacy.  Peace studies scholars should examine models of public peace 
process that are more visible and in which legitimacy emerges not only from the inner working 
of the small group but mainly from its interaction with the public at large. 
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Notes 
1 The instances of the dialogue between the two fields are yet spotted and preliminary.  Saunders (1999: chapter 
three) refers to the deliberative aspect of democracy as “the missing thread in democratic thought” (55) and as a 
model for the public peace process.  A workshop that took place at MIT in the summer or 2005 explored the 
relationship between on deliberative democracy and dispute resolution (but not in the context of peace studies),  
http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/Urban-Studies-and-Planning/11-969Summer-2005/CourseHome/.   Vivienne Jabri’ 
(1996; 2007) and Daniel Wehrenfenning (2008) draw on Habermas for exploring the communicative dimensions of 
peace process.  See also, O'Flynn, 2007; Richmond, 2008; and Caspary, 2009. 
2 To maintain terminological consistency, I will use the term ‘public peace process’ for forums that deal with peace 
process, the term ‘mini-publics’ for forums that address other policy issues, and the term ‘forum’ when I refer to 
both kinds of forums. 
3 The deliberative poll that was conducted by Stanford's Center for Deliberative Democracy in Northern Ireland is an 
example of such initiative.  However, the topic for the discussion was aspects of the education system, which is 
related only indirectly to the core issues discussed in peace negotiations.  See Fishkin et al., 2009. 
4 I do not suggest that Kelman advocates a “sleeper-cell” approach.   In fact, he advocates recruiting “individuals 
who are politically influential but not directly involved in the foreign-policy decision-making process.  The 
important consideration is that they be active and credible contributors to the political debate within their own 
communities and thus can play a role in changing the political environment” (Kelman, 2002: 179). 
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On the Cusp of Water War:  
A Diagnostic Account of the Volatile Geopolitics of the Middle East  
 
Ahmed Abukhater 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides a diagnostic account of the nature and severity of the trans-boundary water 
resources conflict in the Middle East and how it is intertwined with issues of high politics. The 
concepts and analytical framework provided in this paper represent universal principles that, 
while applying to the Middle East water conflict, are also reflective of and applicable to many 
other disputes over natural resources around the world. This aspect about the research is 
particularly of great interest to the quest and scope of many other researches, considering the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is regarded as the sine qua non from which many troubling aspects 
emanate in different part of the Middle East and beyond. By outlining the problem and the root 
causes and nature of the water crisis in arid regions, this paper seeks to provide evidence of lack 
of equitable water sharing in the status quo water allocation and ample justification for the need 
to apply equitable principles to promote cooperation and peace. More precisely, this research 
will reflect on the way in which conflicting representations of hydrological resources have 
created tension, conflict, and injustice in general, with particular emphasis on the Middle East 
water conflict issues of the occupied territories, namely the Palestinian territories and the Golan 
Heights.  
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“Till taught by pain, men know not waters’ worth” - Byron 
Introduction 
Water scarcity is a real problem in the Middle East. In such a semi-arid region, the 
scarcity of water affects the Middle Eastern political arena as much as it affects the lives of its 
inhabitants. The relationship between the hydrological resource use and geopolitical 
representations has always been intimately linked whenever these resources are potentially 
available from either side of a political border. Working in unison together, water use and 
geopolitical representations provide us with diagnostic tools that help trace the roots of one of 
the most pervasive conflicts involving water – the Arab-Israeli dispute, namely the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the issue of the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria.  
Reflecting the growing competition for water in terms of quality and quantity, the 
issue of water shortage (as a key driving force of international disputes) has become the 
focus of many conflicts around the world in general, and more specifically in the context of 
arid regions. The concept of “water wars,” as suggested by Starr (1991), has increasingly 
become an important element of the political rhetoric, and can best be supported in light of 
the Israeli-Palestinian case, where disproportional allocation of water has emerged as an 
obstacle to peace and prosperity. Under this argument, lack of water and the need to secure 
adequate water supply can become a matter of national security and prioritized political 
and military objectives (Mirumachi 2007). In 1967 and prior to the Six-Day War between 
Israel and other Arab countries, the Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol stated that “water is 
a question of survival for Israel,” and that “Israel will use all means necessary to secure that 
the water continues to flow” (Biliouri 1997). Commenting on the same event of the 1967 
Six-Day War, the Crown Prince of Jordan stated that the war of 1967 “was brought on very 
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largely over water related matters” and predicted that without an international water 
agreement in the Middle East by 2000 “countries in the region will be forced into conflict” 
(Irani 1991). These statements and others are frequently referenced in support of the 
“water wars” rhetoric. Because of dramatic population growth and the staggering 
technological advancement of the 20th century that made great volumes of water 
extraction possible (Grover 2007), many scholars have gone even further to suggest that 
the next war will be fought over water. Gleik (1993) for example explains that water in 
these arid contexts can become an instrument for war and can easily escalate to a 
contentious issue. To that end, Dr. Ismail Serageldin, former vice president of the World 
Bank remarked in 1995 that “the wars of the next century will be about water” (New York 
Times, August 10, 1995). In such an arid region, water is an extremely confined and 
precious natural resource that, according to this paradigm, evidently triggered wars in the 
past and could possibly be the reason for peace in the future. In support of this argument 
that water, if not utilized as a catalyst for peace and stability, can potentially be a source of 
conflict and war, the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan states that “fierce 
competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future.” 
He later added, “But the water problems of our world need not be only a cause of tension; 
they can also be a catalyst for cooperation. If we work together, a secure and sustainable 
water future can be ours” (Annan 2001).  
Contrary to the “water war” paradigm that views water as the source of past conflicts and 
future wars, this paper provides an alternative approach to conflict resolution that, by promoting 
a vision of peace through equitable allocation of disputed natural resources, views water as a 
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venue for future cooperation. In keeping with the argument that inequitable water allocation 
schemes undermine chances for peace, water is not the source of conflict but rather an obstacle 
to peace. With the same token, if water is in fact an obstacle to peace, resolving the water issue 
means removing a major obstacle to attaining peace. As such, water can be a catalyst for peace 
and the reason for the disputing nations to come together to the negotiation table. According to 
Dr. Haddadin (2002), former president of the Jordan Valley Authority who served as the senior 
water negotiator on behalf of the Jordanian side in the Israel-Jordan peace talks, “water, after all, 
is used to extinguish fires, not to ignite them.” 
The water crisis of the Middle East has many geopolitical dimensions that tend to 
contribute to this dispute. On the whole, the water crisis is the result of the limited water 
resources, the exponential population growth and the consequent rise in water demand, coupled 
with the regional competition on trans-boundary water resources that is fueled by the overall 
conflict. In essence, four major dimensions are identified as the main characteristics of the 
volatile geopolitics of the Middle East. These dimensions include the political and hydro-
diplomatic dimension, the hydro-hegemonic dimension, the environmental dimension, and the 
psychological environment and ideological dimension. While the hydro-hegemonic dimension is 
characterized by a power structure imbalance and Israel’s national security concerns, the 
environmental dimension pertains to the unequal water access and infrastructure mishaps, 
inequitable and significantly variable trends of water consumption, and the associated adverse 
environmental consequences; the psychological environment and ideological dimension includes 
the perception of the “other,” different interpretations of the notion of water use “efficiency,” 
perception of the land and the environment, and the dramatic variations of agricultural and 
landscape patterns; and the political and hydro-diplomatic dimension reflects the unstable 
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political atmosphere, discusses the inadequacy of the international law, the failure of previous 
water-related diplomatic attempts, and significant political implications. This paper presents a 
discussion of how these factors relate to each other and influence the overall hydrological 
stability creating tension, injustice, and severe conflict and in turn resulting in a state of “volatile 
geopolitics.” 
 
The Political and Hydro-diplomatic Dimension 
Origins of the Conflict  
The Arab-Israeli conflict dates back to the late nineteenth century and water (among 
other pressing issues) has always been considered key in its perpetuation. The Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, land ownership, and the later establishment of the State of Israel in 
1948, triggered armed conflicts that lasted for decades (Shamir and Haddadin 2003). (This armed 
conflict was interrupted by the 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt and later the 1994 
Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan, both of which were bilateral agreements; Haddadin 
2006.) With the increasingly rising idea of establishing a sovereign state in Palestine for Jewish 
settlers, Great Britain turned over the fate of Palestine to the United Nations, who in 1947, 
decided to partition Palestine into provisional states; one Jewish and one Arab (McKinney 2008). 
The UN Partition Plan allocated 44% of the land to the Arab state and 56% of the land to the 
Jewish state although the Palestinian Arabs constituted more than two thirds of the population 
and owned 93% of the land (Söderblom 2003). Because of its inequitable allocation, the Plan 
was rejected by the Arab states and triggered the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (Söderblom), which 
resulted in the establishment of Israel and the creation of the Rhodes Armistice Demarcation 
Line marking Israel’s borders, including historical Palestine, except for the West Bank and Gaza 
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Strip which were subsumed by Jordan and Egypt respectively (McKinney 2008). The June War 
of 1967, known as The Six Day War, was a decisive event that altered the nature of the conflict 
as much it altered the positioning of the co-riparians and the regional water allocation and 
utilization. For the Arab countries, the outcome of this war was deemed as a defeat, as they lost 
part of their territories and once again Israel reinforced its military superiority. The impact of this 
war was not confined to changing the international border; rather, it also changed the 
demographic characteristics and impacted the co-riparians’ access to water as well as their 
relationships (Louka 2006; Elmusa 1995; Zawahri 2009).  
In the wake of this war, the Armistice Line changed as Israel extended its boundaries and 
took over the Palestinian Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the Syrian Golan Heights, and the 
Egyptian Sinai desert (Lowi 1995; and McKinney 2008). As the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
were transferred from Jordanian and Egyptian dominion respectively to Israel, thousands of 
Palestinian refugees were once again displaced into the neighboring Arab states (Lowi). Except 
for the Sinai, which was returned to Egypt through the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Agreement, 
the resultant international borders created in the wake of the 1967 War are largely maintained 
until today (McKinney 2008). This new border and territorial configuration also impacted access 
to water. Now the Upper Jordan River flows, almost entirely, in Israeli territory (Lowi). By 
controlling the Banyas River, Lake Tiberias, the Lower Jordan River, and expanding its access to 
the Yarmouk River, Israel was able to prevent the neighboring Arab countries from accessing the 
Upper Jordan River, block the River at its exit from Lake Tiberias, and exclusively use the latter 
for its own storage needs (Shamir and Haddadin 2003; and Zawahri, 2009). By doing so, the 
West Bank Palestinians and Lebanese were prevented from accessing River basin altogether 
(Elmusa 1995). With its occupation of the West Bank, Israel gained control over the Palestinian 
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groundwater resources, namely the Mountain Aquifer, which is proven significant to its water 
security (Louka 2006). 
Previous Water-related Diplomatic Attempts  
Throughout history, several water schemes were prepared to utilize the regional water 
resources, including the Jordan River, starting as early as 1899 with the Zionist Organization and 
later under the Mandate (Naff and Watson 1984). In the post-1949 period, Israel and the 
neighboring Arab countries were unilaterally formulating and implanting national water 
development proposals to improve their economies and address the issue of water needs for 
immigration and Palestinian refugees in adjacent Arab countries after the establishment of the 
State of Israel in 1948 (Lowi 1995; and Shamir and Haddadin 2003). During these years of no 
direct communication, both Arabs and Israelis unilaterally proposed many conflicting plans to 
govern and manage the utilization of the shared water resources. The first multilateral 
cooperative venture was lead by the United States in 1953-55, known as the Shuttle Diplomacy 
which was conducted by the U.S special envoy to the Middle East, Ambassador Eric Johnston, 
which proposed the Unified (Johnston) Plan (Lowi; Shamir and Haddadin). Although the Plan 
was never ratified, it was accepted by all Arab states (Elmusa 1995), and became a customary 
law in the region as both sides have generally adhered to its technical details and water 
allocations as it constituted the basis for the Jordan River Valley development thereafter (Louka 
2006; Shamir and Haddadin; Wolf and Newton 2008). 
Despite the conscientious attempts to negotiate and cement an enduring settlement, this 
conflict has been particularly violent since 1967. As tension continued to mount, intermittent 
diplomatic attempts, which continued through the 1970s and 1980s, failed to reach a plausible 
resolution creating a situation of talk-fight (Priscoli and Wolf 2009; Gurr et al. 2001). It was not 
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until the Madrid Peace Process on October 31, 1991, that the PLO and the Arab states entered 
into direct peace negotiations with Israel in Madrid aimed at achieving “a just, lasting and 
comprehensive peace settlement” on the basis of the “land for peace formula” outlined by the 
UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338  (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995). No 
progress was made except through the channels of various secret negotiations that were started in 
December 1992 leading to the Oslo Accords or “Gaza-Jericho First” and the establishment of the 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) (Klieman 2000). In September 1994, the PLO leadership 
in exile returned to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Tamimi 2005). In the same year, Jordan 
and Israel signed a unilateral agreement that governed the water allocation and sharing of the 
Jordan River, the Yarmouk River, and the Araba/Arava groundwater, which excluded key 
regional players such as the Palestinians and Syria  (Haddadin 2002). In April 2003, the “Road 
Map,” a peace plan for a two-state solution, was devised by the Quartet (US, UN, Russian 
Federation and the EU) (Reinhart, 2006).  
The failure of previous diplomatic attempts to land sustainable and robust peace 
agreements is related in large part to the fact that all of these diplomatic attempts variously 
suffered from a number of deficiencies outlined below. First and foremost, in the practice of 
many of these international agreements appears a flaw that seems to have led to only fragile and 
unsustainable agreements at best. This major flaw is related to the fact that all of these previous 
negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis regarding water allocation were based on a 
position-based approach (Rouyer 2000). They attempt to address only the question of entitlement 
to land and water resources instead of addressing actual water needs (Rouyer). This problem 
seems to have its roots in the classic process of distributive bargaining, where one party’s gain, 
while viewed as winning, is considered the loss of the other party (Postel and Wolf 2001). This is 
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coupled with the fact that the zone of possible agreements, or ZOPA, between the two parties did 
not even exist in the previous stages of diplomatic efforts and negotiation, which have been 
focused on dividing the resources of the region, namely land and water, rather than sharing them 
(Scheumann 1998). Furthermore, resolutions over water were not part of these attempts, as 
water, Jerusalem and the right of return were the main three issues that were deferred to the final 
round of negotiations (Wolf 1995a).  
Another fundamental flaw is concerned with the challenges in establishing and presenting 
accurate data for water needs, let alone agreed upon reflective consumption figures (Alatout 
2006). Conventional approaches proposed to address the water crisis of the Middle East have 
been problematic as they often tend to establish needs that are either exaggerated or 
underestimated. This is because the production of scientific data and environmental narratives 
regarding the use of water and its environmental consequences is influenced by power 
imbalances as well as the hegemonic structure (Alatout). The accuracy of water data was in 
question as both sides often present different figures regarding water availability and current and 
future demand. Another major problem from which previous water allocation plans suffer lies in 
the evident disconnect between reaching an agreement and its implementation. Almost all of the 
previous negotiations suffered from the lack of implementation. It was not until the 1990s that 
conflict progressed from agreements to partial implementation (Shmueli 1999). However, this 
classical negotiation process that was once thought to be revolutionary is now yielding another 
surprise. The dispute reverted back to a stage of “talk-fight” and the negotiation between the 
Palestinians and Israelis have come to a screeching halt (Gurr, et al., 2001).  
Inadequacy of International Law  
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It is often the case that both the Palestinians and Israelis ground their arguments in the 
negotiation over water allocation on principles of international law. These include the Hague 
Regulations of 1907, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the Helsinki Rules of 1966, and the 
1997 UN Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of Watercourses (Wolf 1999). While it 
introduces elements of water needs, the international law is more concerned with issues of 
sovereignty over water resources. The Helsinki Rules of 1966, which put emphasis on the right 
to “beneficial use” rather than the right to water per se (Housen-Couriel 1994), provided eleven 
factors pertinent to hydrographic and socio-political criteria (Wolf). Similarly, the 1997 UN 
Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of Watercourses provided general guidelines for 
equitable water allocation. The two main principles introduced in the 1997 UN Convention are 
“equitable and reasonable utilization” and “no significant harm” to other watercourse states 
(Diabes-Murad 2004, 5). It further gives “special regards” to the “requirement of vital human 
needs” (Fathallah 1996, 144). Although the concept and guidelines for “reasonable and 
equitable” sharing of common waterways were introduced in the Helsinki Rules of 1966, as well 
as the 1997 UN Convention, no clear definition of this concept was provided (Caponera 1985).  
In handling the conventional long-standing dispute between upstream and downstream 
riparians and existing and future uses, the international law provides more protection for the 
downstream users and existing uses (Wolf 1999). This practice is often conducted with little 
regard for environmental concerns. Although it laid some ground rules to manage the sharing of 
the disputed water resources, international law seems ambiguous and in many cases 
contradictory (Wolf 1996). In addition, the law does not provide a clear enforcement mechanism 
to ensure the applicability of its rules (Rouyer 2000).  
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International law is an area of great controversy, however (Wolf 1996; Wolf 1995b; 
Rouyer 2000). Although binding on all nations, the applicability of many elements of these laws 
to the Arab-Israeli dispute is denied by Israel based on claims of irrelevance (Rouyer). In reality, 
Israel continues to deny its obligations as a “belligerent occupier” and further enforces its 
unilateral control of the regional water resources (Rouyer). As such, the current utilization of 
trans-boundary water resources of the Middle East does not comply with the international law, 
namely the “equitable and reasonable utilization” and the “no harm” principles (Diabes-Murad 
2004).  
Hydropolitical Implications 
Water is one of the most critical issues that shape the geopolitical reality of the Middle 
East. Water constitutes a fundamental ingredient in the making of both the Middle East 
geopolitics and bleak realities. In such a semi-arid region, water is a precious natural resource 
that has always been a point of contention, severe political conflict and vicious disagreement. 
Given its political importance, water remains an unresolved challenge facing the entire region. It 
is one of the major issues, along with Jerusalem and the right of return that are deferred to final 
separate rounds of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians (Zeitoun 2008). This is due to 
a number of reasons. First, the extensive reliance of Israel on water resources originated in the 
Palestinian territories, namely the West Bank rain-fed Mountain Aquifer which is the main 
source of domestic water use for Israel, makes Israel hesitant to enter negotiation with the 
Palestinians over water resources that it currently uses. This is because any meaningful 
resolution will inevitably result into a transfer of this groundwater ownership and use to the 
Palestinian population of the West Bank, leaving Israel short of at least one third of its annual 
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water supply (Lonergan and Brooks 1993), which is already insufficient in the face of its 
growing population and water demand.  
Second, the fact that both the Israeli and Palestinian populations depend on the same 
source of water, along with the current unprecedented degree of regional water stress, created a 
situation known as zero-sum game, where one riparian state’s gain is perceived as another’s loss 
(Postel and Wolf 2001). Third, because water is scarce, the Palestinians, and possibly Israel, will 
continue to experience severe water shortages unless a new radical, feasible, and large-scale 
(proportional to the magnitude of the water crisis) alternative source of water, whether on the 
demand or supply side, is to be employed. This alternative could be, as in demand side 
management (DSM), conserving water, or as in supply side management (SSM), finding new 
sources of water to augment water supply by utilizing alternative technologically-driven sources, 
such as desalination of brackish groundwater or seawater, wastewater reclamation, and trans-
boundary water imports (Wolf 1992). Fourth, another major deterrent to formulating a plausible 
negotiation process is the fact that the practice of modern negotiation and conflict resolution is 
relatively new to the Middle East and viewed as a western panacea (Irani 2000). Akin to 
approaches that exhibit a gap between public needs and public policy, previous attempts at 
negotiation demonstrate inability to connect with the local culture and indigenous practice to 
gain general public acceptability (Abukhater 2009). This indigenous perception of modern 
resolution approaches, as a western panacea, prevents advancing negotiations towards more 
plausible agreements and robust implementation (Abukhater).  
However, the difficulty in initiating and reaching agreements over water is not confined 
to only the above mentioned reasons, although relevant and tangible. This is because the 
importance of securing uninterrupted water access for Israel in reality is not a matter of 
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economic considerations or agricultural production. Rather, Israel’s water policy is solely driven 
by political, religious, and ideological realties and motives. It would be more costly for Israel to 
continue monopolizing the Palestinian water resources, which might trigger confrontation with 
the Palestinians, where Israel would have to expropriate a great deal of its resources (Rouyer 
2000). Conversely, it would be a more economically feasible option for Israel to engage the 
Palestinians in a bilateral negotiation process over water and reach a plausible agreement. 
However, Israel, unwilling to immediately tackle the impending water issue until its security is 
assured, seems to opt for the most costly option (Rouyer).  
 
The Environmental Dimension 
Water Access, Infrastructure, and Variable Trends of Water Consumption 
Water access is characterized by legal and technological imbalances. The problem 
partially lies with the exclusive Israeli control of over 85% of all available water resources in the 
region which leaves other riparian countries with less per capita water availability than that of 
Israel (Zeitoun 2005). Israel, upstream riparian, diverts 75% of the Jordan River’s water before it 
reaches the Palestinian West Bank (PASSIA 2002). While Israel, Syria, and Jordan access the 
Jordan River, Palestinians are the only riparian with no access to the water of the river (Elmusa 
1995). Although the Johnston Plan of 1959 clearly constitutes their share of the Jordan River 
water, approximately 200 MCM per year (Rouyer 2000), Palestinians are denied all access to the 
river to the east, in addition to most of the productive zones in the Western Aquifer Basin 
(Zeitoun 2005).  
Technologically, Israel is far more superior to the other co-riparians. The use of more 
sophisticated technology in water installations makes it easy for the Israelis to dig deeper wells, 
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which increases the Israeli excavation capacity. This practice often causes the old and shallow 
Palestinian wells to dry up, which drastically affects the amounts and quality of water that the 
Palestinian communities can extract (Nasser 2003). This technological prism connotes unequal 
access to the same quality and quantity of water that Israelis and Palestinians extract (Zeitoun 
2005).  
Due in part to the above-mentioned challenges concerning the Palestinian water access 
and technological and infrastructure limitation, Palestinians do not receive anywhere near the 
amount of water they need. The per capita Israeli consumption of water is more than five times 
the per capita Palestinian use (Zeitoun 2005). Because of these dramatic differences, attributed 
in part to the lack of Palestinian access to water along with the intermittent water supply of that 
the Palestinian communities endure, water distribution between the Palestinians and Israelis 
reflects a situation of severe inequity.  
Environmental Consequences  
In addition to the consumptive and exploitive water use imposed by the “tragedy of the 
commons” situation where each state competes to divert the greatest amount of water and 
prevent others from doing the same, this situation of inequity has a number of substantial 
environmental ramifications, including, but not limited to, the deterioration of the quantity and 
quality of water for the Palestinian communities, the salinity of the Jordan River and the 
declining trend of the Dead Sea water levels (Haddadin 2002; Rouyer 2000). More than 80 % of 
the Gaza Strip’s potential drinking water is not compatible with the standards of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) for potable water use due to this high level of contamination 
(Palestinian National Information Center 1999). The extensive consumption and extraction of the 
Jordan River water, which is the main source of the Dead Sea water supply, has caused the 
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disappearance of the Dead Sea at a staggering rate (Greenberg 2006). The decreased inflow of 
the River increased its salinity and resulted in the demise of the Dead Sea, causing its water level 
to drop about one meter per year (the equivalent of 3 feet) (IRIN 2006). It is expected that within 
a few decades the Dead Sea will completely vanish and live up to its own name.  
 
Hydro-hegemonic Dimension 
Power Structure Imbalance 
The shortage of adequate supplies of fresh water has emerged as one of the most severe 
and pernicious conundrums in the Middle East. In many cases, decisions regarding water 
allocation have become increasingly controversial as competition over shared water resources 
has increased (Syme, et al. 1999). As conflicts metastasize, the interplay between water 
acquisition and power structure imbalance becomes more evident.  
In the Middle East, access to water is strongly linked to the degree of hydro-hegemony 
that each co-riparian state has achieved. Realizing the significance of hydro-hegemony as a 
dominant underlying factor in determining who gets access to water helps to understand how 
Israel receives the highest amount of water in the region (Zeitoun 2005). The interplay between 
water acquisition and hydro-hegemony, on one hand, and political decisions of either 
cooperation or altercation, on the other, is seemingly pronounced in Middle Eastern water 
management and policies in a number of ways. First, the riparian states’ inability to facilitate 
stable cooperation has become an undisputable fact. While violence in the region gives rise to 
potential armed conflicts, the more powerful states tend to maximize their share of water and 
undermine that of others. For example, in the case of the Jordan River, many states, including 
Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, claim the right to share access to the river water. 
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However, due to the political instability of the region, the only state that disproportionately 
benefits from accessing the Jordan River is Israel, given its economic and military advantages. 
Conversely, there is strong evidence that the Palestinians, given their weak hydro-hegemonic 
position, are in a less favorable position, compared to other riparians, as far as access to clean 
and reliable water resources is concerned. As such, these results are reflective of the dynamics of 
regional power imbalance.  
Second, the most powerful riparians are usually reluctant to enter into any cooperative 
agreements to regulate their use of transboundary water resources. This is because cooperation is 
perceived by powerful riparians as compromising their most favorable position (Lowi 1995). If 
cooperation is desired by powerful riparians, it is usually coercive, unsustainable, and sought to 
solidify the status quo (Abukhater 2009). With the same token, given the weak Palestinian 
political and military stance, most of the previous agreements achieved between the Palestinians 
and Israel fall into this category of coerced negotiation. Another prominent example emerges 
from the issue of the Golan Heights, which is disputed between Syria and Israel. Overlooking 
northern Israel and southern Syria, the Golan Heights is of strategic importance to Israel. 
Because of the Golan Heights’ strategic importance, Israel, being the more powerful of the two 
states, denies Syria’s access to its natural resources (Atwan 1999). In the wake of The Six Day 
War of 1967, Israel gained de-facto control of the Golan Heights to secure access to Lake 
Tiberias (also known as Lake Kinneret or Sea of Galilee) which provides over 30% of Israel’s 
water supply (Golan 2007). During the 1973 Middle East War, Syria tried to reclaim the Golan 
Heights, but was unsuccessful because of Israel’s strong hydro-hegemonic position. Syria was 
coerced into signing an armistice in 1974, based on which a UN observer force has been 
deployed to maintain this ceasefire (BBC News 2007). Taking advantage of its most powerful 
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hydro-hegemonic position, Israel unilaterally annexed the Golan Heights in 1981, applying its 
law and administration to, and intensifying its settlements in, the territory, which was not 
recognized by the international community (Encyclopedia of the Orient 2007). 
Third, unequal access to water resources generates a state of resentment and lays the 
grounds for international disputes among different nations (Abukhater 2009). Resentment against 
the most powerful state because of its advantageous position as far as access to water is 
concerned generates more hostility that, reflecting the “water war” paradigm, can possibly build 
up to an all out war. As hostility grows and festers, various unrealistic and overestimated demand 
figures on water emerge, defying the notion of sustainable peace. Not only have levels of hydro-
hostility grown more potent as time wears on, but the very nature of the discourse has as well 
(Klieman 2000). With severe resentment and hostility among competing riparian states, water 
(among other political factors) emerges as an essential venue in the geopolitical reality of the 
whole region that fuels the overall conflict. As the population of the region grows exponentially, 
the demand on water increases, while the region’s overall water reserve is fixed. This 
exacerbates the situation and evokes a state of sever hydro-hostility among the disputing nations. 
Thus, the compatibility of the hydro-hegemony and the distribution of water resources in shifting 
the regional balance and fueling the clash between the Arabs and the Israelis have become 
undeniably prominent (Zeitoun 2005; Lowi 1995).  
Water and Israel’s National Security 
All nations require, and rationally vie for, their share of a continuous supply of food, 
water, fuel and other raw materials. The concept of ecological security is related to both national 
sovereignty and the need for a secured statehood access to these resources for economic 
development goals (Barney 2006). Securing this access means, and often necessitates, retaining 
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exclusive control of one’s land and own natural resources (Westing 1988). The strongly 
interconnected nature of the relationship between national security and these factors implies, and 
creates, a complication that triggers conflict among different nations, all of which strive to 
rationally acquire water (Wolf 1992). This rationality in making decisions regarding water 
security constitutes a significant part of the problem.  
By the same token, Israel’s policy makers often link secure water access to Israel’s own 
national security (Frisch 2000). In 1967 and prior to the Six-Day War between Israel and other 
Arab countries, the Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol stated that “water is a question of survival 
for Israel,” and that “Israel will use all means necessary to secure that the water continues to 
flow” (Biliouri 1997). Moreover, Israel considers, and utilizes, water as a resource and effective 
weapon (Zawahri 2004) to reinforce its security, political stability, and strategic position, on one 
hand, and harness negotiations with other Arab states for its benefit, on the other (Lonergan and 
Brooks 1994). Because of its importance to Zionism, the topic of peace and security is given 
high priority and introduced in the first chapter of the Likud Party Platform. Drawn upon this 
belief system, Zionists assert that “the right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is an 
eternal right, not subject to dispute, and includes the right to security and peace” (Virtual Jewish 
Library 1996). Although they acknowledged and emphasized the need to enter into negotiated 
agreements with the Arabs to reach peace, they further qualified this peace with security as a first 
and foremost precondition stating that “security is the basis for durable peace in our region. 
Israel will make security a first condition in any peace agreement” (Virtual Jewish Library). 
Israel’s foreign policy is also anchored around serving its national security concerns which are 
given particular emphasis in any diplomatic effort that Israel may undertake. To that end, the 
Likud Party Platform further holds that “it will recognize the facts created on the ground by the 
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various accords, and will act to reduce the dangers to the future and security of Israel resulting 
from these agreements” (Virtual Jewish Library). 
Given Israel’s control of most of the Palestinian natural resources and the strategic 
locations of the Israeli settlements on the best catchment areas of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, about 70 percent of Israel’s consumption of groundwater, and more than 33 percent 
of its overall annual water budget, comes from the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Lonergan 
and Brooks 1993). This high dependency of Israel on Palestinian water resources is what 
motivated the former Israeli Agriculture Minister Rafael Eitan to declare that relinquishing 
Israel’s control of the Palestinian water resources would be detrimental to its national security 
and would further “threaten the Jewish state” (Lonergan and Brooks). 
The Israeli control of the Golan Heights, which represents a territorial and natural 
resources conflict, provides another example of how Israel’s national security concerns shapes it 
foreign policy. The value of the Golan Heights to Israel cannot be overstated and stems from the 
strategic importance of its location and natural resources. The strategic importance of the Golan 
Heights is due to a number of reasons. First, because of its central location between Israel and 
Syria and its significant elevation, the Golan Heights provides a natural buffer against any Syrian 
military invasion by land (BICOM 2007). Second, without its control of the Heights, northern 
Israel would be vulnerably located within the firing range of any artillery attack launched from 
the Golan Heights (Palestine Facts 2007). Third, because of its adjacent location east of Lake 
Tiberias, the Heights provide significant fresh water supply (about one third) and storage 
capacity for Israel (Golan 2007). 
As such, the Golan Heights constitutes a stumbling block in the way of negotiation 
between Israel and Syria. In 2003, the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, reflecting the overall 
On the Cusp of Water War 
 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 2 
397  
Syrian desire to secure access to the Golan Heights as part of any peace agreement, declared his 
country’s intention to revive peace talks with Israel (BBC News 2007). During the 1999 talks, 
Syria demanded a full Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 border (Wihbey and Berman 2000). 
However, because of the fact that this Israeli withdrawal would give Syria control of the eastern 
half of the Jordan River headwaters and the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias, one of the main water 
resources and the main storage facility for Israel, Israel refuses this condition for negotiation. 
Israel’s decision to relegate its sovereignty of the Golan Heights would undoubtedly shift the 
hydrological balance of power in the region in favor of Syria (Wihbey and Berman). To that end, 
because of the Israeli government’s view of the Golan as an essential asset to Israel’s security 
and water needs, retaining Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights is identified as a major 
prerequisite for any negotiation with Syria (Migdalovitz 2005). In addition, this negotiation may 
potentially yield a deal with Syria that compels Israel to dismantle its Jewish settlements in the 
region. A public opinion survey conducted in 2004 shows that the majority of Israelis oppose 
negotiations that involve returning the Golan Heights to Syria (BBC News). The intensive 
presence of the Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights, which is estimated to be 17,000 settlers 
(BBC News), and the dependence of the State of Israel on water originated in this territory is 
indicative of the Heights importance and suggests that Israel would continue to maintain control 
of the Golan Heights, which is deemed as a matter of national security. 
Reflecting this land-water nexus imbedded in the Israeli ideological, political, and 
religious spheres, Haim Druckman, a well-known Israeli leader, asserts that “settlements are the 
essence of our existence and flesh of our flesh. We shall not accept the amputation of our living 
flesh” (Lustick 1994, 85). As such, Israel will be unwilling to negotiate any agreement with the 
Palestinians or Syrians that may lead to compromising its settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 
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Territories or the Golan Heights, which, given their hydro-political importance, appear to 
provide a safety net to Israel’s national security. According to the 1996 Likud Party Platform, 
“Jewish settlement, security areas, water resources, state land and road intersections in Judea, 
Samaria and the Gaza Strip shall remain under full Israeli control” (Virtual Jewish Library 
1996). It also holds that “Israel will keep its vital water resources in Judea and Samaria. There 
shall be no infringement of Israel’s use of its water resources.” As a result, water seems as 
important as Israel’s national security and almost a non-negotiable matter to the mainstream 
Israelis. The persistence on the deliberate biblical use of “Judea and Samaria” to refer to the 
West Bank has a strong connotation that the current Israeli government, the Likud Party, does 
not recognize the Palestinian ties to this land or its natural resources. These statements represent 
an extreme approach to water allocation that relies only on entitlement and exclusion of the 
“other.” This same goal of maintaining exclusive Israeli control over the West Bank’s and the 
Gaza Strip’s potential pumping areas is also echoed by the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for 
Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University in Israel (Gvirtzman 1998). 
This intimate link between water and national security and perception of water as vital to 
the establishment and survival of the state of Israel explains Israel’s tendency to acquire more 
water. To that end, Moshe Sharett, Israel’s first Foreign Minister, sums up the value of water to 
Israel by stating that “water for Israel is not a luxury; it is not a desirable and helpful addition to 
our natural resources. Water to us is life itself” (Rouyer 2000, 108). Understanding the 
correlation between water and security helps in understanding the rationale behind Israel’s 
negotiation strategy. Israel realizes that improving its access to water resources requires 
maintaining control of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the Golan Heights of Syria while 
continuing to implement restriction on the Palestinian and Syrian water use (Lonergan and 
On the Cusp of Water War 
 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 2 
399  
Brooks 1993). Based on that, Israel seems hesitant to negotiate and reluctant to reach agreements 
over water resources. Agreements which suggest the need for Israel to give up some of its water 
supplies, even though they are acquired from other territories, or stop the expansion of illegal 
settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the Golan Heights of Syria are often 
rejected by Israel. This point is clearly delineated in the Likud Party Platform that holds that 
“immigration will be increased, and settlement will be strengthened. The decision to freeze 
settlements will be rescinded” (Virtual Jewish Library 1996). 
The Psychological Environment and Ideological Dimension 
Perception of land, natural resources (including water), and the “other” impacts riparian 
states’ behavioral tendency to either cooperate or altercate (Dolatyar and Gray, 2000; Lipchin 
2003). This translates into policies, strategies and actions on the ground (Lowi 1995; Rouyer 
2000). Understanding these physiological and ideological discourses has profound implications 
on understanding the nuances of the overall conflict and envisioning appropriate resolutions. 
Consequently, without this understanding of the perception on the local level and the different 
interpretations of the appropriate water management measures, policy makers will fail to produce 
holistic solutions that successfully manage trans-boundary water resources and will continue to 
employ inept policies. 
Perception of the “Other” 
Both parties’ view of the “other” is tailored to reflect general hostile views materializing 
into two forms of representation. First, communicative discourses, namely the representation of 
the “other” party induced by media and educational system, are incorporated as part of the 
statecraft and doctrine system. Many of the Arabs and Israelis remain captive to the idea 
portrayed by their media that the ongoing violence, which is represented in a cynical way, is 
On the Cusp of Water War 
 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 2 
400  
inherently a key characteristic of the Middle Eastern culture. Many of the dimensions and true 
implications of the conflict were censored from the media, and images and narrations are being 
manipulated one way or another and appear to be out of sink to serve the interest of the most 
powerful party. Israel, through its media, represents itself as an established sovereign state 
surrounded by a sea of hostile Arab nations whose only aim is to annihilate it. The complete 
exclusion of most of the Israeli policies and activities in the Palestinian territories by the media, 
namely house demolition in the Gaza Strip, tends to distort and deceive the public opinion and, 
in turn, shape their perception about the reality of the conflict. In contradistinction, the 
Palestinian media represents the conflict as a byproduct of occupation from which everything 
else, including the construction of the separation wall and land confiscation, emanates. They 
view resistance as a legitimate response against the structure of occupation and oppression of the 
shrinking and noncontiguous Palestinian land and population. These distorted communicative 
discourses are believed to target and manipulate public perception of the self and other’s position 
as well. 
Another example emerges from the educational system, where Palestinian and Israeli 
children alike have usually been taught in school two very different points of view about the 
conflict and the other party involved in it. Employing these prominent forms of communicative 
discourse, Israel often tends to deny the term “occupation” and further developed a pejorative 
attitude towards the Palestinians and their water needs (Lowi 1995; Rouyer 2000). Palestinians, 
on the other hand, usually view Israelis as invaders and occupiers, fought by heroic Palestinian 
resistance. In response to Israel’s insensitivity to their needs, Palestinians tend to develop a 
feeling of resentment towards Israel, which prevents them from achieving mutual understanding 
and cooperation. 
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Second, it is often the case that Israel, through its political, intellectual, and popular 
discourses, makes the argument of needs, as opposed to the water rights and entitlement 
argument, as a basis to not only justify their exclusive control and consumption of water, but also 
to provide support for the many ad hoc water resolution proposals for the water shortages that 
the Palestinian communities exhibit (Alatout 2000, 2003; Shmueli 1999). Although the 
Palestinians do not reject the idea of allocating water based on actual needs per se, representing 
the Palestinian water crisis as a matter of absolute need in separation from rights is a 
misrepresentation of their real issue, which remains to be a major concern to them. Water rights 
are essential from the Palestinian perspective as an uncompromised part of their rights to their 
land, which has been denied. As such, the Palestinian perception provides a radically 
contradictory ideology to that of Israel regarding their water use, asserting that “Israel is using 
the Palestinian water” (Rouyer 2000). Palestinians blame the Israelis not only for attempting to 
destroy their identity by occupying their land and squandering its natural resources, but also for 
denying their inherent rights. Saeb Erekat, a high official in the PNA, reiterated the Palestinian 
belief that water is part of their occupied land by stating that “The Israelis are stealing our water 
and it must stop. They must be reminded that they are sitting on our chests; and not by an act 
God, but by an act of war” (Rouyer 2000, 186). 
Regardless of their level of accuracy, truthfulness, or legitimacy, these perceptions of the 
“self” versus the “other” (or “us” versus “them”) invoke fear and ungrounded rationales for the 
annihilation of the “other.” Furthermore, because of these perceptions of one another as the 
adversary, which continue to widen the communication gap and create a state of distrust, it is 
unlikely that the Palestinians or Israelis will respond to any attempts for reconciliation as long as 
they are unilaterally proposed and initiated by the “other” adversarial party. 
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Different Interpretations of the Notion of Water Use “Efficiency” 
This conflict connotes dramatically diverse and conflicting ideological descents, 
interpretations of key concepts, and representations. The concept of “efficient” use of water, for 
example, has been subject to different contradictory interpretations depending on who defines it 
and for what purpose. Palestinians and Israelis have different representations and interpretations 
of “efficiency.” “Efficiency” for Israel, on one hand, means “more crop per drop” regardless of 
how much water is used (Postel 1999). This interpretation of the concept of “efficiency” is linked 
to the notions of “productive efficiency” and “allocative efficiency” (Frisch 2000). “Productive 
efficiency” has its roots in the technological advancement of Israel’s water management that 
aims to obtain a greater yield from a unit of water, whereas “allocative efficiency” emerges from 
the market-driven water allocation and pricing system (Allan 1999). This understanding of 
“efficiency” as “productive efficiency” promotes the search for water management options to 
increase supply or decrease demand. Efficient agricultural practice includes drip irrigation, water 
reuse (which constitutes 70% of Israel’s municipal water supply), desalination, greenhouse 
technology, cloud seeding, and genetic bioengineering of crops for drought and salinity 
resistance (Selby 2005; Wolf 1996). “Allocative efficiency,” on the other hand, is linked to 
economic values and production (Allan). For Israel, water consumption, although may be 
considered excessive by many other standards, is viewed as efficient based on the 
aforementioned criteria of efficiency.  
As such, Israel is often regarded as an example of sound water management. Evidently, 
Israel’s water management and efficient water use is handled well on the micro-level, namely at 
the consumer level (Lonergan and Brooks 1993). However, efficiency of water allocation is 
missing on the macro-level, posing a great challenge for Israel, which seems to be confronted 
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with an acute state of vulnerability to water shortages now and in the near future (Lonergan and 
Brooks). Except for rare occasions of conservation, typical Israeli policy in water resources 
management relies more on increasing supply than decreasing demand.  One of the demand side 
management strategies that Israel tends to rely on to alleviate pressure on natural resources and 
maximize “efficiency” is restricting water consumption. Given that Israel’s per capita water 
consumption constitutes 25% of that of the US, claims are often made that Israel’s water 
allocation strategies are efficient (Lonergan and Brooks). However, figures of water 
consumption data indicate that Israel still consumes great volumes of water for irrigated 
agriculture. This is partially due to its national policy in handling water distribution and pricing 
system, which seems to paradoxically contradict with the very aim and definition of both 
“productive” and “allocative efficiency”. Namely, the problem here seems to be strongly linked 
to Israel’s policy in subsidizing water for agricultural irrigation (Lonergan and Brooks). This 
policy tends to increase water consumption in the long run and undermine both “productive” and 
“allocative efficiency” by counteracting conservation and market economy goals. Nevertheless, 
the key issue is not whether Israel is reducing its water use per se, but rather whether this 
reduction is sufficient enough to match the magnitude of the crisis facing the region (Naff 1990). 
“Efficiency” for the Palestinians, on the other hand, means conserving water at all times. 
Water allotment follows the overall guiding principles of demand side management (DSM) and 
water conservation. Realizing the importance of water conservation, the Islamic teaching 
encourages people to conserve water even if a running river is present (Faruqui 2001). This is 
because Muslims believe that the earth is not a gift that was given to humans unconditionally, 
but rather a sacred trust that has been placed in human hands for safekeeping. This includes 
animals, plants, soil, water, and even the very air that we breathe, which are all borrowed 
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property that will ultimately be recalled and asked for one day. Water in particular is deemed as a 
blessed and sacrosanct resource sent from God to purify and cleanse the earth. As such, it is 
worth saving. 
They believe that humans are equal not only in sharing rights, but also responsibilities. 
Rights include securing equal access of clean and reliable source of water to all people, rich or 
poor (Abukhater 2009). In addition to rights, there are a series of unspoken moral principles, yet 
well-known to everyone, that guide the overall perception of “efficiency” and water 
consumption. These include moral and ethical responsibilities in maintaining the integrity of 
water resources and preventing waste. For example, only 2–3 liters of water is the recommended 
amount for a sufficient bath by the Islamic and societal standards (Faruqui 2000). Moreover, 
people are encouraged to share water and prohibited from depriving others from water that they 
need. In this regard, one must not withhold water from travelers who need it (Faruqui). The 
process of water allocation is, therefore, solely and exclusively based on respecting and catering 
to all parties’ needs, including the right of the environment. This understanding of the concept of 
“efficiency” is closely linked to water conservation and calls for proportional distribution of not 
only benefits, but also costs, of water use among all parties. 
Perception of the Land and the Environment 
Zionists view Israel as a Jewish “safe haven” land. Their perception of the “promised 
land” shaped the way they value the land and its natural resources as being sacred and 
nonnegotiable. Water is a central component of the Zionist ideologies and ethos of nation 
building (Rouyer 2000). For Zionists, the “ideology of agriculture” is at the core of their belief 
that constitutes a predominant part of their identity (Lowi 1995). Large-scale agricultural 
development is deemed essential to accommodate the large numbers of Jewish immigration 
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(Rouyer). Because of its importance to agricultural production, water is viewed by Israelis as an 
essential element for the establishment and survival of this sovereign Jewish state, referred to as 
“Eretz Yisrael” (Lowi). As such, water, in addition to its economic value, is intimately linked to 
ideological and political prisms which are proven significant to Israel’s survival and security. 
Water is regarded as an essential element not only to accommodate the growing 
population, but also for stabilizing their ties to the land. In their continuous quest to keep the land 
“green,” Israelis acquire as much water as necessary to farm and irrigate the land (Lowi 1995). 
This ideologically-driven push to keep the land green motivated Israel, in the 1950s, to establish 
its 130 kilometer-long National Water Carrier, referred to as the Kinneret-Negev Conduit, that 
transfers water from Lake Tiberias and delivers it to the rest of the country penetrating into the 
depth of the Negev desert to support agricultural development (Rouyer 2000; Shamir and 
Haddadin 2003). However, in light of the fact that agriculture is considered a minor sector in 
Israel’s economy, the reason for keeping the land green seems to have little to do with 
agricultural production and economic development. The establishment of this National Water 
Carrier would not have been possible without Israel’s advantageous hydro-strategic position with 
the annexation of the Golan Heights, which allows it to secure access to the principal headwaters 
of the Jordan River. 
By continuing to avoid entering any peace negotiation with Syria over the Golan Heights, 
Israel continues to not only utilize those water resources, but also prevent Syria from diverting 
more water from the Yarmouk River and its main tributaries. By so doing, Israel ensures its 
exclusive control over Lake Tiberias. Because of its strategic location, bordering the northeastern 
part of Israel, the Golan Heights provides an example of how Israel’s perception of water 
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resources and land shapes the course of action taken in securing its access to its natural 
resources. 
Moreover, many scholars tend to justify Israel’s relatively high use of water based on the 
argument that the more astute the society is, the higher the amount of water it requires for its 
development. To them, the Palestinian water scarcity problem is believed to be solely related to 
infrastructure mishaps. Their representation of the problem holds that the Palestinian water crisis 
is linked to the lack of adequate infrastructure that would allow them to extract greatly increased 
volumes of water to meet their exponentially growing demand. 
The Palestinian perception, on the other hand, is shaped by, and reflects their fear of 
dispossession and the 20th century Jewish immigration (Rouyer 2000). They feel that the origin 
of the conflict stems from the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent 
relocation of the Palestinians, known to them as the “Nakba” or catastrophe (The American Task 
Force on Palestine 2005). In addition, their view of their land as being occupied since 1967, 
namely the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, shaped the way Palestinians perceive 
and interact with Israel, the land, and its natural resources (The American Task Force on 
Palestine, 2005). For Arabs, who are living in a predominantly agricultural society, water is seen 
as an extension of their land and an integral part of their daily life (Lowi 1995). Their view of the 
land and water is not only confined to economic values, rather, Palestinians maintain that they 
have been living in harmony with their environment, which they envision to be part of their 
identity and sense of belonging and pride. They believe that no peace can be attainable unless the 
water crisis is adequately resolved first.  
Agricultural and Landscape Patterns 
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Landscape defines and reflects not only states’ national identity but also their use of 
water. Examining the agricultural and landscape patterns in both Israel and Palestine helps 
understand agricultural water consumption and its geopolitical and hydropolitical implications. 
For example, the landscape of the Gaza Strip reflects small and fragmented farm lands, a small 
town feel, and a gradual transformation of an indigenous landscape across the region. This 
indigenous agricultural and landscape pattern that dominates the Palestinian terrain (shown in 
figure 1) represents more conservational water use. Bearing in mind that this is a semi-arid 
region, such indigenous landscape still thrives without harming the environment through careful 
management of water use. On the contrary, the Israeli landscape indicates large-scale agricultural 
development and reflects an alien landscape to a semi-arid region, high use of technology, and 
extensive water use to sustain and keep land green. It is clear that this amount of large-scale 
agricultural land demands significant amounts of water considering the aridness of the landscape 
and environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (1): formal structure of the Palestinian landscape - olive trees and small towns 
Source: Susiman, D., et al.,2005 
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Discussion and Closing Remarks 
We cannot live without water. Water is essential to human survival and development. 
The significance of water has led to the creation of many dramatic and complicated conflicts 
among different nations throughout human history, all of whom vie for their fair share of water 
for different uses. Moreover, the intricacy of man-made boundaries and the natural delineation of 
upstream and downstream riparians make the issue of international water disputes a formidable 
and volatile one (Mirumachi 2007). 
The Middle East in general, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular, 
represents cases in which water availability trends (among other influential factors) 
provide evidence of catastrophic water shortages. This is because water remains an 
unresolved conundrum facing the whole region. In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is one 
of the major issues, along with Jerusalem and the right of return that have been deferred to 
the final round of negotiations. This, which poses a potential obstacle to a lasting peace 
agreement, could be viewed as good news, however, in the sense that water could 
propitiously be a source of cooperation and a catalyst for sustainable peace, rather than a 
casus belli (Fisher et al. 2001).  
I contend, however, that the water problem in the Middle East and in other arid 
regions is not simply a matter of water shortage, but rather it is related to the lack of 
equitable water allocation. To that end, Mirumachi (2007) astutely points out that “…there 
is a growing consensus that water scarcity is not the major and sole factor that prompts 
war…” The persisting inequity in its allocation to and across national boundaries fosters 
hydro-hostility (and therefore excavation of water) instead of hydro-stability and multi-
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national cooperation. It is often the case that water resources allocation is challenged by 
the question of equity, which is a major concern in water conflict management. To that end, 
Wolf (1999, 4) states, “application of an ‘equitable’ water-sharing agreement along the 
volatile waterways of the world is a prerequisite to hydropolitical stability which, finally, 
could help propel political forces away from conflict in favor of cooperation.” 
As such, recognizing that equity is at the core of such conflicts, a plethora of conflict 
resolution methods are developed and considered to manage equitable sharing of trans-
boundary water resources as well as peaceful relationships among riparian states. 
Notwithstanding, severe conflicts over water still exist, where a group of people receives 
more water than their actual need, while many others suffer because of that. As is the case 
in many arid regions of the world, inequitable water distribution is common and means 
that some groups will suffer from lack of water access, while other groups may enjoy 
disproportionate benefits from accessing more than enough water for their needs (Isaac 
1999; Shmueli 1999). Developing and applying principles of equity on water allocation 
processes tends to foster optimal water management, which procures an atmosphere 
conducive for seeding cooperation and rooting out altercation. Equity in water resources 
allocation and the ongoing pursuit of sustainable peace in the Middles East are inextricably 
linked. The application of equitable water-sharing to disputed water resources in the 
Middle East is of paramount importance in enticing hydropolitical stability. 
The applicability of the international law to the volatile watercourses of the Middle 
East is inconclusive and should take a more proactive turn. Enforcing the law is crucial in 
this regard. Without clear and puissant enforcement mechanisms, the situation could easily 
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escalate into chaos, where little hope for peace is left. It is imperative to point out that 
international law provided general rules to allow room for flexibility and adaptability for 
states to more easily find solutions for various cases. However, in the case of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, this flexibility caused more disagreements among disputed parties over the 
meaning and interpretation of the law to justify and legitimize their positions. Aside from 
these laws, the focus should be on finding common ground for equitable distribution of 
water resources based on real needs of the population, rather than the desire of the 
riparian states for territorial and resources accusation. Regardless of water ownership and 
entitlement, satisfying the urgent need for domestic and potable water should have priority 
over agricultural application. In short, the international law is necessary, yet not sufficient 
by itself. Good will on both sides, the intervention of a third party, and an ongoing 
negotiation and cooperation process are warranted for the success of effective and 
environmentally sound water allocation practice. 
The fact that the water issue remains unresolved impacts the political arena and 
exacerbates the conflict. This deferment of water negotiation means that not only will the water 
scarcity crisis remain unresolved, but also a situation of inequity and water deprivation for the 
Palestinians will continue to disrupt and hinder any chances for peace. According to scholarly 
consensus, it is surely to the detriment of the whole region’s future peace and prosperity that 
Israel has expropriated away not only the Palestinians national and land rights, but also the right 
to have access to a clean, reliable, and equitable water supply. With limited channels of 
communication and meaningful diplomatic efforts among the two disputing parties, the situation 
is characterized by unidirectional relationships, where one state, looking out for self interest, 
causes environmental harm to the other, but manages to inflict no harm to itself. This situation 
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will entice the most powerful state, Israel, to continue pursuing large-scale plans unilaterally, to 
maximize its allocation of the shared water resources.   
If all sides have enough water to meet their demands, peace may become, and could stay, 
within reach. This is because water, a simple substance, is very crucial to the survival of both 
nations. This is especially the case since the larger political and cultural clash (issues of high 
politics) is intertwined with the problem of water shortage (issues of low politics) (Wolf 1995b; 
Daoudy 2009). They have emerged as major contributors to the regional hydro-conflict, which 
makes the chances of success for any attempt to craft a meaningful and practical resolution 
almost insurmountable. Therefore, it is hard to skip the conclusion that without equitably 
resolving the water crisis of the Palestinians, Israel’s own interests, security, and stability will 
continue to be at risk. Attaining and maintaining water equity and security is a prerequisite for 
the overall regional stability. Similarly, resolving the overall conflict enhances chances of 
resolving disputes over shared water resources. Any resolution attempt must recognize the link 
between the two factors and the importance of equitable water sharing to succeed. 
Further, given the complexity of sharing the region’s natural resources, fresh water 
scarcity generates and derives conflict among multiple parties sharing these resources. However, 
neglecting the overall regional and multilateral nature of the dispute, most treaties accomplished 
thus far are bilateral. Evidently, there are plenty of solutions proposed for the water scarcity 
problem along the volatile watercourses of the Middle East by various riparian states, none of 
which recognize the region and the different populations as a whole. For instance, under the 
threat of water shortages, a medley of plans have been proposed by different riparian countries, 
all of which lack a regional outlook. Confining their target population to their own people, many 
disputing states often tend to provide national solutions neglecting the regional scale of the crisis. 
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Clearly, the conundrum is not only pertinent to identifying what issues are disputed, but also 
related to the number of disputants involved and the way conflict resolution approaches have 
been sought. These unilateral attempts of bilateral approaches often tend to provide national 
solutions to a regional problem (Ganoulis 1996). The problem, therefore, is not related to a 
shortage of solutions or resolutions, but rather to the lack of a holistic approach that ties all of 
these unilateral resolutions into a unified regional approach applicable to all nations in the 
region. Without regional, comprehensive, and sustainable solutions that consider the future of the 
region as a whole, a disastrous water problem is almost guaranteed. Similarly, approaches that 
depend merely on technological solutions are not adequate to resolve the problem. Rather, 
approaches that treat quantity and quality issues together, recognize the importance of mutually 
shared rights and responsibilities, embody both technological and political solutions, and 
incorporate equity as part of the solution are considered to be more desirable and effective.  
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Abstract 
A state of near-war lasted for almost two decades between Georgia and the separatist 
region of Abkhazia. Localized violence plagued neighboring communities while United 
Nations agencies, humanitarian groups, and religious organizations worked with both 
sides to resolve the conflict’s underlying causes. Unfortunately, those diverse and long-
standing efforts proved fruitless when the parties went to war in August 2008. This article 
examines the reasons for the conflict’s enduring nature and presents an example of 
grassroots peacemaking completed by university students focused on the plight of 
Georgia’s domestic refugees. An in-depth case study reveals the impact of their 
unilateral peacemaking efforts to present costly signals of benign intent.  
 
Introduction 
Local peacemaking plays an important role in conflict resolution. It enables 
individuals and social groups to move beyond the trauma of violence towards tolerant 
cohabitation at a minimum, and full reconciliation in the best cases. The problem facing 
such efforts is the lack of real power to change the structural conditions fostering 
violence. Limited by scarce resources and few connections between hurting communities, 
local peacemaking often has little impact on decision makers responsible for officially 
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ending hostilities. There have been, however, noted exceptions that inspire continued 
efforts. South Africa’s indigenous peace churches, Catholic and Protestant inter-
community repentance services in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, truth commissions in 
Sierra Leone, and Palestinian-Israeli wilderness encounters in the Sinai all give hope that 
peace is possible, even if only on a small scale. The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict offers 
another potential example of local peacemaking despite the bleak prospects for large-
scale conflict resolution.  
Prior to the outbreak of open hostilities in 2008, a state of near-war lasted for 
almost two decades.1
This article discusses the reasons for the conflict’s enduring nature and the recent 
war that brought Russia directly into the violence. However, its most significant 
contribution is to present an example of grassroots peacemaking completed by university 
students focused on the plight of Georgia’s internally displaced persons (IDPs – the 
official term for refugees living within their own country but not their original 
communities.) Their story deserves repeating because of the courage, empathy, and self-
sacrifice they exhibited in the face of resistance by the Georgian government and 
longstanding suspicion by the Abkhaz leadership. An in-depth case study reveals the 
 Local violence plagued neighboring communities while United 
Nations agencies, humanitarian groups, and religious organizations worked with both 
sides to resolve the conflict’s underlying causes. Unfortunately, those diverse and long-
standing efforts proved fruitless when the parties went to war in August 2008. The 
Summer War appears to have ended Georgia’s hopes of recapturing Abkhazia, but it did 
so without ensuring the conditions necessary for lasting bilateral peace. Instead, official 
relations will likely remain frozen for the foreseeable future.  
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impact of their unilateral peacemaking efforts to present costly signals of benign intent to 
the Abkhaz people and government. It also shows the structural limitations of such an 
approach when the controlling government has ulterior motives contrary to its 
declarations of peace.  
 
Historical Context 
 The Abkhaz have sought independence from Georgia for decades. Academics, 
policymakers, and the antagonists themselves offer numerous reasons for their separatist 
inclinations, including Soviet legacies of regional autonomy, forced Georgian 
immigration during the twentieth century, strong ethnic connections to groups in southern 
Russia, and de facto internal sovereignty within Abkhazia itself. Despite the range of 
explanations though, every Georgian government from the early Soviet period to today 
has claimed Abkhazia as part of its territory.  
Even if it were possible for outside analysis to establish which side is correct, 
each group’s deeply held beliefs would likely remain unchanged, especially so after the 
events of 2008.  However, centuries of ethnic intermarriage, cultural homogenization, 
and outside control make them far more similar than the separatists claim. The Abkhaz 
are closely related to groups in Southern Russia, but in many ways can be seen as part of 
the Georgian cultural community. Each Georgian area has its own unique customs and 
dialects, but all share the same basic qualities of Orthodox Christianity, common cuisine, 
and the Georgian language. The Abkhaz have rejected the Georgian language altogether 
but retain the first two.  
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The Abkhaz government restored the use of their language after decades of 
neglect and subservience to Georgian, but its phonetic similarity to Mengrelian gives 
credence to the view that the Abkhaz belong in the larger Georgian social construction; 
many regional dialects differ from the others but this patchwork community has existed 
for centuries as the model of Georgian society. Unfortunately, political decisions during 
the Soviet period greatly complicated relations within Georgia by emphasizing Abkhaz 
differences rather than similarities, thereby fueling separatist aspirations and making a 
difficult situation far worse. 
The Bolsheviks initially offered full Republic status to Abkhazia and the border 
areas of the North Caucasus. For seven years Abkhazia was on par with the other 
Transcaucasian republics, but Stalin eventually withdrew his support and placed the area 
firmly under Georgian control. He may have done so out of loyalty to his Georgian 
heritage, his penchant for creating political confusion as a way to maintain personal 
control, or simply as one of several territorial reorganizations in the early Soviet period. 
Whatever the reason, the Georgian Soviet Republic seized the opportunity to eliminate 
dissent by closing local language schools, forcing mandatory Georgian language 
instruction, and prosecuting regional leaders for instigating factionalism and treason. The 
heavy-handed approach left a lasting bitterness and fear of political servitude among the 
Abkhaz.  
 The issue of territorial sovereignty might have ended then but the Abkhaz were 
given a reprieve when Khrushchev authorized the creation of Abkhaz schools, special 
Abkhaz positions in the Georgian government, and increased funding for social programs 
in Abkhazia. However, Moscow’s imposition of separatist ways soured Georgian views 
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of Russia and the legitimacy of regional autonomy. A widespread view among many 
Georgians has been that Moscow actively seeks to divide their country in order to ensure 
its weakness and compliance. Creating a false state in Abkhazia in the Soviet period, then 
siding with it during the post-Soviet civil war contributed to a deep mistrust towards the 
Russian government that the Summer War confirmed.  
Antagonistic nationalism increased in both areas during the late Soviet period, and 
the Abkhaz eventually appealed to Moscow to restore the first Soviet Constitution that 
had granted them independence. Gorbachev denied the request, but the attempt increased 
Georgian resentment.2
 Approximately fifty thousand Georgians eventually returned to the Gali border 
region of Abkhazia, corralled in a buffer zone guarded by Russian peacekeepers. Abkhaz 
government officials claimed this was an effort to restore Georgian property while 
 Skirmishes broke out in Abkhaz capital of Sokhumi (Sukhum in 
Abkhaz), and in 1990 the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet declared independence from the USSR 
and Georgia. The Georgian government responded by removing its legislative authority, 
declaring its own independence from the Soviet Union, and electing a radical nationalist 
to the presidency. Full-scale war broke out soon after driving close to three hundred 
thousand Georgians from their homes. Casualties were high on both sides with claims of 
human rights violations leveled by both governments. Accounts bear a striking 
resemblance to other regions engulfed by ethnic civil war: mass executions, torture and 
rape, burning victims alive in their homes, and infanticide. While neither side can claim 
the moral high ground, the Georgians suffered the added trauma of fleeing their homes en 
masse with little hope of return. This more than the violence itself would define the next 
two decades of bilateral relations. 
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preserving the Abkhaz nature of their country (Interviews June 2007). Squatters were 
given carte blanche to claim abandoned homes, with the stipulation that Georgians with 
legal claims in the area be given priority over refugees from Abkhazia proper; the latter 
were seen as illegitimate migrants resulting from Georgian political domination. The 
ability of the Gali residents to restore normal lives remained limited given the pervasive 
localized fighting and persistent fears of escalating violence. However, life in Gali was 
infinitely better during the “decade of conflict resolution” than what followed during the 
Summer War of 2008. 
 The intervening years witnessed increasingly hostile cross-border relations 
between the Georgians and Abkhaz, and their respective international patrons, despite 
numerous peacemaking efforts at all levels of government and society. The United States 
and UN Security Council repeatedly asserted the territorial integrity of Georgia to 
Abkhazia, while Russia used its peacekeeping mandate to pressure the Georgian 
government into various political and economic concessions. Things got much worse 
after the 2003 Rose Revolution soured relations across the board. The new Georgian 
administration pursued closer relations with the United States and began pushing back 
against Russian influence in the region.  Bitter exchanges ranged from the mutual 
expulsion of diplomatic representatives and trade embargoes, to Georgian claims that 
Moscow was behind increasingly aggressive domestic opposition rallies.3 Hostile rhetoric 
ratcheted up threat perceptions on all sides as Georgian media and government sources 
focused on Russia’s imperialist intentions and the separatists’ illegal pro-independence 
actions,4 while the separatists and Russia blamed Georgian President Saakashvilli for 
radically destabilizing the long-standing peace.5 
Letters of Intent 
 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 2 
426  
The separatists claimed to be under threat of outside aggression since they 
maintained purely defensive positions under the 1992 Sochi Agreement that established a 
Russian supervised cease-fire. There had been small-scale skirmishes around Gali for 
years but nothing more than the occasional flare-up, and neither the Georgian capture of 
the Kodori Valley in northern Abkhazia in 2006,6 nor growing Russian claims that 
violence was imminent in early 2008 changed the military status quo.7
The war began outside Abkhazia but quickly spread there as Georgian and 
Russian troops advanced towards the border. Russian troops participating in a counter-
terrorism exercise responded in defense of their peacekeepers and entered South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia to destroy Georgian groups claimed to be undermining the pro-Russian 
separatist governments.
 However, the 
Russian government abandoned the pretense of neutrality and forcefully intervened in 
both separatist regions once Georgian troops began killing Russian peacekeepers in South 
Ossetia, and the Abkhaz used the opportunity to push the Georgians out of their territory 
for good.  
8
However, the Russian offensive into Georgia proper calls into question the view 
that Moscow’s policy was a) peacekeeping, b) the Right to Protect civilians against 
 What followed was “peace coercion” to ensure the Georgian 
government would never again try to alter the status quo in its favor. This led to a full-
scale invasion of northern Georgia, driving the Georgians out of their American-financed 
bases near Zugdidi (the closest town to the Abkhaz border), and maintaining security 
zones for several weeks to eliminate guerilla activity in the area. Abkhazia was also 
fortified by sea and land forces through newly repaired roads and railways connecting it 
to Southern Russia.  
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aggression, or c) outside intervention in support of oppressed ethnic groups. It seems 
clear that breaking the stalemate, reestablishing regional hegemony, and punishing 
Georgia were the ultimate goals, goals which Moscow completely succeeded in 
accomplishing. Official recognition of Abkhazia followed soon thereafter. 
The separatists clearly benefited from Russia’s military intervention and 
diplomatic strong-arming, but the long-term effects remain unclear.9
The new balance of power is a fait accompli, wherever blame ultimately lies, and 
political relations have been fundamentally altered. However, there are still stories to be 
told, stories of courage and sacrifice in the face of overwhelming opposition which can 
offer hope to hurting individuals and broken communities elsewhere. The following 
sections examine one such effort, an eleventh-hour unilateral attempt to bring 
reconciliation several months before the war’s occurrence.  
 While the lack of 
broad international support has not slowed Russian efforts to build up the separatists’ 
internal security forces or Abkhaz appeals for full recognition by other countries, the area 
is no closer to becoming a viable independent state than before the Summer War. In 
addition, its new Russian-sponsored status has not encouraged Georgian IDP repatriation, 
one of the most contentious and heart-wrenching problems facing thousands of the war’s 
victims. Russian security guarantees to protect all sides ring hollow after its military 
actions, and a climate of fear, intimidation, and mutual animosity remains widespread 
and deeply entrenched.  
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Unilateral Initiatives and Empathy 
 Reconciliation often requires both parties to engage in admission of guilt and 
forgiveness.10
 Boyle and Lawler (1991) build on existing theories of Graduated Reciprocation in 
Tension-reduction (GRIT) and Tit for Tat to show that unilateral initiatives reduce threat 
perceptions more effectively than does a strategy of strict reciprocity. The challenge for 
such efforts is to express benign intent without appearing to be weak and vulnerable. 
They suggest small, symbolic gestures that do not degrade an actor’s fundamental 
security, but are large enough to illustrate the gravity of the issue at hand and a degree of 
risk for the initiator. Motivations for such signals of benign intent come from either trust 
in the good nature of the Other (either through bona fides provided by a trusted outsider 
or through learning-to-trust activities fostered by GRIT, Tit-for-Tat, or similar strategies) 
or from a defensive mindset.
 Beginning the process need not require mutual effort though; it is also 
possible for one side to express contrition and a willingness to repair the broken 
relationship. The type of response usually determines the pace of peacemaking, and may 
even derail the entire process if some form of reciprocity is not given. However despite 
its limitations, unilateral initiatives remain an important part of the conflict resolution 
toolkit.  
11
The success of such unilateral initiatives often depends on existing balances of 
power between antagonists (Lawler 1999). Disparate power relations create barriers to 
accurate perceptions of intent, with both sides feeling their present vulnerabilities or 
 Aggressive actors reduce their ability to win if they give 
up something fundamental to offensive strategies; defensively minded actors do not need 
offensive power assets and do not reduce their security by eschewing them.  
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fearing being perceived as weak in the future. Therefore, signs of benign intent are most 
credible between equally powerful actors; slightly less effective are concessions made by 
the weaker side. In contrast, concessions by the stronger party embolden the weaker side 
to advance its demands based on perceptions of weakness in the stronger. This leads to 
heightened threat perceptions by the stronger and a retreat from reconciliation.12
The constraints of playing a two-level political game make these perceptions even 
more challenging for decision-makers as domestic regime constraints affect the range of 
negotiation win-sets. This is especially true for democracies since election promises 
capture elites and limit their ability to operate with impunity in the international arena.
  
13
Large (1999) shows one possible solution to the problem, arguing that signals 
about peripheral issues are more easily perceived as non-threatening and less likely to be 
seen as signs of weakness. By avoiding contentious central issues, these signals do not 
activate “knee-jerk” rejection responses by international negotiators or domestic groups. 
Relatively high costs to the giver also increase the successful perception and reception by 
the receiver. Trust builds as the receiver sees the gift as a meaningful sacrifice by the 
giver, more so than because of any perceived benefit he or she might receive personally. 
 
Increasing the size of one’s win-set at the negotiating table signals flexibility, and 
potentially increases the chances of reaching a compromise, but the electorate may 
perceive it as less representative and punish elites in the next election. Nationalist rhetoric 
used during campaigns places even more severe restrictions on negotiators because it ties 
issues to indivisible identities of nation, culture, and ethnicity (Wiegand 2002). Backing 
away from such rhetoric risks alienating domestic supporters and reducing bargaining 
credibility, thereby decreasing available compromises.  
Letters of Intent 
 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 2 
430  
Thyne (2006) labels these efforts as “cheap” signals, distinguishing them from traditional 
costly signals made in alliance commitments, military deployments, sanctions and other 
material sacrifices. However, “cheap” does not mean they are valueless since they signal 
a degree of risk taking in the cause of conflict resolution. 
Cheap signals can include speeches by elite decision-makers, ambassadorial 
changes, media interviews, and statements of intent by low-level government 
bureaucrats. Thyne examines the timing and intensity of such signals to government and 
opposition groups poised on the edge of civil war, and shows that enduring cheap signals 
of support for governments have the greatest impact in deterring civil war. However, the 
reception of any cheap signal largely depends on the place of empathy between 
antagonists.  
Keller and Yang (2009) discuss the centrality of empathy in elite decision making 
as part of a two-stage process, arguing that empathy during the first stage – narrowing 
possible choices –  leads to the greatest chance of conciliation; empathy during the later 
implementation stage helps as well but less by comparison. They include several factors 
that shape empathy including personal experiences with the Other before the crisis, the 
presence of multiple channels to contact the Other, and the Other’s familiarity with 
Self.14
Empathy can be defined generally as the ability to see situations from another’s 
perspective. “Walking in another person’s shoes” gives new insights into how the Other 
perceives him/herself and other people. However, getting to that place is a persistent 
challenge for conflict resolution theorists, practitioners and the antagonists themselves. 
Komorita et al. (1992) argue that Tit for Tat can be an effective strategy if participants 
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are taught to trust the rules. Feeling safe enough to do that is a difficult, but necessary 
condition. However, creating space for empathy training can be frustrated easily since 
weaker groups tend to favor changing the status quo, while participants from the stronger 
side try to build new relationships within the current system (Dessel et al. 2006). Opotow 
et al. (2005) describes this problem as one of moral exclusion by rival groups, arguing for 
more inclusive identity development within and between antagonists through fairness 
education exercises, resource sharing, and personal investment in the process of peace by 
respected community leaders. 
Rossi (2003) proposes a teaching model that can be used in these situations, either 
across antagonist groups or in single-identity work, as participants discuss their past 
experiences and recognize their common future.15 He suggests some kind of catharsis is 
necessary to start the process of building empathy, usually personal or group trauma, 
psychological distress, or trust in a respected leader’s guidance, many of which were 
evidenced in the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict resolution context. The process gains 
momentum over time and reaches a tipping point when empathy becomes the new norm 
and the common motivation to make peace.16
Rossi’s practical curriculum requires practitioners first to build the participants’ 
interest in the issues and determine the rules for communication. Role-playing then forms 
the basis of empathy training with extensive time for learning about the Other through 
personal information sharing and research. Individuals are encouraged to take their roles 
seriously and identify beneficial and harmful forces shaping their interest fulfillment. 
Instructors let participants interact within broad parameters, reminding them that the goal 
is not to reach a settlement per se, rather to gain mutual understanding.  
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  Peace circles are another effective, though less didactic way to build empathy. 
Based on the principles of interconnectedness, equality, and diversity, peace circles 
follow several prescribed stages (Boyes-Watson 2005). Opening ceremonies set the tone 
and the “process keeper” explains the guidelines. Participants then pass a talking piece 
around the circle with each person taking turns to speak. This gives people time to 
consider their words, while drawing shy people into the discussion and preventing any 
single member or subgroup from dominating the conversation. Participants discuss their 
expectations, decide on the definitions of key words, and share their views. The circle 
then closes with another meaning-laden ritual to reinforce empathy and understanding. 
 These approaches work best at the grassroots level and can be used in either 
single-identity or inter-community settings. They also have a legitimate place in broader 
conflict resolution efforts despite their structural limitations influencing policy making. 
Evans-Kent (2002) rightly criticizes international peacemaking efforts that overlook local 
factors and rely exclusively on elite decision-makers. Such approaches ignore the role 
local grievances have in fomenting violence that often spreads to neighboring 
communities. She also criticizes exclusively elite-driven approaches that reframe issues 
which were once malleable and suitable for conciliation into highly politicized and 
inflexible positions. Using the Dayton Peace Accords as an example of an imposed/non-
local peace, Evans-Kent shows that ethnic identities hardened despite the decline in 
violence, creating stereotypes and reinforcing fear of traveling to neighboring “foreign” 
areas; better integration across multiple diplomatic tracks could have prevented the 
growth of latent hostilities while stopping the overt violence. NGOs helped overcome 
some of these problems afterward by focusing on empathy building in several villages. 
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School programs to teach children values shared by their former enemies, microfinancing 
for small businesses, and job training for unemployed men were all successful in 
reducing hostilities between neighbors and across ethnic lines. 
Kelleher and Johnson (2008) present similar success stories of religious groups in 
Sudan and Northern Ireland. Local workers had a high level of cultural understanding 
since many were members of the antagonist communities and had suffered through the 
violence themselves. In addition, international groups had proven expertise in conflict 
resolution methods used in other areas, and local leaders gave legitimacy to the activists 
because they committed to stay until life improved for the locals. All of these attributes 
facilitated peacemaking at the local level even when structural violence and injustice 
remained unchanged.17
 
 In addition, many programs were started unilaterally. One group 
bravely faced their enemies armed only with goodwill and peace, knowing that their 
signals could be misinterpreted, or worse, taken advantage of by the other side. A similar 
project occurred in the months preceding the Summer War. 
Letters of Intent 
  I traveled to Georgia in 2007 on a Fulbright Scholarship to apply multi-track 
conflict resolution strategies between Georgia and Abkhazia. One approach was to 
engage government officials in Tbilisi and Sokhumi, working with existing ministries and 
international organizations to create new avenues of communication. I met with several 
members of the Georgian Ministry for Conflict Resolution staff, including then-Deputy 
Minister Davit Bakradze, to discuss current efforts and future possibilities. The US 
Embassy facilitated the meetings and most resulted in broad support for grassroots 
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efforts. I had not yet formulated a specific program for my students,18
 One original approach began with local Orthodox priests to increase their 
peacemaking efforts among refugee communities in Tbilisi, Kutaisi and Zugdidi (the 
three cities with the largest IDP populations). The Patriarchate supported a host of 
suggested plans, including a peace march to the Russian checkpoint at the Inguri River 
separating the antagonists. Unfortunately, even though priests were highly effective at 
conflict resolution in their communities, Track Two projects to build peace with the 
Abkhaz proved unsuccessful (Meredith 2008-2009). 
 but the overall 
government view was supportive of cross-cultural communication, as were the views 
expressed by the Abkhaz Foreign Ministry; Deputy Minister Maxim Gunjia was 
particularly helpful.  
 The final component of my research was a grassroots letter writing project 
developed with students at Tbilisi State University and International Black Sea 
University, during which time I applied many of the theoretical and practical guidelines 
mentioned in the above literature review. Our first meetings began with a combination of 
didactic and interactive learning. Students introduced themselves and told if they were 
natives of Tbilisi; roughly one third were IDPs from Abkhazia. Ground rules for the 
semester established how topics would be discussed and the format for questioning each 
other’s statements. The goal was to build a safe, honest environment where students 
could express their deeply held views about the Georgian government, their plight, the 
Abkhaz, and international actors trying to assist them.  
 The students were initially reserved during the first few classes, with only a 
handful speaking out. The main reason was their unfamiliarity with discussion as a form 
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of instruction; most of their formal education had been in lectures and they were not yet 
comfortable speaking in public. Language barriers were quickly overcome though, as 
students with better English language facilities translated for those with limited abilities, 
and after three weeks, almost everyone spoke every class period. The courses then moved 
into the research and analysis stage. 
 Each student was asked to write down the main actors in the conflict with 
Abkhazia, then rank them in terms of responsibility for the violence. They blamed the 
Abkhaz as a whole, followed by the Russian, US, and Georgian governments. The results 
were read aloud to the class and discussion of the rankings brought further classifications: 
the Abkhaz people held less responsibility than their government, the Russian 
government expanded to include the Russian people in general, and the US and Georgian 
governments remained unchanged. The process of exonerating the Abkhaz people while 
blaming the Russians was an unexpected result, one that led to increased empathy once 
the letter project took shape. 
 Over the next two weeks, classes broke into smaller groups of four or five 
students to define national interests for each government involved. They concluded that 
Georgian interests were to maintain its territorial integrity, return all IDPs to their homes 
(or Abkhaz homes if theirs were no longer available), and if necessary, use military force 
to reassert national pride. Abkhaz interests varied from independence, a medium position 
of de facto autonomy with Russian protection (the status quo position) or directly joining 
Russia. They described Russia as imperialistic bent on keeping Georgia weak and driven 
by strategic interests to gain Abkhazia’s Black Sea ports, or worse, determined to 
recapture Georgia itself. The United States was seen as using Georgia to annoy the 
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Russians, but unwilling to commit fully to its defense in the likely event of Russian 
aggression. 
 The students then conducted research for the next few weeks. They read Western 
and Russian media sources to compare with their perceptions; some changed in degree 
but the overall tone remained the same. The next stage involved teaching conflict 
resolution strategies. Several lectures dealt with the different diplomatic tracks, 
specifically assessing the value and likely success of each in the Georgian-Abkhaz 
conflict. Few students had hope for inter-governmental relations, although they believed 
people-to-people contact still held promise; nearly half had taken part in NGO-sponsored 
encounters with Abkhaz students. Despite those experiences, the biggest challenge was 
overcoming their apathy and anger after nearly two decades of failed negotiations and 
broken promises by the international community and their own government. 
 Weeks passed with heated discussions, harsh words, and even tears. Over time the 
hard-line Georgian nationalists began to see the need to compromise, and the apathetic 
renewed their hope for change. Their perspectives represented many in the larger 
community, and the movement towards reconciliation encouraged bolder steps. The topic 
of costly signaling came up for discussion midway through the semester, and the students 
learned about threat perceptions and how to show benign intent through role playing and 
connecting the concepts to their personal lives. Dating, friendships, and family 
relationships served as templates for extrapolation to relations with the Abkhaz.19 
Empathy began to develop as students saw their struggles for identity in a post-conflict 
country, broad economic hardships resulting from international relations beyond their 
control, and the need to forgive as equally valid for the Abkhaz as for themselves.  
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 Orthodox Christianity played a significant role for many of the students reaching 
that tipping point, and even more importantly, the movement toward forgiveness.20
 The critical discussion came one month before my scholarship ended. I asked the 
students what it would look like for them to offer peace to the Abkhaz: would they have 
to humiliate themselves or could peace also come through strength. I challenged them to 
set aside the traditional methods they had learned or witnessed over the past fifteen years 
and to be creative. A female student named Natia spoke up, saying that she had come to 
realize peacemaking required a radical shift in tactics, but that real strength came from 
sacrifice not violence. She referenced the American civil rights movement and the 
peaceful demonstrations in Georgia and Ukraine that brought about political change. She 
committed herself to doing whatever she could to make peace, even if that meant giving 
up her notions of Georgian statehood; what mattered to her was helping the victims of the 
war, not preserving her national pride. The power of her words was made stronger by her 
previous position against any compromise on territorial integrity. While Natia was not a 
norm entrepreneur creating a new way to interact with her enemies, she served as a 
catalyst for other students to express empathy and a desire for forgiveness. That class 
discussion produced a plan to write letters on behalf of the thousands of IDPs wanting to 
return home.  
 By 
this time sufficient trust had been established between the students and with me as their 
leader in peacemaking. We began to discuss the church’s teaching on peaceful relations, 
and their responsibilities to sacrifice and live humbly as Christians. Statements by several 
well-known local priests laid the groundwork justifying what became the letter project. 
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 The letters had a simple message translated into four languages. They stated 
“Please, let me come home” in Russian, Abkhaz, Georgian and English. We spent much 
time debating the message and meaning of those words. Some feared they would seem 
weak in the eyes of their enemies. Others thought the letters would be taken by the 
Abkhaz government and never shown to the Abkhaz people, the real target of the project. 
Still others wanted a more aggressive tone that asserted Georgian rights and called on the 
Abkhaz to do the “right” thing and rejoin Georgia. In the end, the words recorded in the 
Christian Gospels, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of 
God” convinced the hold-outs to proceed with the more humble message (Matthew 5:9-
10). One student added the next Beatitude as further reason to put their lives on the line 
for the sake of peace, “Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for 
theirs is the kingdom of heaven.”  
 The front side of the letters contained the four-language message and space for a 
signature. The reverse side had a poem written by the students. It expressed their pain 
from the past violence, and their present isolation from historical homelands; their fears 
that nothing would improve and the conflict would drag on indefinitely; a growing hope 
that the Abkhaz people were just like them – tired of war and wanting to be reunited; and 
finally, a willingness to change their perceptions and believe the best about former 
enemies. Written in Georgian, the English translation is as follows. 
We are peacemakers. We are people of the Caucasus. 
We grieve for the pain of all our pasts. We hope for the promise of all our futures. 
We are men and women, sons and daughters. We remember, but we do not hate. 
We have suffered loss, but we long for reconciliation. 
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We have seen horrors in war, but we hold onto hope in peace. 
We have tasted death, but we want to breathe life. 
We are a proud people, but we are not enemies. 
We want justice, but we offer mercy.  
We belong to the land, but the land does not belong to us. 
We are the future, but we must live it together. 
We are peacemakers. We are people of the Caucasus. 
The choice of Georgian was primarily for the people who would be asked to sign the 
letters, the thousands of IDPs living in despair and poverty throughout Georgia. 
 We made roughly five thousand letters to be signed in Tbilisi, Kutaisi, and 
Zugdidi. Students spoke to their families and neighbors, school friends and work 
colleagues. They visited elderly pensioners, parents, unemployed day laborers, and 
anyone else they knew. They made new connections and expanded their circle of 
influence until all the letters were signed. Almost every person they spoke with signed a 
letter, but few conversations were easy. The students showed what they had learned and 
internalized about conflict resolution, sometimes spending hours talking with people. 
Individuals would invite relatives and neighbors to hear what they were doing, and heated 
discussions often developed, but the students held firmly to their convictions and 
convinced many to join the project.  Daily debriefing sessions allowed the students to 
share their successes as well as struggles, and advice filtered through the groups. My role 
became one of encouragement rather than instruction.  
We made plans to deliver them at the border once all the letters had been 
collected. The students would go to the center of the Inguri bridge separating the conflict 
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zones and deliver the letters to the Abkhaz and Russian soldiers stationed nearby. Some 
had been there before for peace demonstrations, and locals regularly crossed the border to 
buy produce and visit relatives. My own experiences at the border crossing had always 
been uncomplicated, and a local television news crew agreed to cover the event and 
broadcast it throughout the country.  
 The students chose ten representatives to take the letters, three of whom had 
previously been their staunchest opponents (Natia was one of them). Traveling by 
overnight train, they arrived tired but excited to see the fruit of their labors. However, our 
plans began to unravel once we reached the Georgian checkpoint. 
Word of the project had spread to Members of Parliament through several 
professors at the universities, and officials waited for our arrival and confiscated the 
letters. This was a complete surprise to me as I had spoken with the Chair of the 
Department of Conflict Resolution at Tbilisi State University about the project weeks 
before our trip.  
Border personnel refused to allow anyone past, claiming the letters would incite 
violence from the Abkhaz. I tried to show that the letters were signs of goodwill, and that 
as humble, self-constraining messages of peace they would not be construed as 
aggressive. While I had no idea what the soldiers would do with the letters afterwards, I 
assured the Georgian officials that the message would benefit the government’s stated 
position of conflict resolution. I mentioned my conversations with the Abkhaz Foreign 
Ministry, but this only aggravated them more and precipitated the arrival of the regional 
security commander for northern Georgia. He too was unmoved by theoretical reasoning, 
examples of similar efforts in other conflict areas, and even several students’ open 
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weeping. The boxes remained behind the Georgian border and our peacemaking efforts 
looked to be at an end.  
 However, the students decided on one final gamble: I would hide a handful of 
letters in my shirt and deliver them myself; the television crew would not be able to 
accompany me, but they interviewed the students and promised to run the story later that 
day. I had been in Abkhazia before but the Georgian officials tried to stop me from going 
again. Dire warnings aside, my American passport ensured my trip across the bridge one 
more time. I delivered the letters as planned and spent several tense hours being 
interrogated by Abkhaz intelligence officers sent from the capital, only escaping a trip to 
Sokhumi because of the friendship I had struck up with the local soldiers.  
None of us heard any more about the letters, whether the ones confiscated at the 
border or those delivered to the Abkhaz. I had told Abkhaz Deputy Foreign Minister 
Gunjia about the project weeks earlier and I hope they reached him. Whatever their fate 
though, one year later Georgia and Abkhazia were at war and the chances for cross-
community peacemaking disappeared for good.  
 
Conclusion 
 What lessons can be learned from the letter project and can any principles be 
generalized to other conflict areas? Despite its failure to change the course of events in 
the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, this grassroots effort made three valuable contributions to 
the practice of conflict resolution. First, unilateral initiatives can change the giver even if 
the receiver remains unmoved. Very few students initially supported reconciliation and 
forgiveness, and several hated the Abkhaz outright. All of them moved towards 
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peacemaking in the process and committed to carrying on the effort despite the results at 
the Inguri bridge.  
 Initial meetings with participants had two key aspects that made this progress 
possible, but may not always be available in other contexts: 1) the participants were 
students and 2) they had an existing knowledge base for evaluating political decision-
making. The first aspect established a hierarchy between me and the students, one that 
was initially deferential and allowed for easier teaching than if they had been adult 
volunteers with low exit costs. The students had committed to their Georgian professors 
to listen respectfully and try to keep open minds. Their willingness to move beyond 
cognitive dissonance and embrace new ideas was extremely important to building trust 
early in the project. Equally important was the legitimacy I received from the other 
professors; cross-cultural education works best when resident teachers welcome outsiders 
as equals and require that students respect them as native instructors.  
 In addition, the students’ previous studies in political science and conflict 
methodology allowed us to move beyond rudimentary lessons to more complicated tasks 
of analysis and application. This enabled the students to become agents for change in 
their communities once they became convinced of the project’s merits. However, 
unilateral initiatives at the grassroots level take time to diffuse throughout society, 
sometimes taking years to overcome resistance within local groups. Norm entrepreneurs 
are also critically important in the process. Their presence as respected community 
leaders gives them access to critical social network connections enabling them to 
influence widely dispersed members. South Africa, Northern Ireland, Mozambique and 
Sierra Leone left behind decades of violence through the efforts of social leaders 
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committed to the cause of peace and the thousands of individuals working alongside them 
in their local communities. Local Orthodox priests played that role in the letter project. 
Unfortunately the students and priests ran out of time when war broke out one year later. 
The second lesson shows that despite the changes in people’s thinking, education 
was not enough to move all the students down the path of peacemaking. While not 
exclusive to the process, religion played a key part as Christian teachings offered by the 
students and supported by local priests repositioned religion in their understanding of the 
conflict. The most pervasive use of religion in the country has been to connect Orthodox 
Christianity with nationalist political agendas. Utilizing the existing connection between 
religious and ethnic identities to revise political goals occurred at several levels of the 
project, but its most important location was between the students themselves. Over time 
my role became more similar to a “process keeper” in peace circles than the traditional 
professor most students had encountered before. Engaging them in personal ways helped 
to internalize the material, but their interactions with each other carried the greatest 
weight, and interactions with other Georgians outside the classroom revealed the extent 
of their personal transformations. 
 Finally, the unfortunate results at the Ingui bridge show that grassroots 
peacemaking needs the support of government officials to bring about cross-community 
interactions, to say nothing of reconciliation. Despite initial offers of support and tacit 
approval, the Georgian government resisted most efforts conducted outside their stagnant, 
unproductive approaches. I spoke with many long-term peacemakers at all levels of 
conflict resolution, and their views rang through with frustration at the hypocrisy of 
official peace efforts. The government’s unwillingness to engage original solutions 
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outside its control could have resulted from the interplay of complex domestic 
challenges, specifically the rising opposition against Saakashvilli’s administration and his 
stated policy of territorial integration. It may also have resulted from a lack of empathy 
for the Abkhaz. More troubling would have been a hidden agenda to cast off the guise of 
conflict resolution and affect the balance of power militarily, in which case we simply got 
in the way. Or perhaps it was a parochial mentality that was reluctant to welcome new 
actors into the process. In either case, the result brought the country closer to its deadly 
showdown with Russia the following year, and every attempt to build new bridges with 
the Abkhaz failed. 
 However, hope for unilateral peacemaking remains because suffering people 
gained a measure of comfort through the project, and many built new connections and 
meaningful relationships based on the shared goal of peace. The future may look bleak 
for Georgian territorial integrity, but every student expressed their desire to help those 
around them forgive and move on with their lives. In the end, that was all one could hope 
to achieve. 
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Notes 
1 This article focuses on the Abkhaz component of Georgia’s civil war, leaving the South Ossetian 
question for later analysis. The two separatist causes share many similarities, but the goal here is to tell the 
story of a peacemaking effort directed specifically at the Abkhaz. 
2 Georgians usually describe the Abkhaz as opportunists and Russian puppets. More severe descriptions 
include Stalinists, terrorists, and even animals and savages. There is broad acceptance of these views in the 
government, academia, and society at large. The Abkhaz have similar names for the Georgians. Soldiers at 
the border with Georgia shared deep hatred for their neighbors and the United States for supporting them. 
Bank tellers in the Abkhaz capital of Sokhumi had almost visceral reactions when they saw Georgian 
currency, refusing even to touch it (Interviews March-June 2007). 
3 The November 2007 opposition demonstrations revealed a growing weakness in the government’s 
monolithic control. How far that weakness would have extended in the absence of outright war with Russia 
seems less certain. George and Stefes (2008) make a convincing case that Saakashvilli could have 
weathered the storm without fundamentally damaging Georgia’s democratic consolidation. 
4 Russian actions in 2007, specifically shooting down Georgian unmanned aerial vehicles and a helicopter 
attack on Georgian positions in the Kodori Valley, had taken relations in a decidedly negative direction, but 
Letters of Intent 
 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 2 
448  
                                                                                                                                            
the real change occurred when Russia opened official relations with the separatists in April 2008. This step, 
with greater diplomatic significance than the previous issuance of Russian passports to locals, signaled a 
major shift from tacit approval to outright recognition. 
5 President Saakashvilli changed the title of the previous Ministry of Conflict Resolution to the more 
assertive Ministry of Territorial Integration. While such an action escalated the hostile rhetoric, it was by 
no means the catalyst for the war; it can be explained either as playing to nationalist sentiment in the face 
of growing domestic opposition,5 or simply as fulfillment of a campaign promise to restore Georgia’s long-
lost territory. In either case, renaming the ministry did not violate the international agreements governing 
relations between the parties, and the Georgian government even offered full autonomy to the separatists in 
early 2008, granting them a wide range of political and economic rights in a renewed Georgia. Such a 
compromise represented a major step towards reconciliation, but the separatists rejected all proposals that 
included territorial reintegration. 
6 Georgian paramilitary forces advanced out of the Gali region and established a base of operations in 
Kodori. From that position, the Georgian Government of Abkhazia in Exile met and issued proclamations. 
Their position was always precarious and proved indefensible during the Summer War. (Interviews May, 
2007 with members of the Government in Exile) 
7 Regardless of their ulterior motives, Russian military commanders claimed an attack into Abkhazia would 
come in the immediate future (Vignansky 2006; http://www.russiatoday.ru/Top_News/2008-04-17/Build-
up_of_Georgian_troops_on_ Abkhazia_border_ causes_ concern.html; RIA Novosti 8 August, 2008). 
Saakashvilli countered that the Russians and Abkhaz were preparing a breakout across the Inguri River, the 
main border crossing between Abkhazia and Georgia (L’Express 1 September 2008). 
8 Accounts differ as to which side actually started the fighting in South Ossetia, with the Russians claiming 
the Georgian army began shelling Ossetian villages in the early hours of August 8th, while the Georgians 
counter that Russia invaded their sovereign territory and theirs was only a response to aggression 
(Pladysheva 2008; Dulian  2008). This article does not focus specifically on the causes of the war, rather 
seeing them as the part of the larger context of fear, violence, and bitterness between the Abkhaz and 
Georgian people. See “Restoring Georgian Sovereignty, Redux,” Foreign Policy Journal, August, 2009 for 
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more details on the war’s causes.  
9 This is the subject of a forthcoming article on quasi-statehood and international aid as rents. 
10 See Theissen (2004) for an excellent review of the roles various conflict resolution actors play in 
transforming conflict mentalities at the systemic, national, and local levels. Accordingly, the basic premise 
that reconciliation requires some measure of honest confession and forgiveness is born out through 
empirical evidence in numerous cases, the most noted being South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. While this statement does not preclude other options for reaching reconciliation, it does assert 
the broad value of confession and forgiveness in peacemaking. 
11 Mitchell (2005) offers a solid treatment of steps and obstacles involved in choosing to take the risk of 
signaling benign intent, specifically the need to interpret signals accurately and how third-party 
practitioners can provide valuable information for those perceptions.  
12 A fundamental problem is determining the relative strength of the parties and who makes the decision. 
Perceptions of one’s own capabilities can be as mistaken as those made about the Other (Francis, 2004).  
13 The same can be said for full-fledged democracies or pseudo-democracies that maintain the façade of 
democratic ideals but whose use of power and its concentration remain outside the electorate’s control. See 
Diamond (2002) and Lynch (2005) for classifications on regime types and examples of each. 
14 These were especially important during the early 1990’since many Abkhaz and Georgian elites had 
worked together during the Soviet period. The first civil war shaped those interactions, usually in negative 
ways, but cooperation increased over time under the Shevardnadze government. However, the 2003 Rose 
Revolution brought new characters to the Georgian side which made a priori empathy less likely. The 
challenge for the Abkhaz was deciphering Saakashvilli’s intentions: he offered broad autonomy to the 
formerly separatist region of Ajaria but was more ambiguous about how he intended to deal with Abkhazia. 
15 Self-selection for participation need not bias the results; Rossi looks at people who are trying to make 
peace, but need help getting there. 
16 Tipping points are notoriously difficult to define a priori, but this article does not seek to predict their 
occurrence, instead showing when they occurred in the letter project described later. 
17 Kelleher and Johnson do not discuss the reasons local peace correlated to national peace in Northern 
Letters of Intent 
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Ireland but had limited impact on Sudan’s government. It is sufficient for this article to focus on the 
grassroots effects. 
18 There were several UN and NGO programs already in place (with a long history of student-student 
interactions), and my goal was not to duplicate successful programs, rather to find new avenues for 
communication and cooperation. 
19 While not a perfect match to cross-community conflict, the easy application of basic principles to their 
lives allowed them to appreciated more complex measures in larger contexts. 
20 Religion was by no means sufficient in this process, but its necessary role was very clear to me 
throughout my time there. 
 
